

THE MAKING OF MODERN

China

A Short History

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BY
OWEN AND ELEANOR LATTIMORE

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For
DAVID



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Preface

CHINA is one of the most important countries in the world today, and in many ways may turn out to be the most important country for the next hundred years. About half the people in the world live in Asia, and of that half, about half are Chinese. Hardly any of the other people in Asia rule themselves. The Chinese do rule themselves. For this reason alone, what the Chinese do and what happens to them are important to everybody. If things go well with China, they will go well with Asia. If they go badly with China, they will go badly with Asia. At the end of a world war it will matter a great deal whether things go well or badly with half the people in the world.

We have written this book because we are Americans who have lived a great part of our lives in China. We have tried to make the book simple and straightforward. If you are not simple and straightforward you are bound to get lost in the description, history, and politics of a country as big as the United States and many, many times older. We have tried equally hard not to be superficial. You cannot understand a country just by description, unless the description gives you material for thought. We have tried to give the facts in this book in such a way that readers can do their own thinking about the facts.

We have used no footnotes or references. Many ideas,

themes, and actual sentences come out of books or printed lectures by one or the other of us. The source we have drawn on most heavily is "Inner Asian Frontiers of China," by Owen Lattimore, published in two editions by the American Geographical Society of New York and the Oxford University Press, and we thank both publishers for the courtesy of allowing us to use this material without footnote references.

We have made no fuss about things like dates and names. Some of the dates of ancient Chinese history are open to discussion, but we have just used the dates that are conventionally accepted. We have also used the simplest conventional forms for writing names of places and people. We do use two names for one place—the city of Peking, or Peiping, because Peking was the name used up to 1928, and Peiping after that.

The maps showing the spread of Chinese culture, the Han and Roman empires, and the Tang and Sung empires are adapted from sketches by Henry C. Fenn, *A Syllabus of the History of Chinese Civilization and Culture* by L. C. Goodrich and H. C. Fenn, published by the China Society of America. The chronological chart on pages 124–125 was also based to some extent on a chart by Mr. Fenn, to whom we are most grateful.

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PART ONE

The Land and the People

CHAPTER I

Where Is China and What Does It Look Like?

CHINA, like the United States, is a huge land mass. In size and even in shape the two countries are roughly the same. They lie at about the same distance between the North Pole and the Equator and they have many similarities in climate and vegetation. Siberia stretches to the north of China much as Canada lies to the north of the United States, and on the south and southwest of China, French Indo-China and Burma correspond roughly to Mexico. Peiping stands almost exactly on latitude forty north while New York stands just a little above it. From Peiping to China's westernmost frontiers is about as far as it is from New York to Oregon. Just as our New England states reach up far to the east and north of New York, so China's northeastern provinces, known to us as Manchuria, extend about 1,500 miles to the northeast of Peiping.

NORTH AND SOUTH

China's climate, like ours, is cold in the north, hot in the south, and temperate in between, with much the same seasonal changes. In the northeastern provinces there are for-

ests like those of Minnesota or Maine, while in the western part of the same provinces there are vast wheat fields like those of the Dakotas. In Mongolia and the northwest provinces there are deserts that look much like ours in Arizona and New Mexico, although they have no cactus because their climate is more like that of the butte country in Wyoming. Rising abruptly from the flat plain of Peiping, the bare yellow hills and little groves of trees look much like a landscape in northern California. The Yangtze valley is green and fertile like the Carolinas. Farther south, China is as semitropical as Florida, while Yunnan has the flowers and fruits and sunshine of southern California.

These resemblances of landscape, however, do not always exist in corresponding locations in the two countries. Our greatest waterway, the Mississippi, runs from north to south, while the Yangtze runs from west to east. The Yangtze is in some ways even more important than the Mississippi; ocean-going steamers can navigate it for 600 miles to the great inland port of Hankow.

South China has more rain than our South and the country is therefore greener, with rice as the principal crop.

North China, except for a summer rainy season, is a good deal drier than our North, and the landscape is more brown and yellow. Wheat, millet, and corn grow in the North, together with all the fruits and vegetables that we know in New England.

These differences are due to the monsoon seasons, which rule the climate in a great part of Asia. During the wet monsoon, in the spring and summer, the prevailing winds blow landward from the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific and the clouds they bring with them break into rain when they strike the land masses. During the dry monsoon, in the fall and winter, the prevailing winds blow from the

land toward the ocean, and there is little rain or snow except where mountain ranges cause peculiar local conditions.

If you look at the map you will see that the coast of China bulges eastward in a great curve. This explains the difference in climate between South and North China. In South China the wet monsoon winds blow against the coast and consequently the rainfall is dependable; but in the north they blow along past the coast, the clouds turn inland rather irregularly, and consequently the rainfall is irregular. Except where they can count on irrigation, therefore, the farmers of North China must cultivate crops that can stand a good deal of dry weather. In North China there is a really good crop only about once in three or four years, when the rain comes in just the right quantity at the right time. In other years there may be scanty crops or even famine when there is not enough rain, or at the other extreme there may be floods when torrential rains are concentrated in a short period of time.

In South China, more rain and more warmth make possible a growing season of from six to nine months. Farmers can count on two crops a year; three crops are not uncommon, and in some favored localities, like the mountain-enclosed basin of Szechwan, there is no day in the year when some crop is not either ripening or just sending green shoots above the earth. In North China, less rain and more cold allow a growing season of only four to six months; one main crop is all the average farmer can count on, with two crops for favored localities.

Regular rainfall also explains the rich natural growth of trees in South China, where most of the country in ancient times was covered with forest. Great virgin forests are now found only in the remote and thinly settled region of the southwest provinces, where mountains and poor communi-

cations have made it unprofitable either to cut and fell timber or to grow and export grain. In all the more accessible parts of South China the forests have been cut off and the hillsides terraced to grow rice. In most of North China there probably never was heavy forest, even in ancient times, partly because of scant rainfall and partly because of the nature of the soil. In the northeastern provinces, however, especially near the Siberian frontier where the climate is related to that of Siberia and not to the monsoon seasons, there are remnants of great and noble ancient forests.

CHINA'S PROVINCES

The provinces of China correspond to the American states. There are twenty-eight provinces, not counting Outer Mongolia and Tibet which, though technically part of China, have certain claims to autonomy.

The expression "China proper," which is quite often heard, applies to the eighteen provinces that lie south of the Great Wall. In these provinces the overwhelming majority of the people are Chinese and have been Chinese for many centuries, except in two provinces of the extreme Southwest.

The remaining ten provinces stretch in a great band between the Great Wall and the Siberian frontier. They reach from the Pacific in the east to the huge mountain ranges which in the west divide China from India, and include the three provinces of what we call Manchuria, the four of Inner Mongolia, two carved from the eastern side of Tibet, and Sinkiang or Chinese Turkistan. Intermittently, during the long history of the empire, these provinces have formed its outlying sections, and except for Manchuria they have been peopled largely by non-Chinese races.

Chinese resent, and quite rightly, our speaking of their

northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungchiang as "Manchuria," as though they were a separate country and in some way politically distinct from the China that lies south of the Great Wall. At the time of the Japanese occupation Manchuria was as much an integral part of China as any other part, and will be again. The name "Manchuria" was never used by the Chinese, or even by the Manchus. The Japanese now call these three provinces "Manchukuo," as a way of accentuating the claim that they are not an integral part of China. Since calling them "Manchuria" makes it seem to the Chinese that we are upholding this Japanese claim, we shall make a special point of referring to these three northeastern provinces of China not as "Manchuria" but as "Northeast China"—or "the Northeast," a literal translation of the Chinese name "Tungpei."

The opening of modern communication by road, rail, and air, and the development of mines and other sources of industrial raw materials will soon add tremendously to the importance of the marginal provinces of China and the great outer territories of Tibet and Outer Mongolia. All of these territories taken together cover an area a good deal larger than the eighteen provinces of China proper and almost as large as the United States, but their population amounts to only about ten per cent of China's total population of 450,000,000 or more.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION


The ninety per cent of the population who live within what we call "China proper" are more concentrated toward the east and more thinly distributed toward the western hinterland. The thinly populated China of the Northwest,

the West, and the Southwest actually has thousands and thousands of square miles where people could live as they do in parts of Europe and parts of the United States—under a mixed system of dirt farming, dairy farming, fruit raising, lumbering, and small-scale mechanized industry using the power of either water or steam. People have never lived in this way in China simply because of the overwhelming concentration in the eastern areas where irrigation made it possible for millions and millions of people to live by a particular kind of farming without mechanization.

With the rapid increase in mechanization and in transportation facilities it seems a certainty that the future of China will see a geographical shift westward both of the center of gravity of population and the center of gravity of industry. This will completely change both the age-old geographical balance between the border regions and the central territory of China, and the age-old population problem of the multitudes of Chinese who live in the area of intensive irrigated agriculture.

SEA BARRIER AND LAND BARRIER

This brings us to the most marked and obvious difference between the geography of China and that of the United States. Instead of living between two vast oceans like the Americans, the Chinese have on their west a deep barrier of desert and mountain ranges. America was discovered, colonized, developed, and industrialized in the period of about 400 odd years following the great ocean voyages and discoveries of men like Columbus and Magellan—the men who opened such wide doors leading out of Europe that the history of Europe became the history of the world. Con-



Map of the United States Superimposed on the Map of China in Corresponding Latitudes

sequently we Americans, although we are a land people with 3,000 miles of solid land from east to west and about 1,500 from north to south, are also a people who think of the ocean when we turn to foreign lands. The Chinese are different from us because for them the age of ocean voyages is not the whole of history but only the last chapter. During all but the last two of China's thirty centuries her ocean frontier has been a more complete barrier to foreign intercourse than her land frontier.

The art of sailing was never highly developed by the Chinese, and while their navigators made a few voyages as far as Arabia and Africa they did not as a rule push into the ocean and go where they pleased. They kept fairly close to land and depended in the main on the regularity of the monsoon winds, blowing for six months from southwest to northeast and six months from northeast to southwest. European navigators, and later Americans, whose ability to sail against or across the wind made them independent of seasonal winds, first made China open to either trade or invasion along the whole sea coast. But this did not happen until after the voyage of Magellan in 1520. In the seventeenth century England began her trade with Canton through the East India Company, and toward the end of the eighteenth century American ships began to sail from New England to China around Cape Horn. Only after the development of the port of San Francisco in 1849 did ships begin sailing regularly from our Pacific Coast direct to China.

China's chief intercourse with the rest of the world, therefore, was by land across her western borders until comparatively recent times. The land approaches to the Near and Middle East have been in use from remote antiquity. When the Roman Empire reached the height of its development

under the line of emperors founded by Julius Caesar about 2,000 years ago, the civilization of China, under the Han Empire, was quite as mature and sophisticated, and while these two empires were separated from each other by vast mountain ranges and waterless deserts there was an appreciable exchange both of things and of ideas. The silks, furs, rhubarb, and cinnamon of China reached markets in India, Arabia and the Roman Empire, and to China in return came ivory, tortoise shell, precious stones, horses of fine Central Asian breeds, and asbestos. Chinese caravans did not travel all the way to Rome, but made shorter journeys to oases in the Central Asian desert where they exchanged their wares with intermediate traders who had bought cargoes from other caravans coming from the west.

Ideas also traveled. Foreign influences in Chinese art can be traced from the ages of stone and bronze. Buddhism was introduced from India in the first century A. D. Moham-medanism also found its way into China, both by land routes and sea routes. Yet all this time, probably no lady of ancient Rome who wore fine silk from China ever saw a Chinese; very few Chinese Buddhists ever saw an Indian, and rarely did a Chinese Mohammedan see an Arab. Nor did any of the ancient conquerors—neither Alexander the Great, nor the kings of ancient Persia, nor Arab caliphs, nor powerful Indian potentates—carry their arms as far as China across the Central Asian desert or the Pamirs or Himalayas. China was not entirely cut off from the rest of the world, but it was remote and detached.

In the nineteenth century, when steam succeeded sail, the nations who were masters of the seas broke down that isolation. Today, in the stress of war, the sea approaches to China have been again cut off; but at the same time new approaches have been opened by land and air, from Central Asia and

from the far southwest. In the next chapter of history, China will be open all around, from the land as well as from the sea; for the times in which we are now living no longer respect the isolation of China or of any other country.

CHAPTER II

Who Are the Chinese?

OF EVERY five persons in the world, one is Chinese. What are these people like who form so large a portion of the human race? Many writers and travelers from China have tried to make us believe that the Chinese are just about as different from us as human beings could be. Missionaries have emphasized their heathenness so as to convince us that missions are a fine idea. Writers have described them as backward, exotic, mysterious and unfathomable, even sinister, because quaint picturesque people make travel books less dull. The Chinese language is difficult for westerners, and the fact that few of us have been able to talk freely with Chinese or read their literature has helped to make them seem difficult to understand.

The truth is, however, that they are much more like us than we have been led to suppose, certainly much more like us than the Japanese, or even than the average Latin. The Chinese are creatures of their environment, of course, just as we are, but with a little acquaintance and study both the environment and the people are not difficult to understand.

It is as hard to describe a typical Chinese as it is a typical Englishman. Would you choose a London Cockney, an Ox-

ford scholar, a country squire, or a "man about town"? There are as many typical Chinese as there are typical Britishers. But one thing it is safe to say—the exotic and inscrutable Chinese depicted in American fiction is no more true to life than the la-di-da Englishman with an exaggerated Oxford accent so popular in our plays and stories.

There are a few characteristics, however, which most people who know the Chinese will agree are typical.

WHAT ARE CHINESE LIKE?

The typical Chinese is honest. Foreigners coming to China for a short time sometimes question this and fret about the Chinese practice of "squeeze," which seems dishonest according to American custom. This judgment, however, is based on lack of understanding of this Chinese custom. Chinese who buy groceries, collect taxes, and do many other forms of business for others, large and small, are by common consent entitled to keep for themselves a small percentage of the money passing through their hands. This is a recognized practice, like brokerage, and therefore not actually dishonest. It is only when the percentage becomes unduly large that squeeze can be classed as corruption.

Foreigners, on the other hand, are often amazed to discover that in China a man's word is really as good as his bond. Many large deals are made and contracts let without any written document, and it is just as much the custom in China to live up to these verbal agreements as it is the custom in America to live up to a written contract—though of course, in China as in America, there are men who will wriggle out of any contract.

Men who laugh at the same things are not apt to misun-

derstand each other. The typical Chinese has a very keen sense of humor and one much nearer to the American sense of humor than that of many other peoples.

Chinese, like Americans, relish mother-in-law jokes. They also have "Scotch" jokes, which are told about the people of Shansi province. Nor is China lacking in stories which are the equivalent of the one about the traveling man and the farmer's daughter. Not only is Chinese humor a good deal like American humor, but Chinese good-humoredness is also much like American good-humoredness. The jolly, perspiring, jostling crowd that gathers at a Chinese country fair is in many ways the Chinese equivalent of a Coney Island crowd. At a big fair, the crowd is apt to be especially thick around the jugglers, acrobats, and tight-rope walkers, and these spectators of the physical exertions of others are the Chinese counterpart of the bleachers crowd at a baseball game. The fair indeed gives opportunities for shopping, but it is also a holiday occasion for the people from all around.

The typical Chinese is in many ways more "civilized" than we are. He does not admire directness and frankness the way we do. In fact, he thinks these characteristics are rather barbarian and unsubtle. He is more tactful, his chief concern being to make the other fellow feel comfortable, to give him "face" rather than to tell the truth. This comes from thousands of years of having to get along with each other, often in crowded, and uncomfortable surroundings. And this is one reason why we like the Chinese. They know better than any people on earth how to make the awkward foreigner feel comfortable and happy. For subtle flattery is often more pleasant than the truth. Foreigners, however, occasionally find this tactfulness exaggerated and the emphasis on face irritating and uncomprehensible.

The typical Chinese is naturally democratic, and in this he is as much like most Americans as he is unlike most Japanese. In the Japanese language there are whole separate vocabularies for ordering servants about, for keeping your wife in her place as a subordinate being, or for showing a ceremonial obsequiousness to your social superiors. The Chinese are not like this. They have ceremonial ways of saying things, but they use these formalities on occasions when it is polite for each man to act as if the other were well-educated, financially well-off, and socially important—regardless of whether either of them actually is all these things. But as soon as the ice is broken, Chinese like to be easy and informal with each other, much like Americans. Above all, no matter how poor, badly dressed, or uneducated a Chinese is, you must, when you first speak to him, show your respect for him as an independent human being. To treat him brusquely as "one of the lower classes" is bad-mannered and is regarded as showing that you yourself are ill-bred. A further Chinese characteristic is that anybody will pick up a casual conversation with a boatman, rickshaw puller, or mule-cart driver in the same friendly way that Americans talk with taxi drivers. They feel that the act of paying money for personal services is made more civilized by friendly conversation.

Most people think of the Chinese as being more philosophical than Americans. This is a characteristic that is partly true. In the old China, everything was pretty well settled. The life story of the average man was something that had been repeating itself for centuries. There was very little reason for supposing that the world as a whole was going to get noticeably better in the next few years. It was pretty obvious that very few poor men got rich quickly, while anyone who looked around him could see that it was

quite common for people who were fairly well off to meet sudden disaster in the way of flood or famine or disease. All of this tended to encourage a philosophical acceptance of fate, and even to make successful people feel that their success was due as much to luck as to merit.

Americans are different in this respect, because we are still a young people in a new country. According to our tradition, there is always another opportunity around the corner; even if what you are doing now turns out to be a failure, you are as likely to get another chance as the next man is. Chinese philosophicalness is changing, however. The things that are happening in modern China affect the whole people and go far beyond the good luck or bad luck of individuals. The horizon of the future promises far more than a mere repetition of the past; it is crowded with new prospects and new opportunities. Accordingly, it is not at all surprising to find that younger Chinese are much less philosophical and fatalistic than their parents, and more like Americans—restless, eager, experimental, ready to assert that what you do for yourself counts more than what happens to you.

WHERE DO THE CHINESE LIVE?

There is no accurate census of the population of China. The most generally accepted estimate is 450,000,000, but the true number may be nearer to 500,000,000. This enormous population is very unevenly distributed. Even if we exclude regions like Mongolia, Tibet, and the Central Asian province of Sinkiang, one third of the area of China contains no less than six sevenths of the people. This area of dense population is in the east, in the lower valleys of

the Yellow River, the Yangtze, and the rice-growing areas south of the Yangtze.

The general rule is that wherever irrigation is possible the land is watered and cultivated with minute care in small plots which resemble market gardens more than they do the normal American farm. There is also a relationship between cities and farming that is quite different from that in America. In China, the biggest cities do not stand apart from the most important farming regions, but right in the middle of them. This is not only because the farms feed the cities. It is also because the most important fertilizer is human excrement—known throughout the Orient as night soil. Instead of being disposed of through sewage systems, this fertilizer is collected and sold to the farmers near the cities. A large Chinese city, seen from the air, is surrounded by concentric circles of different shades of green. The densest growth and the darkest green is nearest the city, where the fertilizer is most plentiful and cheap. The crop yield per acre diminishes in mathematical proportion to the distance from the source of fertilizer in the city.

More than eighty per cent of the Chinese people are farmers, and the typical farmer does not live in a house in the middle of his own land, like the American farmer, but in a village. A city in the densely populated part of China is therefore not surrounded by residential suburbs, but by clusters of villages.

PEASANTS AND SCHOLAR-GENTRY

Before the war there were two types of Chinese who might be called representative of the people as a whole. They are still the two most important types, but their importance

relative to each other is changing. In fact, this changing relative importance epitomizes the Chinese Revolution and the emergence of the new China out of the old China. One of these types is the peasant, the other is the scholar-gentleman.

Judged numerically, since four fifths of the people live by farming, the typical or average Chinese is a peasant—just the kind of simple, honest, limited, but shrewd and likeable peasant we have come to know through “*The Good Earth*” and other books by Pearl Buck. As communities, Chinese peasants are people who know how to work together with little apparent leadership. As individuals, they are men who go ahead rapidly when not too much restricted by the peculiar combination of paternalism and oppression characteristic of the traditional Chinese form of government.

Both the paternalism and the oppression trace back to the scholar-gentry, or landlord class. These are the typical Chinese that Lin Yutang had chiefly in mind when he wrote “*My Country and My People*.” From the landlord’s families came the scholars whose long fingernails were the proof that they did no physical work, and who combined the grossest corruption (particularly as officials appropriating squeeze from state revenues) with the most delicate artistic refinement and the most subtle training of the intellect. The power of the landlords rested on the fact that grain, accumulated and stored, was until very recently the standard of real wealth. This made the landlords more powerful than the merchants, because the landlords actually controlled agriculture. In fact, merchants were often merely the agents of landlords.

Almost all of the officials, the “mandarins,” came from the scholar-gentry class. It is true that according to law the way to appointment as an official was through the

public examinations, for which anybody could enter; but since the knowledge of literature and philosophy required for these examinations demanded years of study, the sons of landlords, who did not have to work in the fields and could study at home with private tutors, had an immeasurable advantage over the sons of peasants. Accordingly, while men of peasant birth did occasionally rise to high official rank, the vast majority of mandarins were sons of families which produced a regular crop of candidates for the examinations, generation after generation. There was indeed a traditional law preventing a mandarin from holding office in his own province, where his family connections might be too influential; but this did not prevent a mandarin from dealing mildly with the scholar-gentry landlords in the province to which he was appointed, since after all they were "his own kind of people."

As the mounting insistence of the western nations in the nineteenth century forced China to open her territory to foreigners, a new process began which has meant the gradual destruction of the old way of life. The westerners introduced many new kinds of wealth and power, but these were welcomed least by those who already had the most power and the most wealth under the old order. The mandarins, accordingly, withstood the west as long as they could. The first signs of conversion came not from the mandarins but from the middleman-merchants, who were able to serve the foreigners as brokers if that service offered them more profit than their old function as the agents of the scholar-gentry. Since, however, some of these merchants also had a footing among the scholar-gentry, the process of conversion spread in time among the families that for centuries had provided China's landlords and mandarins.

Today, China is dominated by the families that have

diversified their activities; they continue to hold large landed properties, but at the same time are active in trade, industry, and banking. The artisan class is being rapidly converted into an industrial proletariat, divorced from the villages and the peasant family standard. The last to be affected have been the peasants. This makes the fate of the peasant decisive for the nation. If he is to be held down to the old way of life while the rest of the nation changes, then China will become a vast Japan, with an industrial development high in certain activities but uneven as a whole, and with a disastrous and widening gap, as in Japan, between the mechanical progress of the factories and the human-labor standard of the farm. Either the peasant must be liberated and granted equal rights to progress with the rest of the nation or else the overproduction of human labor on the farm, under serflike conditions, will drag down the wages and standards of factory labor and undermine the whole national economy—again, as in Japan.

WHERE DO THE CHINESE COME FROM?

However much we may consider people, individuals or nations, as products of their recent environment, it remains a fact that in attempting to understand them the question "Where do they come from?" is pertinent. The answer, with respect to the Chinese, must be sought among prehistoric records. The Peking Man is the first Chinese we know anything about. He lived in North China about 500,000 years ago, and studies of his remains, particularly of skulls and teeth, have led anthropologists to believe that he is the remote ancestor of the people who inhabit North China today. These remains, which were dug up in the country

near Peking in 1927, were relics of the most ancient and primitive human beings of whom we have more than one skull or part of a skull.

If you find only one skull in one place, as in the case of the Neanderthal Man or the Piltdown Man, you are not absolutely sure how far the individual was typical and how far he may have been peculiar. In the case of the Peking Man we have a whole group of skulls—some men, some women, some young, some old. We therefore have an idea of their type as a group, and some idea of the changes of growth from youth to age. Moreover, study of the skulls, and especially of the teeth, suggests that as far as the Peking Man can be considered related to any living human type, he is related to the present living North China type. This is our oldest evidence—even though it is part guess, part fact—of the dramatic continuity in time from thousands of years B.C. to the present day, and continuity of evolution in the same geographical area.

The Peking Man belonged to the Old Stone Age. He kept fire going in a cave and used rough stones as tools. The difference between the Old Stone Age and the Neolithic or New Stone Age is that Neolithic people knew how to grind and polish a sharp cutting edge on their tools made of chipped stone. We have a great deal of evidence that Neolithic people were widely scattered over China. Some of them lived by hunting, fishing, and gathering many kinds of food—fruit, nuts, berries, edible roots, and the seeds of wild grasses. Others, in North China, knew how to cultivate millet; probably, in South China, rice was already cultivated in the Neolithic Age. The dog and the pig were the first animals domesticated; later, sheep, cattle, and horses were also domesticated. The Neolithic people used stone knives and axes, spears, and bows and arrows. They wove baskets

and cloth, and they made a great deal of pottery, some of it on the potter's wheel and some of it very beautiful.

Before 3000 B.C. the area around the great bend of the Yellow River became one of the most important centers of Neolithic culture. Probably the soft loess soil of this region was a help to cultural progress, because it is easily worked with crude primitive tools, making possible more food, larger communities, and a more rapid development of social organization. Probably irrigation was also practiced in this region, by digging ditches in the soft loess.

CHINESE EXPANSION



We can say with certainty that this Yellow River culture was not just pre-Chinese, but was in fact the early Chinese civilization. Gradually it spread eastward into the coastal plain and southward toward the Yangtze, taking over other early Neolithic settlements and making them Chinese. From settlements they became states. On the Yangtze other states grew up which challenged the supremacy of the northern states. Below the Yangtze the wilderness of mountain and subtropical jungle was penetrated more slowly, but gradually its aboriginal tribes began to be absorbed, or partially absorbed. Eventually the Chinese spread all the way to the edges of the Mongolian and Central Asian deserts, the Tibetan highlands, and the frontiers of Burma and Indo-China.

The way in which the Chinese people grew and spread explains why they are so homogeneous. There is no other group in the world that combines, as the Chinese do, vast numbers and a high degree of both physical and cultural uniformity. This is explained by a Chinese attitude for which Confucius found a formula many centuries ago:

"Let those who wear the costume of the barbarians be barbarians; those who wear the costume of the Chinese, be Chinese." In other words, if you want to act like a barbarian you will be treated like a barbarian; if you want to act like a Chinese, you will be accepted as a Chinese. The Chinese have been spreading out for thousands of years to occupy the vast territory which is now China; but in any one region, at any one time, the rate of migration was rather slow. Of course the process was accompanied by war and slaughter, of which there are many echoes in Chinese romance and legend; but it seems always to have been the rule that either a group or an individual willing to speak the Chinese language, dress like the Chinese, and farm like the Chinese would be accepted as Chinese without discrimination.


At the beginning of the Manchu dynasty three centuries ago the Chinese were still chiefly confined to China proper. During the last three hundred years they have found their way into many regions. They poured into Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. They settled in Formosa and Korea. They went as laborers to Australia and New Zealand, to Japan, to Hawaii, Canada, South America, Mexico, and the United States. Very few reached Europe. In Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Siam, the Philippines, and Netherlands India, where the Chinese first went as laborers, they rapidly developed also a prosperous and influential class of merchants, bankers, and industrialists.

Except for the northern Chinese who migrated to Manchuria and Mongolia, most Chinese who have gone abroad have been from the two provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung. And while their total number would amount to only about one per cent of China's population, they have sent home considerable wealth and many new ideas and have



The Spread of
the Chinese

- A. 8th Century B.C.
- B. 400 B.C.
- C. 100 B.C.



played a big part in the modernization of China. Sun Yat-sen for instance, who lived abroad much of his life, in Hawaii and elsewhere, and received a western education, returned to China to play a larger part in history, than any other Chinese of modern times.

CHAPTER III

Border Lands

ONE OF the master keys to Chinese history is an understanding of the balance of power between China and the "barbarians" of the outlying regions.

Between the Pacific Ocean and the Pamir plateau and curving southward from the Pamirs into the bleak highlands that divide China from India, lie the Northeastern Provinces, Mongolia, Chinese Turkistan, and Tibet. These are the Inner Asian barrier lands, one of the least known frontiers in the world, which limit the geography and history of China on one side as the sea limits them on the other.

The Great Wall, for a score of centuries the most colossal tide mark of the human race, stands as the symbol of this entire frontier. It runs from the sea westward into the deserts of Central Asia for a distance about as great as from New York City to the Rockies. Parts of the Great Wall were built by several ancient Chinese kingdoms. In the third century B.C. the Chin emperor Shih Huang Ti, the first imperial unifier of China, joined these local walls into a complete national walled frontier. Later the walled frontier was modified more than once by succeeding dynasties.

The idea of the Great Wall was to divide the settled Chi-

nese people from the nomad shepherd peoples. Actually, however, the Great Wall never worked very satisfactorily as a sharp dividing line. If you went far enough north of the wall you came to people who were only shepherds; if you went far enough south you came to people who were only farmers. But the region of the wall itself stubbornly insisted on remaining a region, not a line of cleavage—a region in which some people were herdsmen and some farmers. Because they combined two ways of life these people were pulled two ways in their political allegiance. Sometimes they came under the control of the nomads; at other times they were under the control of agricultural China. The real political frontier, accordingly, often lay either to the north or to the south of the Great Wall.

MONGOLIA—HORSEMEN AND SHEPHERDS

Directly to the north of the Great Wall lies the main expanse of the grassy steppes of Mongolia. What makes Mongolia important in the history of China and Inner Asia is the natural scope of movement of nomad peoples. In a nomad society there can never be as many people to the square mile as in a farming society. On the other hand, when war or politics make it necessary, nomads can gather together from great distances more readily than farmers. Hence in the wars of the past between wandering peoples and settled peoples, the nomads normally had the advantage of sudden and concentrated impact.

From ancient times the sheep rather than the horse has fixed the character of Mongol life. What the runnel of irrigation water is to the Chinese farmer, the sheep is to the Mongol. The Mongol lives because he knows how to keep sheep alive—how to find the right pastures for them in

all seasons and how to find shelter for them in the winter and spring storms. The sheep supplies food, wool and pelts for clothing, wool for making the felts to cover the round Mongol tents, and dung to be burned as fuel. Food, clothing, housing and fuel are all the basic necessities; and any surplus of the flock provides goods for trading.

In China as in other settled countries, nomad conquerors and the garrisons they brought with them were always "absorbed" simply because they relinquished the source of their strength, which was mobility, by becoming sedentary. On the other hand, when nomads were defeated and driven away from the frontiers of "civilization," this very defeat normally led to a renewal of the strength of nomadism, for the nomads were thrown back completely on the pure techniques of herding and mobility which gave them strength.

Moreover, while nomads were from time to time absorbed among the settled people, there were also many settled people who became converted into nomads. These included farmers along the frontier, merchants who traveled among the nomads, and prisoners of war. In the upshot, the conflict between the tilled lands and the pasture lands always renewed itself because each kind of society was capable of recovering vitality even after severe defeat.

"Westernization"—especially such manifestations of it as the railroad, the factory, and modern firearms—has been having in our own time as revolutionary an effect on the old Mongolia as on the old China. Both of the old cultures are being in part destroyed; but the industrial economy is also making possible a bridge between the two kinds of society that could never be built in the past centuries of ebb and flow between the steppe and the land of rivers in agricultural China. Just as the modern economy in America links

together the rancher of the West, the farmer of the Middle West, and the mines and industrial cities that are found in all parts of the country, so in Asia the "extensive" culture and economy of the nomad and the "intensive" culture and economy of settled China can be integrated together in a new, inclusive, and modern society.

NORTHEAST CHINA—HERDSMEN, FARMERS, AND FOREST WANDERERS

To the east of Mongolia three kinds of country, three kinds of people, three ways of life were for centuries in contact with each other in the Northeastern Provinces of China.

In the south of this territory there is an open country extending in a horseshoe arch from the eastern end of the Great Wall to the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula. Here the natural conditions favor exactly the same kind of farming that is typical of North China, and consequently the region has been homogeneous with North China in population and culture for at least 2,000 years.

To the east and far to the north of this open country lies a different landscape, with hills and fairly high mountains, anciently covered with a heavy growth of forest, where even today there are still large stands of timber. This land was for centuries the stronghold of nomads who differed both from the Chinese and the Mongols. They had a little agriculture, which linked them to the Chinese; but cultivation, especially in the more primitive periods, was largely the work of women. The men hunted and fished. These people also domesticated animals, which linked them with the Mongols; but whereas the herds of the Mongols meant both sustenance and mobility, the forest nomads kept their animals chiefly

for mobility—reindeer in the mountains, and dogs for pulling sleds in the lowlands and on the frozen rivers in winter. They also used skis and snowshoes, and in summer for travel and fishing they made canoes both of birchbark and of hollow logs. A few pathetic remnants of these ancient tribes can still be found, looking somewhat like specimens that have come to life and escaped from a museum.

Even in ancient times these peoples, because of their diversity, were always a collection of tribes rather than a nation. Sometimes, however, they united in political confederations. The latest of these was the Manchu confederation, which ranged from tribes that had become so civilized that they were almost Chinese to tribes far away on the edge of Siberia, skin-clad herders of reindeer and drivers of dogsleds. The name "Manchu" which the tribe adopted was a political invention, and was first used only a few years before the Manchu conquest of China in 1644.

In the west of the Northeastern Provinces there is a wide land of steppe and pasture. Its people are largely Mongol but their history is not strictly Mongol. On the west, throughout the alternations of many centuries, they have participated in Mongol history; on the south, in Chinese history; and on the east in the history of the forest nomads.

The influence of the western world broke into China's Northeastern Provinces not only from Russia on the north and Japan on the ocean side, but also from China itself. Railways from China greatly increased the depth to which the Chinese could penetrate northward from the Gulf of Liaotung and then westward into the pastoral regions and eastward into the forest regions. The Chinese colonists who flooded in by the millions were partly the exponents of the twentieth century, partly its victims. They had railways, machinery, and firearms, but China as a whole was limited

in freedom to make use of modern advantages by an international treaty system which gave political privileges, military ascendancy, and a large degree of economic control to a number of foreign countries.

The Japanese, as the result of successful wars first against the decaying Manchu Empire in China and then against the decaying Tsarist Empire in Russia, had more privileges in Northeast China than any other country. They had, so to speak, harnessed the Chinese with treaty clauses. Every time that the Chinese made a step forward the Japanese, making use of these clauses, tried to convert the progress to Japan's benefit and to establish their interests more deeply within Chinese territory and more firmly within the structure of the Chinese nation.

In fact, it was Japanese insistence that the Chinese should not only be harnessed, but docile in harness, which began the present war. In 1931 the Japanese invaded Northeast China in order to teach the Chinese docility. When Japanese occupation of the Northeast failed to overawe the rest of China, the Japanese attempted another "lesson" in 1937, and the final struggle began.

TURKISTAN—OASES AND DESERTS IN THE HEART OF ASIA

Westward from Mongolia and northwestward from China, the steppes of the nomads thin out into deserts where no herds can be grazed. On the western side these deserts run at last up to the foot of the highest mountains in the world, which shut off Tibet and India and Afghanistan. On the northern side other mountains bar access to Siberia and the Soviet Central Asian republics, except for a few gaps through which trade and migration have flowed

for centuries. In narrow curving lines where the mountains meet the deserts lie the thinly strung oases of Sinkiang or Chinese Turkistan.

Each of the oases of Central Asia is like a miniature China. Its bearded men and fair-skinned women differ from the Chinese in physical appearance and in many other respects. For the most part they are Turkish by speech and Moslem by religion but they belong in the main to a white race, descended in unbroken line from ancestors who are known to have lived in the same regions in the Stone Age. These ancestors at one time spoke languages belonging to the Indo-European system, and they were closely akin to the people who still live in Switzerland and the Tyrol, whom anthropologists call "Alpine." These differences, however, only disguise the fact that in its essential structure the life of the oases is like that of China. It is closely dependent on agriculture; the agriculture is of a specialized, intensive kind, with a maximum of irrigation and hand cultivation; and as in China a walled city stands at the heart of each agricultural district.

Something like eighty per cent of Sinkiang is desert, without even grazing for cattle. This is the great enclosed basin of the Taklamakan in the heart of Asia, where rain falls only in occasional angry storms, and from which no rivers flow to the distant sea. Water here is the gift of the mountains. From the glaciers and high snows of ranges that rise in peaks to over 20,000 feet, rivers flow down into the desert. Where each river issues from the foothills into the gently sloping deserts its waters can be spread out through irrigation canals to form an oasis. As the heat of summer increases and more water is needed, more is provided by the melting of the snows, so that year after year crops can be gathered in with almost unvarying certainty. Each oasis has

also its own mountain hinterland, from which it gets minerals and a certain amount of livestock from herdsmen in high Alpine pastures.

Between the oases lie stretches of desert. There are big oases and little ones, but otherwise any oasis is almost exactly like any other, so that there is a minimum demand for trade and exchange. Trade, in both the recent and the ancient past, has largely been the concern of alien merchants dealing in such commodities as can stand the high cost of transport over very long distances.

In the Middle Ages, at an oasis like Turfan, where routes from the deserts and the steppes and from China, Persia, and India converged on each other, there dwelt whole communities of alien traders. Turfan, in the eighth century, for example, was like a landward Shanghai. In each foreign trading quarter, people wore the costumes and spoke the languages of their distant homes, and worshiped at the temples and chapels of their own religion; but when war interrupted the caravan trade, the merchants vanished and the people of Turfan were left to their ancient occupations, tending their canals and irrigating their fields.

With external communications in the hands of strangers, and the real life of each oasis focused inward on itself, no national consciousness ever developed. Politics of more than local scope, like trade of more than local range, were only known in Central Asia when they penetrated there from the outside. The linking together of oases did not grow out of oasis life, but out of the imperial activities of greater nations like China or conquest by mobile peoples like the steppe nomads.

The world of the twentieth century is now pressing in on Sinkiang more heavily than any ancient advance of the Chinese or raids of the nomads. The range of railways and

automobiles and airplanes has made the world of thinly scattered Central Asian oases something quite different from what it was when men thought of time and distance in terms of slowly trudging camel caravans, or small bodies of mounted raiders who carried their provisions on their saddles. The local loyalties of Chinese Central Asia are rapidly being enlarged by these new influences, which provide the framework essential to new kinds of social consciousness, nationalism, and patriotism.

These new tendencies also have their international aspects. The essential relationship between Chinese Central Asia and Soviet Central Asia today is not one of propaganda but one of physical, economic, and social fact. The Turksib Railway, built by the Russians to link Siberia and Soviet Central Asia, runs within about 50 miles of the Sinkiang frontier, while the nearest railhead in China is about 1,500 miles away. It will be many years before industrialization in China can project into Central Asia influences as profound as those which are already being projected by industrialism in Soviet Siberia and Central Asia.

These influences, which must be understood in terms of a complex of society and economics, not in isolated terms of a political creed, are already working in Chinese Central Asia remarkable transformations which, however, must not be oversimplified and misinterpreted as the "sovietization" of a Chinese province. The cardinal fact is that, deep and sharp as is the cleavage between the shepherd of the steppe and the cultivator of the oasis, neither the cultivator nor the shepherd can resist the integrating action of mechanized industry and transport, which create new demands for the interchange of products and at the same time provide the facilities for exchanging them.

On the other hand, the primary political ideas at work

in Sinkiang today come from China, not Russia. Japan's attack on China and the fear that some far-striking mechanized Japanese column might invade Sinkiang through Inner Mongolia or Northwest China have focused the minds and loyalties of people in Sinkiang toward China. Fully eighty-five per cent of these people are not Chinese and do not even speak the Chinese language, but their interest is naturally turned toward the people who are defending them from the danger of invasion. It is not surprising, therefore, that Sinkiang province has made contributions to the cause of China that are remarkably large for a population of not more than about 4,000,000.

The Russian industrial and social influence and the Chinese political influence have been linked together in a remarkable way by the great wartime development of transport. War material moves by air and by truck roads from Soviet Russia through Sinkiang to the battle fronts of China. Though less publicized than the Burma Road, this Central Asian route has probably carried more war supplies to China than the Burma Road ever did. This way into China cannot possibly be cut off sharply when the war ends. It is bound to be supplemented in time by railroads, and to become a trunk line of communication from Eastern Asia through Central Asia to Western Asia and Europe.

TIBET—THE HIGH WASTES

The history of Tibet is governed by its dominant geographical characteristics: it is almost impassable and almost impenetrable. The whole country is vast, high, and cold. It probably does not contain more than about 3,000,000 people—there are no accurate figures. The most important political center is the holy city of Lhasa; but many districts

are far from being under the control of Lhasa. Although China claims sovereignty over the whole country, actually there are very few Tibetans who are under direct Chinese rule except in the border provinces of Sikang and Chinghai.

From its great height Tibet, "the roof of the world," looks down on the dusty plains of northern India and the forested hills and rich valleys of western China. At one end it overlooks the semitropical jungles of Burma and Assam, at the other end the desert wastes of Turkistan that have been called the "dead heart of Asia." The people of Tibet are not one people; they have been gathered from all four sides. For untold centuries, the mountainous edges of Tibet have provided refuges for small bands and tribes escaping from the wars and migrations of Asia. From such refuges, people ventured gradually into the wide, dry, central plateau. Here they learned to hunt the shaggy wild yak and to domesticate it as a provider of milk and a beast of burden; here also the modern Tibetans herd sheep and even drive them in caravans, carrying packages of borax and salt. Nomadism, in Tibet, is not the primitive way of living from which settled life developed, but a later technique discovered by people venturing into the central plateau from settlements around the edge.

Religion dominates the society and politics of Tibet. The religion is Lamaism, compounded out of Buddhism, which entered Tibet from India, and out of various primitive magical beliefs and practices. The unit is the monastery, presided over by an abbot who is often called a Living Buddha, who is both spiritual and temporal ruler. In the small, widely separated communities of Tibet, the monastery provides a center of authority; at the same time the ecclesiastical structure as a whole provides a uniformity and continuity which the scattered communities would find it

difficult to evolve in any other way. Each monastery is a corporation which owns property, carries on trade, and collects dues and taxes. If it controls enough territory and population, it approximates to a small feudal state. Monastic domains or states not infrequently carry on small wars against each other. Since all are part of the same hierarchy, all are nominally subordinate to the Dalai Lama at Lhasa, the pope of Lama Buddhism; but as in medieval Europe, the real power of this pope over any monastery is exactly proportionate to that monastery's actual wealth and manpower.

PART TWO

The Oldest Living
Civilization

CHAPTER I

The Birth of China

AN OLD missionary student of China once remarked that Chinese history is "remote, monotonous, obscure, and—worst of all—there is too much of it."

This dreary and discouraged view comes from being taught history in the way that millions of people have been taught Biblical history or English history—as a baffling catalogue of who slew somebody, who begat somebody, who succeeded somebody, with only an occasional concubine thrown in for human interest. If studied in this way, Chinese history can be matched against any history in the world for profusion of dates, difficulty of names, and complication of detail.

Taken in another way, Chinese history can be made to throw sharp lights and revealing shadows on the story of all mankind—from its most primitive beginnings, some of which were in Asia, to its highest point of development in philosophy and religion, literature and art. In thought and philosophy no culture has ever surpassed that of China in its great creative periods. In material culture, though we think of the roots of our own civilization as being almost entirely European, we have also received much from Asia—paper and printing, gunpowder and compasses, silk, tea, and porcelain.

There is never any fixed point at which to begin history. However far back you go, you might always go still farther. What the historian usually tries to do is to set a sort of base line from which to work forward. In practice the base line always turns out to be a sort of twilight zone. At the near edge of the zone there are a few facts. From this edge you can work forward, finding more and more facts to work into a system of knowledge. But you can also work backward, deeper into the twilight zone. Here you have to deal with a kind of evidence that is part fact, part legend, and part guesswork. The deeper you go into the twilight, the slimmer the proportion of fact and the bigger the proportion of guesswork. Here the human factor enters in: different people have different opinions as to when you pass from the twilight into the dark where all is guesswork and nothing is fact. And again fresh research and new discoveries tend to push the base line back.

THE SHANG—LEGEND AND HISTORY

The twilight zone of Chinese history now lies in the Shang dynasty, which lasted from about 1766 to 1122 B.C. Until twenty or thirty years ago it was generally accepted that there was no authentic Chinese history before the Chou dynasty which began about 1100 B.C., and although there was a large body of legend about the Shang dynasty and even about the Hsia dynasty before it, including a chronological list of rulers and many stories about them, all of this material was labeled "prehistory" by the scholars.

Within our lifetime, however, 500 years have been lifted from the realm of legend and guesswork and placed clearly within the realm of history. The story of how the base line of Chinese history has been pushed back from the begin-

ning of the Chou dynasty to the middle of the Shang is an exciting one. And after the war, new archaeological discoveries may push the base line even farther back into the twilight zone.

About fifty years ago there began to be discovered in the Yellow River region, in what we now know was the Shang territory, bits of bone and tortoise shell on which writing had been scratched, a very ancient form of Chinese writing. Ancient forms of Chinese characters were already known, especially from bronzes that were undoubtedly more than 2,500 years old; but these marks crudely scratched were still more ancient. Here was a problem for which the scholars of China were magnificently equipped. Changes in the form of their writing had long been studied, and they were able, by comparative methods as advanced as those used in the study of the languages on which western scholars have long worked, to decipher a large quantity of these bone inscriptions.

When this was done, the full value of this ancient material began to be revealed. Many of the inscriptions were "magic." When people had wanted to go on a war or hunting expedition, they had scratched questions about what luck or weather they might expect. Then a shallow hole or depression was scraped out, and the shell or bone was heated. As it heated and then cooled again, there was different rate of expansion and contraction in the thick and thin parts of the bone or shell, which led to cracking; and the cracks tended to spread from the hole that had been scooped. From the pattern of the cracks the magician gave a favorable or unfavorable answer to the question asked.

Since this kind of magic was directly connected with both personal and social needs of the people, it has left for us a peculiarly vivid kind of evidence. These people were the

Shang. They were a chronicle-keeping people, we know, because we have echoes or actual fragments of their chronicles as well as their oracle relics. The two types of document illuminate each other. When the Shang Chinese or the Homeric Greeks composed their chronicles, they stylized them; human actions were reduced to types, and events were chronicled according to the type of action recounted. The bone inscriptions are material of a different kind; they show planning for action, and concern about action, before the action was chronicled or even performed. Therefore these "magic" questions and answers, although they also obviously follow conventions of their own, are peculiarly realistic, and correspondingly exciting to the historian. The great bulk of history describes what people say was done; the historian is left to analyze, guess, check, and try to establish how accurately the events described correspond with events that actually happened. This magic material does contain statements of what people say they did; but even more revealing is the record of the way people thought, and the things they were concerned about when they were getting ready to do the things they actually did.

The Shang were already known to us from the canon of Chinese history as restored in Han times and handed down since then with volumes of early commentaries, later commentaries on the commentaries, and so on. The actual historic reality of the Shang, however, had long been questioned. The ancient references to them had come to be thought of not as history but as shadowy folklore or epic memories. Now the bone and shell materials have not only confirmed the names of their chieftains, but prove that these rulers followed each other in the order of succession which the Han scholars, after an interval of more than a thousand years, had written.

Among the fragmentary materials which the Han scholars reduced to the form of written history there are references—again with names of rulers—to a “dynasty” called Hsia, which was even earlier than the Shang. The probability that there really was a Hsia period, and that the Hsia people were true and direct ancestors of the Chinese, is greatly increased by the remarkable way in which the Shang materials have confirmed “orthodox” Chinese history. Even the writing of the Shang encourages this belief; for though the Shang inscriptions are “primitive” compared to the writing on bronze vessels of a thousand years or more later, which again is “primitive” compared with the forms of the Chinese characters as used today, yet the Shang writing is not itself primitive. It had probably already evolved through a good many hundred years.

Finally, this new material for very ancient Chinese history throws a cross light on Chinese history as a whole, because it can be handled as easily and as legitimately by the sociologist as by the historian. This has been very important in giving Chinese historians a fresh view of their own history. The new data largely confirm the conventional Chinese history; but they are not conventional in themselves, and so they lead people to think in a more original way. From thinking more originally about their most ancient history, the Chinese have been encouraged also to take fresh views of their later history.

A good example is the doctrine of filial piety, with its associations of paternal prestige, property, and authority. This code naturally grew up in feudal times, when princes and warriors wished to leave their belongings and their conquests to their sons. It took a new form in imperial times, when the authority of the emperor over the whole country was compared to the authority of a father over his family.

Naturally the most ancient sanctions were sought out to prove that this important "ideology" had been established from time eternal. Now, with the increasing use of sociological methods for studying the new evidence from the most ancient times, the classical version of the way in which inheritance was passed from one to another in preclassical times begins to look a little queer. It appears that there was once a time when in China, as in many other countries, property and the family were traced through the mother, not the father. The evidence of this was preserved, but later, partly because it simply was not understood and partly because there was an actual social need for giving dignity and authority to clans and families headed by men, the old evidence was given a new twist.

The oracle bones give us a check on Chinese history as far back as about 1400 B.C. A study of the bones and of other things dug up in the Shang region—tools, utensils, weapons, and the remains of walls and fortifications—gives us a fairly clear picture of what China was like at that time. It was by no means a primitive society. Near where the city of Loyang now stands on the railway from Peiping to Hankow there was a flourishing city and a people of high culture. Walls enclosed the city, which was a large one—large enough to make it likely that it was the capital of a community that was fairly widely spread and had still other cities.

The people who lived in the city had a civilization that preserved traces of earlier stages of its own development. They were an agricultural people, but they also went on hunting expeditions of a kind known also elsewhere in Asia—peasants drawn up in a long line gradually curving into a semicircle and driving the game before them to be shot from chariots by nobles with bows and arrows. The most important crop was millet, and one of the important

deities was the grain-god of millet; other gods were family and tribal ancestors. Rice was also known; some of it may have been grown locally, some obtained in trade from farther south, toward the Yangtze.

Cattle were known, and their meat was eaten, but there is no evidence of the use of milk or butter. This is a very strong indication that the Chinese line of evolution was from farming without domestic animals to farming with the addition of animals; if the Chinese had first been nomads and later settled down to farming, it is not likely that they would have completely forgotten the use of milk. In this way the Chinese differ from the Hindus, whose ancestors were undoubtedly once pastoral herdsmen who later became farmers and city dwellers. The ancient Hindu literature refers to this and the Chinese literature does not; The Hindus use milk and butter, and the Chinese do not; and milk and butter also have a ceremonial and religious significance in India, but not in China.

The farming tools of these Chinese of 1400 B.C. were still made of stone. In spite of working with stone tools, however, the Chinese of this time quite probably dug canals and irrigated their crops. This technological point is of the very greatest importance, because irrigation makes possible greater crops per acre, a larger population per square mile, and a surplus of grain to feed people who live concentrated in cities and do not do their own farming.

There are several reasons for supposing that the Chinese of this period were already successful in practicing irrigation. The gentle gradient of the plain made it easy to control the flow of water. Wells could also be dug, and did not have to be dug very deep, for irrigation "by the bucketful"—a method still widely used in North China. The earth was deep, soft, and without heavy stones, so that it could

be worked even with stone and wooden tools. The climate is uncertain enough so that comparatively dry years are common and very dry years not uncommon. This variability would encourage irrigation for insurance against lack of rain as well as for the reward of greater crops. The people of that time had quite enough engineering knowledge to practice irrigation, as is shown by the scale of this particular city, the depth to which the great royal tombs were dug, and the foundations of the important buildings. It would not have been practical to congregate in cities unless the annual food supply was well assured.

While the peasants and some artisans worked with stone tools, the aristocracy benefited by a technique in bronze-working which was nothing less than magnificent. Their chariots and the harness of their chariot horses were plated with bronze; they had bronze helmets and armor, and bronze swords. In addition, their skilled workers were able to cast for them vessels of bronze that were both noble and delicate. Some of the most beautiful art in all China's long artistic history dates back to this early period. The technique used in casting was by no means primitive; molds were packed around wax models which were burned away when the molten bronze was poured in—the *cire perdue* method.

Some have suggested that the bronze-using aristocrats must have been invaders from somewhere in Central Asia who conquered the stone-using Chinese peasants. There is nothing to prove this, in what we know either of the social system, the religion of the time, or anything else. The making of bronze may have been discovered in China independently of its discovery elsewhere, or it may have been brought to China by the slow travel and trade and diffusion of knowledge of the Stone Age, without the actual migration of a conquering people.

What is important in a historical question of this kind is whether, by the time bronze appeared, China already had a high culture and technique based on the use of stone implements. China did have a high stone-using technique when bronze became known, either by trade or by discovery, and therefore was able to pass easily to the technique of bronze. After that, the further use of metal was largely a question of the supply and transport of raw material. Questions like this are important in the history of all culture, because a high technique can "fertilize" a technique that is already just high enough, but not one that is too low. Give a knife to a savage, and you do not automatically teach him how to make metal knives. Even if he is very primitive, he can get the idea of using the knife; but he has to have, already, a certain amount of technique in order to be able to get the idea of making one. The early white men in America soon taught the Indians to use metal, but the technology of the Indians was too backward, and that of the white men growing too fast, for the Indians to be able to create, in time, a metallurgy of their own.

The use of bronze in China can be traced to about 2500 B.C., when the New Stone Age was still flourishing. The bronze culture of the Shang seems to have stemmed directly from these Neolithic roots. Metal replaced stone tools only gradually, and in many cases stone and metal were used side by side for hundreds of years. Iron was not generally used in China until about 500 B.C.

The remarkable continuity in Chinese history is evidenced by the fact that in some parts of China today you can see a peasant actually cutting grain with a sickle whose blade is identical in size and shape, and used with the same swing in cutting, as a stone blade dug up perhaps a hundred yards away. Moreover, in parts of Northwest China these

very peasants live in caves dug into the soft earth, exactly like the caves dug thousands of years ago by the users of the stone tools, except that the modern cave dwellers prefer to dig into the side of an exposed cliff of earth, while the ancient people dug from the top.

The Shang dynasty began about 1700 B.C. and ended about 1100 B.C., although we cannot be sure of either date. Both the rulers and their people were Chinese; that is, their physical characteristics were like those of the Chinese of the same region today. In spite of all the invasions and conquests in Chinese history since the Shang period, there has been no movement of people in great enough numbers to swamp the original stock. Moreover, the original stock had already been there for a long time. There is no conclusive proof that either the people or their rulers were migrants or invaders who had come from somewhere else.

We do know that the Shang were frequently at war with other people, people who were probably very much like themselves. There was nothing yet nearly as big, politically, as a Chinese nation. What the evidence indicates is a number of "tribal states," each probably grouped about a stronghold like the "capital city" of the Shang. Among these groups the Shang were almost certainly the most important and powerful; but they were far from all-powerful, not being able to subdue and unite all of their neighbors at once. Power overwhelming enough to create a nation out of a group of states was not to emerge in China for many hundred years yet.

THE CHOU DYNASTY—AGE OF FEUDALISM

The Shang period in Chinese history was followed by the Chou period, which lasted from about 1100 to 221 B.C.

The Shang were conquered by the Chou, a less civilized people living to the west in what is now Shensi province. The Chou ruled the Chinese world for 900 years, starting as a people who could not even read and write and developing a culture as rich and complex as any that has since existed in China.

The Chou were not a foreign or barbarian people who moved in on the Shang and conquered them. They were also Chinese, developed from the same cultural antecedents as the Shang. The Shang, on the rich eastern side of the loess highlands, merely began their advance to a higher stage earlier, whereas the Chou, on the poorer and less watered side, started to mature later and must have been considered by the Shang to be not barbarian but merely provincial. They imitated the Shang but were still at a comparatively crude level when they became politically ascendant over the Shang.

The Chou period is called by archaeologists the Bronze Age, because the use of bronze for weapons, utensils, and implements, first learned by the Shang, reached its highest development in Chou times.

The Chou period is known to historians of Chinese culture as the Classical Age and is compared to the Golden Age of Greece. It produced such great Chinese classics as the Book of History and the Book of Songs, which have molded Chinese thought right up to the twentieth century. China's great philosophers—Confucius, Mencius, Lao-tze and Mo-tze—belong to this time.

The Chou period is known to social historians as the Age of Feudalism, since society in the Chou era was undoubtedly feudal. It is not difficult to see how feudalism arose in China. In valley after valley of the loess highlands there are areas admirably suited to a feudal society, being neither

too large nor too small, and easily defended in warfare of feudal scale. The ease with which the loess soil of Chou China could be irrigated led from a primitive mixed economy of hunting and farming to one of intensive agriculture. Irrigation demanded co-operative organization, not only for the digging of canals but also in order to regulate the right of access to water and to defend community-owned irrigation works. Irrigation made for greater crops to the acre and greater population to the square mile. Granaries were worth plundering and irrigation works were vulnerable. The peaceful development of intensive agriculture had therefore to be safeguarded by a warrior class; and as the allotment of war service under the military chiefs had to be co-ordinated with the division of collective labor in establishing and maintaining irrigation, the situation favored the development of a territorial nobility monopolizing both military and civil control.

Chou feudalism resulted in a sort of cellular structure of society, each cell including a garrisoned walled city for the safe storing of grain and the protection of the surrounding countryside of small farms. The walled city was also the center of artisan crafts producing cloth, tools, utensils, and other commodities of trade for the countryside. These cells had a radius of only thirty to sixty miles, a one- or two-day journey by foot or cart, because transport of grain and everyday commodities was uneconomic at greater distances.

Long after the era of feudalism and right up to the present day of modern communications, the Chinese countryside retains some of the aspects of this cellular structure. There are still walled towns which were originally built to protect the neighboring farms from civil war and banditry, towns that continue to store their farmers' grain and supply them with the manufactured goods they need.

In feudal China, as in feudal Europe, the real unit of sovereignty was not the nation but the domain of the feudal lord. The Chou emperors represented the center of gravity of a widely spread culture but they did not rule an integrated empire by direct administration of each territory that composed it. All they could claim was the allegiance, within the limits of feudalism, of a number of great nobles each of whom claimed in a similar way the allegiance of minor nobles. The Chou rulers also had their own personal domain which they administered not as emperors but as great feudal nobles.

The Chou capital remained in the west, near what is now the city of Sian in Shensi province, for about 300 years. Then, in 771 B.C., the Chou were disastrously defeated by "western barbarians" who were still, presumably, what the Chou themselves had once been. After this defeat the Chou moved their capital to the east, thus making northern Honan, once the territory of the Shang, again the cultural center of China.

The terrain of this Great Plain of the lower Yellow River favored a development away from feudalism. A petty baron could maintain himself in a small valley which could be easily defended, but the scale of enterprise necessary on the Great Plain, where no one feudal lord could mark off his domains with a secure and permanent frontier, meant that feudal nobles had to act together, forming new and larger combinations which in time took the form of national states.

The loess valleys of Shensi became a border domain, ruled by a hereditary line of nobles who were, so to speak, "wardens of the Western Marches." From this line developed the feudal state of Chin which eventually overthrew the Chou line in the third century B.C. and created a new and much more centralized empire.

For the second part of the Chou period the records are increasingly complete and the dates more and more certain. They record how the imperial power of the Chou declined and how the feudal states became more and more independent and fought each other for the control of the weakling Chou emperors, who came to be confined to the north of Honan within a small domain that was much less important than other states of China. Control of the Chou emperor, however, did not mean a change of sovereignty.

At the same time there was a steady increase in the geographical area occupied by the Chinese culture and filled with the events of Chinese history. This increase was particularly noticeable in the Yangtze valley. In fact, the wars between the states of the South in the Yangtze valley formed for some centuries a series distinct from the similar wars of the North, in the Yellow River valley. They led to the rise of the great state of Chu, founded near the junction of the Han and Yangtze rivers, where Hankow now stands. The rulers of Chu, it is related, derived from a follower of the second Chou king, but the people were distinct from the northern Chinese. Expanding down the Yangtze to the coast, Chu conquered several other states and came to dominate the South before any one state had secured the control of the North. Consequently the final devastating cycle of wars that closed the Chou period took on a double character. It was not only the control of the North which had to be settled, but the question whether China was to center on the Yellow River or the Yangtze valley. Chin was the state that finally triumphed and united China as a single empire.

Confucius, Mencius, and Lao-tze, the "founding fathers" of Chinese philosophy, all belong to the centuries of unending war and great social change in the second half of the

Chou period. Since they appeared at a time when the Chinese had already had a high civilization for a long time, we must not make the mistake of thinking that they invented Chinese philosophy by just sitting and meditating. They were great philosophers because they lived in times of change. The changes that were going on made men think. The greatest thinkers were those who looked back into a past already rich in monuments of thought—tradition, literature, religious and social institutions. In search of the meaning of the events and problems of their times, they selected from the past what they thought most significant, and applied it to the present.

Lao-tze, for instance, built a philosophy of the forces of nature partly out of Chinese lore about nature that was already ancient. His philosophy being more philosophical than scientific, it has gathered to itself in succeeding centuries a great deal of mysticism; in fact popular Taoism (as the philosophy of Lao-tze is called), as distinguished from learned Taoism, is a vast repository of magic and miracles. In its present form it includes a great deal that has been borrowed from Confucianism and Buddhism and redecorated with supernatural legends.

The philosophy of Confucius was concerned with human relationships; he sought to work out a uniform ethical system for the individual, the family, and the state. Since he lived in a period when the positions and functions of the individual, the family, and the state were all changing, and since he reinterpreted old views and traditions and put his emphasis on new tendencies that eventually ceased to be tendencies and became prevailing standards, his teaching won a place as the classical sanction of the Chinese social system. The core of his teaching was the subordination of women to men; the responsibility of the son to the father,

and the authority of the father over the son; and the parallel between the state and the family, with the sovereign in patriarchal authority over the family of the nation and the hierarchy of officialdom graduated like a vast family structure of elder and younger sons and brothers.

Some of the materials collected by Confucius, already ancient in his time, were poems and folklore. Society, the family, marriage, the relation of the sexes, and the ownership of property, long before the time of Confucius, had not always been what Confucius ideally thought they should be. Consequently, in the Confucian classics—as they now stand and are traditionally interpreted—there are many passages which have become as far removed from their ancient context as some of the passages of the Old Testament. The chapter headings of *The Song of Solomon* in the King James version of the Bible, as compared with the ancient Hebrew content of *The Song of Solomon* itself, are a good parallel.

CHAPTER II

The Chinese Empire

IN THE year 221 B.C. the last of China's independent feudal kingdoms fell before the Chin emperor Shih Huang Ti, the great conqueror, and China was united as a single empire. At that time Rome and Carthage were fighting each other in the Punic Wars, and Carthage had not yet been destroyed. The imperial form of government lasted in China from 221 B.C. until 1911 A.D. Thus China (despite many invasions and internal wars) has a history of a continuing form of government over more than two thousand years. Compare this record with that of the western world: in the same period the center of interest in western history moved from Italy to France, to Spain, to England, to the Atlantic and to North America. The history of China may seem by contrast to be shut in and stagnant. Yet China in fact had its own history of inner development and we need only to know the main facts of this development in order to appreciate their dramatic interest and their significance in the chronicle of mankind as a whole.

Chin Shih Huang Ti is given too much credit when he is called the unifier of China. What he really did was to destroy the kind of feudal strength which enabled the various regional Chinese kingdoms to live in independence and


disunity; but the overwhelming military striking power which he developed was not matched by an equal holding power in transport, economic organization, and political administration. His military stronghold had been in the northwestern corner of China. From this corner he had pushed inward on the rest of China, shattering not only the political structure but the social order of Chinese feudalism.

After his death, his conquests fell apart and a chaotic period of internal war followed; but it is interesting to see how the Chinese were unable to get out of this chaos by returning to feudalism (although some of their leaders tried to). They could only go forward by putting together again the kind of empire which Chin Shih Huang Ti had tried to create, only doing it better.

It is also interesting to note that when the building of an empire was done over again it had to be done from the heart of the country, not from the corner where Chin Shih Huang Ti had begun.

THE HAN DYNASTY

The new empire was that of the Han dynasty which lasted from 205 B.C. to 221 A.D. There was a short break in the middle of this dynasty when a usurper seized the throne in the year 9 B.C., and this break divides the period as a whole between the Earlier or Western Han and the Later or Eastern Han. The founder of the Han dynasty came from the low, flat country of the Huai River valley, midway between the Yellow River and the Yangtze. Geographically, he was able to consolidate his power because he stood between the remnants of the feudal kingdoms in the North and those in the South. Socially and politically he came to power because he was not an aristocratic noble attempting to restore feudal-



Han Empire and Roman Empire, 1st Century A.D.

ism, but a man who had once been a petty official and at another time an outlawed bandit. This experience gave him the advantage of knowing something about government at the level where government in China has always been most important—the government of the village and the district—and the advantage of knowing at first hand the people who were most difficult to govern—the outlaws who had been driven into handiwork by the breakdown of the old form of government. He built up his military power by organizing his original bandit following into a regular army that steadily grew larger and larger, and he built his political power by placing subordinates and relatives in each economic area where he gained control. Only when he had mastered the rest of China did he make his final campaign. This brought him into the strategic northwest corner and here he made his capital; but once in this corner he did not have to leave it again in order to crush the rest of China, but could use it as a point of vantage from which to watch over and consolidate his conquests and his empire.

This northwest corner had many advantages. The capital city of Changan—now called Sian—stood in a broad plain where the Wei and several smaller rivers flow to join the Yellow River. Crops raised in this plain provided food for the imperial garrisons; and the Yellow River to the east and the Tsingling mountains to the south furnished defenses which made it difficult for rebel armies raised in other parts of China to attack the imperial capital suddenly.

With this position overlooking the rest of China, the Han emperors were also well placed to watch the Mongolian and Central Asian frontiers. Here the Yellow River, swinging upward in its great northern loop, formed a frontier as vital to the Han Empire as the Danube was to the Roman Empire. Beyond the frontier were tribes as troublesome to the

Chinese as the tribes of Hungary were to the Romans. There was no great profit in conquering these tribes. Trade with them was profitable in its way, but not vitally necessary; conquest cost more than it was worth, because the dry plains of Mongolia were not good for farming and therefore not good for the land tax based on farming values, which was the basic state revenue in China.

Out of this situation grew an age-long uneasy relationship between the settled Chinese and their nomad neighbors in Central Asia and Mongolia. At times the Chinese felt forced to send out expeditions to break the growing military power of the nomad tribes, but they learned to avoid such actions as far as they possibly could. It cost a great deal to send out expeditions and the results were never decisive. The nomads, being nomads, could always pack up their tents, drive away their flocks and herds, and move to almost unlimited distances. Then, as the Chinese armies withdrew, the tribal horsemen would harass their retreat. The Chinese, like the Romans, used other methods whenever they could. They hired warriors from small tribes to serve as auxiliaries in the Chinese army against the greater tribes. They subsidized one tribal chief to fight against another.

Another method of keeping the peace along the border and beyond was to encourage trade. Many modern writers have completely misunderstood the nature of this trade. The Chinese were not searching for new markets in order to dispose of their surplus production. On the whole, Chinese trade was well balanced. There was no mass production, making the cost of each unit cheaper and cheaper. Generally speaking, most regions in China produced and consumed just about what they needed. A more important driving force behind the expansion of Chinese trade into Central Asia was the need to provide barbarian chieftains

with an opportunity to buy what they needed so that they would not attack China on plundering raids. A convenient device for arranging this trade was to allow the barbarians to send parties to China which were politely called "embassies." These embassies brought with them what was conventionally called "tribute"—gold dust, fine horses, and other products of the barbarian lands. In return for this "tribute" they received from the Chinese court "presents" of silk and other things which China produced. In addition, of course, the members of these parties did a great deal of private buying and selling. What they took back with them they sold and bartered to other barbarian tribes. It was in this way that such things as silk from China eventually reached markets as far away as the Roman Empire.

There grew up also, along the border, mixed peoples who were partly Chinese and partly "tribal barbarians." These peoples would sometimes serve the Chinese in fighting against the barbarians and at other times would join with the tribesmen in raids against China. Some of the most famous Chinese generals came from these mixed border peoples; some were out-and-out tribesmen who served as professional Chinese fighting men. In fact, there were a number of celebrated warriors who were sometimes generals on one side and sometimes on the other.

China's wary policy of alternate war and negotiation along the northern frontier was balanced by a steady expansion of the Chinese themselves beyond the Yangtze valley. Here the Chinese came in contact with weaker people who were partly hunters and fishermen, partly cultivators of little patches of farms in the midst of the jungle and forest. These people could be rather easily absorbed by the Chinese—"turned into Chinese." This assimilation is undoubtedly one reason why the greatest variety of Chinese dialects is

found to this day in the South and especially along the southeastern coast. These dialects are to some extent like historical tide marks; they show the different periods at which various people, originally speaking non-Chinese languages, adopted the Chinese language and the Chinese culture as a whole.

In the Han period political centralization, reorganization, and expansion was accompanied by cultural standardization and new cultural advances. Just before the Han period the Chinese had begun to write with brushes instead of pointed instruments and this innovation was accompanied, or closely followed, by the invention of paper. This new practice naturally led to modifications in the forms of the written characters. An even more important invention followed: the Chinese began to reproduce books by printing. At first they carved a whole page of a book on a block of wood; later they added the improvement of movable type.

These inventions, coming one after another, had important effects. The new way of writing changed the shapes of the written characters and printing standardized and perpetuated not only the shape and number of the brush strokes in each character, but also the whole body of the Chinese classical literature and history. Instead of copied manuscripts containing innumerable variations, a permanent standard could be fixed. This opportunity gave enormous importance to the editorial work of the Han period, in which were printed the first "definitive" editions of the classics, the first dictionary, and the first encyclopedic history of China.

One of the most important cultural developments of the Han period was the penetration of Buddhism into China. This was the first impact on China of a sophisticated body of

ideas developed within another culture, that of India, and the first appearance of a religion institutionalized apart from both the family and the state. For centuries Chinese pilgrims made arduous journeys to India, not only to visit the holy places but to obtain authoritative copies of the Buddhist scriptures. Until Chinese students began to go to Europe and America, Buddhism was the only authoritative source of ideas which Chinese thought it worth leaving their own country to study.

HOW DYNASTIES ROSE AND FELL

The Han dynasty collapsed in disorder. This collapse brings us to one of the key problems of all Chinese history: why dynasties fell and how new dynasties arose. It has always been fashionable to look for the explanation in the difference between "strong" emperors and "weak" emperors. In order to understand history as something more profound than the accidents of personality, we need to go a good deal further. We therefore interrupt the narrative of history in the interest of illumination.

Economic control in China has always been dependent on the ownership of land. Harvested grain has been the standard of wealth; the ability to levy taxes in actual grain has been the standard of state power; stored grain has been the measure of capacity to maintain garrisons and armies. There has always been, in fact, a conflict between the power of the state to levy taxes and the power of the landowner to collect rent—both rent and taxes being, in hard economic fact, simply the surplus part of the grain harvest which was not actually used up in feeding the peasants who cultivated the land. When the state was strong it could collect all the tax revenue it needed, by preventing the landlords from

taking for themselves too large a share of the produce of the land in the form of rent. When the landlords were strong they were able to defy or evade the power of the state, standing between the peasants and the government and siphoning off as private rent revenue the wealth the land produced.

Conflict over this one overwhelmingly important form of wealth took a peculiar form because the rent-collecting landlord and the tax-collecting government official were often one and the same man. China has always been a country in which financial activity has required an enormous amount of bookkeeping. The importance of irrigation in Chinese agriculture has a great deal to do with this. As Americans who live in California and other states where irrigation is important are well aware, irrigated farming means that the ownership of water rights is even more important than the ownership of land. Irrigation demands careful calculation and the keeping of complicated accounts to show who is entitled to how much water at what time and in what place. When the chief revenue of the government is from taxes calculated according to the productivity of farming land, both the tax roll and the rent roll are intimately connected with the keeping of these records.

One of the most striking things about the culture of China is the intricacy and difficulty of the Chinese written language. It is very probable that Chinese writing (like Egyptian writing) was purposely developed from a very early period in a way to make it as difficult as possible, because writing guarded the "secret" of wealth and power in controlling the allotments of water and the apportioning of rent and taxes. Even if this opinion may be called speculative, we do at least know that in working practice the Chinese written language has always been so difficult that to acquire a good education demanded more time and hard

work than in any western culture. Ordinarily, therefore, the son of a leisured landlord in China had a much better chance for an education than the son of a poor tenant. Moreover, the same ability to keep records and accounts that made it profitable to be a landlord was an essential qualification for the servant of the state who collected taxes.

The son of a landlord, accordingly, not only had the pleasant prospect of inheriting the family land; he also had a much better chance than the average man of rising to a high position in the service of the government. It can easily be seen how this worked out in practice. Most higher officials were members of landowning families. Rather than inflict supertaxes on wealthy landlords, they were inclined to allow the landlords to keep their wealth by shifting the burden of taxation to the peasant, the very man who also had to provide the wealth of the landlord by paying rent. The process was one which easily could be carried and frequently was carried to the point of driving the peasant from poverty to worse poverty and finally to intolerable poverty. This explains why, in the long course of Chinese history, we periodically find the same phenomenon: a "prosperous" country, a civilized, sophisticated, and lavish court; families of great wealth and culture scattered over the country—and then, in the course of a few years, an appalling collapse into the wildest confusion marked by savage peasant rebellions. Out of these rebellions arose warriors and adventurers who seized power by the sword, without any reliance on the civilized and philosophical standard preached in the Chinese classics.

Once power had been seized by such men, however, they needed steady revenue to keep their power going. The war lord who succeeded in bringing into his service scholars who

could keep the records of a government administration was therefore the war lord most likely to succeed in founding a new and stable dynasty. When he had done so, the old cycle began all over again. The scholar-administrator was inevitably the scholar-landlord. While he built a government service for the new dynasty, he also founded a landed estate for himself and his heirs.

In the years of confusion before and after the fall of the Han dynasty in 221 A.D. we can also see other notable factors at work. Chinese emperors, trying to keep the upper hand over the landlords who were both their servants and their competitors, tried to work out a number of combined social, political, and economic devices. One such device was the institution of eunuchs. A landlord's family tended to grow more powerful generation by generation. A eunuch, unable to found a family, was first and foremost the servant of the emperor and could serve him not only at court but in the government. No one device, however, can make the monopoly of power secure and permanent. Eunuchs played a sinister part in Chinese history. They were far from being the sole cause of bad government, but they were always at their worst when bad government had already set in for other reasons.

Whenever local rich men began to increase in actual power their ambition led them to intercept as much as possible of the land revenue at its source and prevent it from reaching the capital. In so doing they ran the risk of being investigated and punished by the imperial authorities. Accordingly, they felt much safer if the emperor personally was weak and indecisive, or if he was surrounded by corrupt officials and palace attendants. Men at court who could be easily corrupted by money were thus the natural allies of

men throughout the country who were interested more in local wealth and power than in the stability of the nation as a whole.

As this alliance worked out in practical terms, it is obvious that the time which offered the most tempting opportunities to all who were eager to grasp personal power was the period when a new emperor had succeeded to the throne and had not yet been able to assert his own personality or to master the administrative details of government. How could such periods be prolonged for the benefit of those who were interested? If the new emperor was already a grown man, one obvious device was to intoxicate him with the personal aspects of his new power so that he would never begin the hard work of really mastering the essentials of power. If he could be distracted with luxury and pleasure, the real power would remain in the hands of men who already knew how to use it. Toward the emperor these functionaries would only have to be obsequious, providing him with whatever he needed for his pleasure; toward the rest of China they could be as arrogant and exacting as they pleased. Eunuchs had more opportunity than anyone else to corrupt an emperor in this way, because of their intimate access to him and to the women's apartments in the palace.

Even wider and more lasting opportunities for corruption were provided when the new emperor was an infant. During the years of his minority anything could be done in his name by those who held the power of regency. The extremes of corruption were reached—and here again the eunuchs were sinister and convenient instruments—when a boy emperor was prematurely debauched to such an extent that he would never become a determined and responsible man even when he grew up, or when his death was contrived

before he assumed power, so that he could be succeeded by another infant and the period of regency prolonged.

Such factors as these have been important throughout Chinese history, but the very fact that Chinese history provides such a crowded gallery both of able, far-sighted, progressive, and heroic figures and of selfish, treacherous, and ignoble figures ought to put us on our guard against interpreting the whole history of a vast country, a rich culture, and a people of unlimited energy and creative potentiality in terms solely of individual personality. This method has biased too many Chinese historians and commentators, and it is especially tempting to western students who pick their way through the crowded pages of China's chronicles.

For a better proportioned understanding of China's history as a whole it is necessary to keep the important figures of each period in focus against the physical background of their time—the geography, the main regions that form natural units, the trade routes and lines of communication.

If we do this, we soon discover that the rise and fall of dynasties was not simply a question of alternating periods of good government and bad government. This alternation was just a process within another and even larger process—the growth of the Chinese culture and the spread of the Chinese people.

The Chinese people and their culture have always had a tendency to spread beyond the limits of the Chinese state. In the north, in Mongolia and Central Asia, powerful barbarian tribes were affected by the culture of the Chinese and even by their political ideas; but because these people lived by the herding of animals and not by cultivating the soil, they could not become identical with the Chinese and could not merge with them. Even in Central Asia, where there

were many oases making rich farming communities possible, deserts between the oases made it impossible for the farming communities to amalgamate together in great masses, as in China.

In the south, the Chinese were a colonizing and civilizing people. Here they found a country of hills, jungles, lakes, and small, rich, but as yet undeveloped plains. This country was inhabited by what the people of a later time would have called "native tribes." The Chinese penetrated among them as groups of adventurous people carrying with them a higher political technique of group organization. They settled among the native tribes, fought those who resisted them, and gradually "converted" others to the Chinese way of life.

THE SIX DYNASTIES

Now we resume the narrative that was interrupted at the end of the Han dynasty in 221 A.D. One of the reasons for its collapse was that the political structure of China as a whole was no longer able to handle efficiently the geographical spread of the Chinese people and their culture.

There followed a period of no less than three and a half centuries during which the area of the Chinese culture reverted to a system of smaller political units. Although this period was long, it was not stable. Inherently, the culture was so uniform that it really needed a political structure capable of filling the whole geographical area; but the search for such a structure needed generations of conflict, during which cultural and political progress could only very gradually overtake the destructiveness of war.

First, there was the half century of the Three Kingdoms. This was a period of breakup. Its romantic, heroic, and

villainous figures, about whom the tales and legends have never died in China, were not men of a new time, but essentially men of the once great and now decayed and fallen age of Han. Each of the Three Kingdoms represented a natural geographic region. In the North, based on the middle Yellow River and inheriting the frontier problems of war and trade with the nomad tribes of Mongolia, was the kingdom of Wei. In the West, based on the rich rice-growing region of modern Szechwan, isolated and protected by mountain walls, was the kingdom of Shu. Along the middle and lower Yangtze, drawing wealth from the rice lands around the Tungting Lake, was the kingdom of Wu.

These three kingdoms illustrate the way in which China continued to grow, even in times of chaos. From the kingdom of Shu, they penetrated what is now the province of Yunnan, and even Burma; from the kingdom of Wu they spread far south of the Yangtze, colonizing and civilizing among tribes that had not yet become Chinese. Thus from the point of view of internal politics the period of the Three Kingdoms was one of disintegration; from the point of view of the spread of Chinese culture, it was a period of continuing expansion.

Out of these kingdoms grew others. The wars of the North followed a course that is in itself one of the great recurring themes of Chinese history. Out of the kingdoms of Wei and Shu there grew a kingdom or empire called Chin. In its wars with the northern barbarians, this kingdom was defeated and recoiled; in its wars with the center of China it was victorious and expanded. It began with a capital at Loyang on the Yellow River and ended with a capital at Nanking on the lower Yangtze.

As Chin receded from the north, it was replaced, toward the end of the fourth century, by an empire called Wei, of

nomad barbarian origin, with the tribal name of Toba. Here again the historical process has a double aspect: in one sense the political frontiers of the Chinese were being pushed to the south by barbarian conquest; in another sense the cultural frontiers of the Chinese were being expanded far to the north and northwest by the conquerors, who rapidly became more and more Chinese in their cultural and social characteristics.

The Wei dynasty is notable in the artistic history of China; its colossal rock carvings in what are now the provinces of Shansi and Honan are monuments of the Buddhist religion that bear strongly the mark of Indian culture; and this Indian influence, in turn, carries a distorted but unmistakable reflection of the Greek influences that had penetrated deeply into Central Asia and northwest India through the conquests of Alexander the Great.

The Wei dynasty fell in 589; in the meantime a number of smaller states had grown up on the Yangtze and south of the Yangtze. For this reason the period of the fifth and sixth centuries as a whole is known as the Period of Division between North and South. The kingdom of Sung had its capital at Nanking from 420 to 477. It was succeeded, at the same capital, by the dynasties of Chi (479-501); Liang (502-557); and Chen (557-589).

Looking at this period as a whole it is easy to think of brief and turbulent little kingdoms, each in a shrunken geographical territory, battling each other in all directions to the detriment of all cultured and orderly life. Yet in fact this time was one also of growth and discovery. New techniques of organization and power were being tested against each other. This was one of the periods in which Buddhism flourished in China, not only as a religion but as a

social and political force. Its monastic communities were important in advancing the techniques of a collective economy. Although they did not have the family type of heredity, from father to son, they did have corporate continuity. They made possible the pooling of individual knowledge and skill; they held large tracts of land; their farming was prosperous and progressive, and they carried on the great Chinese engineering techniques of irrigation, drainage, the prevention of floods, and the building of transport canals.

In the South, though the successive kingdoms were small, their cultural contacts were wide ranging. Near Nanking can still be seen tomb sculptures of the little kingdom of Liang which are a striking departure from the classical traditions of China; in spite of unsettled conditions, the trade and cultural exchange of the lower Yangtze valley at this time reached far into Indo-China and Siam (the modern Thailand).

It was in the North, however, that the new center of gravity for the whole of China came to be fixed. War in the North was not only repetitive war between the same kinds of armies. The Chinese of the North had to contend against the nomads of the steppe, from whom they learned cavalry tactics and wide and rapid maneuver. At the same time they fought against the kingdoms of the South, the land of rivers and of flooded rice paddies, which slowed down the movement of all troops, especially mounted troops. Warfare here depended on the holding of strategic regions, commanded by big garrisoned cities, provisioned by transporting grain in barges along rivers and canals which had a double strategic significance, economic as well as military. The engineering which was here essential to successful warfare was equally essential in government and administration.

THE SUI DYNASTY—UNITY AND COMMUNICATIONS

Knowing how the wars of the Six Dynasties developed administrative, martial, and technical skills makes it easier to understand the new large-scale unification of China which began under the Sui dynasty. The Sui dynasty is reminiscent of the Chin dynasty, which lasted only from 255–206 B.C., though of course it represented the imperial expansion of a smaller kingdom which had lasted for much longer. The Sui dynasty crystallized out of a long preparatory period of warfare. Its capital was first at Changan (modern Sian) and later at Loyang, that other classical center of the development of Chinese culture, just east of the great bend of the Yellow River.

The startling rapidity of the Sui unification of China, after so many centuries of inconclusive regional warfare, was due to the combination of two factors. From its position on the northwestern rim of agricultural China, the Sui state used the mobility and striking power of an army hardened in the tradition of frontier war against the nomads. The great range of the Sui armies was demonstrated in a successful invasion of Korea.

In the heart of agricultural China, however, the Sui dynasty was able to seize power because it came at just the right time to exploit a major technique which was the common heritage of all the agricultural Chinese. This was the heritage of hydraulic engineering. Hitherto the engineering work of irrigation, flood prevention, drainage canals, and transport canals had been carried on within natural regional compartments—the Wei valley in Shensi; the Fen valley in Shansi; the lower Yellow River valley, of which Loyang was then the most commanding capital; the wide, flat, valley of

the Huai, with its marshes and lakes, intermediate between the Yellow River and the Yangtze; and the lower Yangtze, whose natural capital was Nanking. The time had now come when all of these regions could be joined and held together by putting in a new connecting canal section; and this was the work of the Sui dynasty, which first joined up China's fabulous Grand Canal as a trunk system running through a number of canal networks. This made it possible to co-ordinate the collection of grain taxes and the maintenance of key garrisons in all the major food-producing regions.

The Sui dynasty fell as suddenly as it had risen; but China did not fall apart again. This also can be simply explained. The Sui dynasty had the kind of military power which could only be developed on the nomad frontier of northern China; but it turned inward against the rich agricultural heart of China before it had full control of the nomad frontier. This move left it vulnerable to any military pretender who had a greater command of the same kind of military power. Thus the Sui dynasty was supplanted by one of its own generals, who founded one of the most brilliant and long-lived of all Chinese dynasties, that of Tang, which lasted from 618 to 907.

THE TANG DYNASTY

The power of the Tang dynasty rested on a combination, even better than had existed in Han times, between China's northern frontier land, along the Great Wall, and the agricultural heart of the country. The modern Mongol tribes of Mongolia had at that time not yet come into being. North of the Great Wall and in Chinese Central Asia the dominant language and culture was Turkish. Some of the modern Mongol tribes are in part descended from the Turks.

In the most eastern part of Mongolia and a large part of what are now China's Northeastern Provinces the tribes were mainly of the Tungus group, among whose later descendants were the Manchus. The Tang dynasty had a complicated system of alliances among the Turkish and Tungus tribes. Chiefs of the tribes nearest to the Great Wall were given Chinese princesses in marriage and treated as "kinsmen" of the Chinese emperor, and their tribes gradually became permeated with a good deal of Chinese culture. They furnished cavalry contingents to China and they prospered by trade with China on favorable terms.

Beyond these tribes, in the northern parts of what are now the Northeastern Provinces, Outer Mongolia, Chinese Turkistan, and spreading far into Siberia and Russian Central Asia, were other tribes which the Chinese never either conquered outright or joined to themselves in a system of stable alliance and trade. Backed by a strong Chinese government and administration, the nearer tribes were quite willing to fight, when necessary, against the more distant tribes, in spite of the fact that these "outer barbarians" were more akin to them in language and culture than were the Chinese. The situation was in many ways comparable to that of the Roman Empire during the long period when in Germany and along the Danube groups of Germanic and Slavic tribes functioned as "auxiliaries" of the Roman Empire, defending its inland European frontiers against more distant and more barbarian Germans and Slavs. At the Chinese court, as at Rome, there were also "Praetorian" guards recruited mainly from barbarians, who occasionally dominated the emperor and the court.

As long as the dynasty flourished, the stability of the frontier system made prosperity stable within China. Irrigation works, well kept up, provided surplus harvests.

Cheap transportation of grain by canal made possible an artificial center of gravity for the empire as a whole. The natural economic center of gravity was in the Yangtze valley, which produced the greatest harvests and also such commodities as tea (which first became generally used in China under the Tang dynasty) and silk and porcelain. The natural political center of gravity lay in the Yellow River valley, because of the military power drawn from the northern frontier. By the use of the Grand Canal system, the economic center of gravity was pulled northward and combined with the political center of gravity at the Tang capital.

With the natural wealth of China both protected and controlled in this manner, progress of many kinds became possible. It was in this period that the Chinese system of a civil service based on literary examinations reached its full development. Complex administration demanded an immense amount of bureaucratic paper work. The difficulty of the Chinese written language meant that anyone who could read and write at all was practically assured of government employment. A bureaucracy of this kind naturally tended to evolve its own élite, and the standard of the elite was inevitably a literary standard. The more difficult, involved, sophisticated, philosophical, and poetic the language that a man could handle in written form, and the more he could train his memory to draw on a vast store of quotation and precedent, the higher the post which he could hope to attain. Thus philosophy and literature came to be in fact mainly a by-product of the personnel of government and civil service—just as, until quite recent times, the ability of Englishmen to write verse in Greek and Latin was in the main a by-product of Oxford and Cambridge education for the cream of the British and Indian civil services.

Inevitably, the young man who did not have to earn his


living had a better chance to study for higher and more difficult examinations. This practical fact meant that in spite of the nominally "democratic" form of the Imperial Examinations, which were first systematized in the Tang dynasty, the higher bureaucracy became in fact semiaristocratic and semihereditary.

The Tang period was one in which China was by no means a closed world. Because of the way that politics and strategy were balanced between China and Central Asia, the deep inland frontier of China was more important for trade and cultural transmissions than was the coast. There was a fresh infusion of Buddhism from India, and Manicheism, Zoroastrianism, and Nestorian Christianity reached China through Central Asia. The town and oasis of Turfan in Chinese Central Asia could well be called the Shanghai of this period. Here many communities of foreigners lived together in the city and yet apart in quarters of their own. Each community kept its own way of worship, its own costume and its own language. Because of the dry desert air, striking relics of this period have been preserved—manuscripts in many strange languages, and wall paintings in caves the colors of which have not faded. Following a human habit that seems to be universal, painters of religious frescoes often incorporated portraits of their patrons in religious scenes, and thus we have even visual evidence of the many kinds of people that thronged around the western gates of China.


Buddhism, introduced into China at the beginning of the Han dynasty, attained its highest development and influence under the Wei kingdom and the Tang dynasty. Partly this was because in these centuries there was relatively free and safe travel to India through Central Asia, where Buddhism also flourished at this time. Partly it was because

Buddhism had an even greater survival vitality as a church than as a body of ideas. This was the period in which the Buddhist church, through its monasteries, flourished as a property-owning institution. As in medieval Europe, the monasteries managed to establish the legal concept of impersonal corporations, entitled to own property, to be neutral in periods of war, and to be exempt from taxation. Their wealth and their neutrality enabled the monasteries to patronize painting, sculpture, and scholarship; but as in Europe, their immunities led eventually to conflict between them and the state. In times of war and invasion great private landholders were politically conspicuous. They had to take one side or the other, and as a consequence they alternated between great power and sudden ruin. Only the church as a whole tended to grow more and more wealthy, though of course individual monasteries were occasionally despoiled of their land and revenues, or even plundered. Many private landholders made over their lands to some powerful monastery, in order to secure immunity.

Inevitably, when the Tang dynasty came to the height of its power, it had to reduce the power and immunities of the church, both in order to increase its own revenues and to reward the families which had supported the dynasty and risen to power with it. The result was a persecution of the church and a confiscation of its lands from which Buddhism in China never recovered. Buddhism survived as a cult, but Confucianism was restored to supremacy as the philosophy of the state and the basis for the training, in thought and politics, of the bureaucracy, whose most important members were of landlord origin. In the meantime, however, Buddhism had spread from China to Japan, which borrowed more copiously from China in the Tang period than at any other time.



The Tang Empire Mid-8th Century



China before the Mongol Conquest, Early 10th Century

Of the Central Asian religions which entered China in the Tang period, Nestorian Christianity appears not to have spread beyond the communities of foreign merchants, but Mohammedanism established itself permanently. In South and Southwest China, Mohammedanism was carried by Arab traders who came by the sea route around Singapore. In Northwest China the first Moslems included, besides traders, Central Asian and perhaps even Persian and Arab mercenaries in the pay of the Tang emperors. Many of these were given lands and settled permanently in China, with Chinese wives.

Cosmopolite influences and the revival of Confucian learning in Tang China interacted to create great painting, great sculpture, and above all great poetry. Of these it is the poetry that has been most highly regarded in China ever since; it is Elizabethan in its profuseness and in its combination of lyricism and tragedy.

THE FIVE DYNASTIES

When the Tang dynasty decayed, it decayed both from within the country and from the frontier. Within the country there was a repetition of the old and already well-known phenomenon: powerful officials enriched their own families; these families, usurping local authority as dominant landlords, appropriated to themselves the revenue of the land in the form of rent, diminishing the flow of revenue to the government in the form of taxes. Losing the power to control its own officials, the government lost the power to control the provinces.

At the same time, on the frontier, the chiefs of tribes "loyal" to China began to assert their own authority. They began to use for their own wars and their own power the

cavalry levy which they had formerly sent to serve in China or had commanded on behalf of China in wars and expeditions against the more distant barbarians. In proportion as China itself began to separate once more into regional units, the great border chiefs began to create units of their own.

These border kingdoms became the most important determining factor in the history of the next few hundred years, leading up to the great Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century. In their typical structure they combined a northern half with a society of warrior herdsmen and a southern half in which a Chinese population provided a revenue in grain, together with craftsmen and artisans of all kinds, traders, and enough bureaucrats to carry on an administration under the orders of the warrior rulers.

Kingdoms of this kind inevitably fought not only against each other, to determine who should have the greatest power, but against the more purely tribal society in the outer barbarian regions of northern Mongolia and the Amur frontier, in order to determine whether the kingdoms that drew a tribute from China should themselves pay a tribute to the warrior barbarians on their own northern frontiers.

Once more the fall of a great dynasty was followed by a period of extreme atomization—the half century from 907 to 960, known as the period of the Five Dynasties. Reintegration then began once more; but it was to be about 300 years before a “greater China” was again created.

THE SUNG DYNASTY

The Sung dynasty was founded in 960, and lasted until 1280; but though it was a dynasty with periods of brilliant and local prosperity, and of great literary refinement and

cultural subtlety, it never laid the whole of China under a firm rule. Its first capital was in the Yellow River valley, but in 1127 the capital had to be withdrawn first to Nanking and then to Hangchow in the lower Yangtze valley. From then on for more than a hundred years the Sung dynasty stood for the stubborn but slowly losing fight of a Yangtze China in which the quintessential Chinese characteristics were defended against a Yellow River China which was the tribute area exploited by a succession of barbarian conquerors.

The first of these conquerors was the Liao tribe, a nomad people of partly Turkish, partly Mongol characteristics, whose stronghold was in the north of what is now Jehol province. The Liao, whose tribal name was Khitan (the name from which "Cathay" is derived) were no sudden apparition on the Chinese frontier. They had a history reaching far back through the Tang dynasty, of which they had been auxiliaries. Hence, from the time when they began to encroach on China, they already had some knowledge of things Chinese and of how to administer Chinese affairs and exploit a Chinese population. They could not be easily and quickly absorbed into the society and culture of China, however, because unceasing wars with other tribes, much less Chinese and more barbarian than themselves, kept vigorous and warlike the tribal heart of their society.

First the Khitan took over a part of North China from one of the five dynasties that followed the fall of Tang. They set themselves up as the Liao dynasty even before the founding of the Sung dynasty, and by the beginning of the twelfth century they ruled all North China down to the Yellow River, with a capital at Peking, the modern Peiping. From that time on, they fought occasional wars against the Sung dynasty which ruled Yangtze China, but instead of conquering the Yangtze territory outright, they drew from the

Sung court large indemnities and tributes in silk and money.

Other wars, and the rise to power of other northern tribes, prevented the Liao from turning the whole of their strength against Central China. To the north, the Liao were able to dominate but not to subdue completely a number of tribes in Outer Mongolia and the Northeastern Provinces; to the west, their spread was limited by the rise of the kingdom of the Tangut, one of the least studied in Chinese history. (The Tangut were originally a Tibetan tribe. On the upper Yellow River, in parts of what are now the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia, they founded a curious mixed kingdom of Chinese, Tibetan, and Central Asian and Mongolian tribes.)

Eventually, the Liao were overthrown by one of their own tributary barbarian tribes, the Jurchid. The name of this people eventually came to be written by the Chinese as Nuchen; they founded a dynasty called Chin, which continued both the frontier wars of the Liao and the wars and demands for tribute against the Sung.

Orthodox Chinese history considers that all through this period it was the Sung who maintained the true line of Chinese dynastic succession. In spite of their military weakness they kept up a high and even luxurious culture in terms of philosophy, literature, and art.

Sung philosophy is noted especially for its re-examination and restatement of the Confucian code. In the arts the people of South China excelled in painting and in the production of silks and porcelains. This period was also one of the few in Chinese history when navigation was of notable importance. Sung vessels sailed to Netherlands India, India, and even Arabia. Perhaps Arab and Indian influences account for the revival of mathematics in the Sung period. In

the North, under the Liao dynasty, there was a distinct style in architecture of which the little that has survived is very impressive.

The Sung dynasty also produced in Wang An-shih a celebrated innovator in the practice and theory of government. It is typical of the Chinese culture that his prestige as a government official was based on two things—his studies in classical literature and his direction of public work in engineering for flood prevention in the Yangtze valley. It is also typical that the problem with which he tried to cope, and which finally defeated him, was the problem of shifting control of agricultural life and revenue from the landlord class to the government, without destroying the structure of the landlord class as such. His theory has often been called socialistic, which is a distortion. What Wang aimed at was not ownership by the state, but a monopoly of control by the bureaucratic personnel of the state. What defeated him was the fact that too many of the men who were servants of the state in public life were rent-collecting landlords in private life.

Wang An-shih's theories have been revived and much discussed in recent years in China because of an uneasy awareness of the same old problem—the dual orientation of the man who is both a public servant and a private landowner. There is also a desire to attempt once more to solve the problem by improving the honesty of officials through education and training, without removing from them their greatest temptation, which is the autocratic control over the lives and fortunes of tenant peasants that is inherent in the landlord system.

Weak though it was the Sung dynasty also had its warrior hero, Yueh Fei. He is a popular hero of folklore to this day, not so much for his genius as a general as for

his loyal determination to keep on fighting against the northern invaders of China. What defeated him was the attitude of the bureaucratic government officials, who were able to resign themselves to paying a heavy tribute to the northern barbarians but were unwilling to see the rise to power of a great soldier whose military prestige might enable him to dominate the civil government.

A great deal of the atmosphere of this age, combining a sophisticated culture with economic decline and social unrest, is preserved in one of the most celebrated Chinese novels, the *Shui Hu Chuan*, translated by Pearl Buck as "All Men Are Brothers." Although there is in it only a distant echo of the wars with the northern barbarians, it describes the China of the Sung period, shattered within itself by that distant concussion.

THE MONGOL DYNASTY

Both the northern kingdoms that ravaged it and the Sung Empire itself were eventually overwhelmed by the vast Mongol conquest. Usually the Mongols of Jenghis Khan are treated by historians as a mysterious, primeval, terrible force that erupted suddenly out of the desert north of China and rode destructively into China, Persia, Russia, and as far as the Balkans and Poland. Jenghis Khan himself is treated as a strange genius, for whom there is no rational explanation, or as a pure fighting man who hacked his way into history solely by fighting. Some other efforts to explain this phenomenon of history look rational and scientific but are really as farfetched as fairy tales—like the "explanation" that the Mongols were driven to disperse and conquer by the supposed fact that a change of climate had dried up their home pastures. As a matter of fact, the

politics and wars of nomad people can be as rationally analyzed as the politics and wars of any other society. The conquests of the Mongols and the career of Jenghis Khan did not burst suddenly on the world; they grew out of a long generative process. The events of Mongol history in the thirteenth century were rooted in the history of the barbarian and semibarbarian kingdoms along the Great Wall of China.

Jenghis Khan himself did not leap into history from the Gobi Desert; his family had for several generations been petty princes or tribal chiefs in the rich eastern pastures of Outer Mongolia. Here they were hangers-on—partly allies and partly tributaries—of the Jurchids who founded the Chin dynasty in North China. As the Chin dynasty decayed at its capital, its representatives were no longer able to keep order among the distant tribes far beyond the Great Wall. The family of Jenghis Khan was defeated in a tribal feud, and Jenghis as a fatherless boy had to make his own way. Entering the service of a chief who was an enemy of his father's enemies, he gradually built up both a reputation in battle and a reputation as a man who looked after his followers between battles. He was always careful to give himself a "legal" excuse whenever he betrayed a liege lord or an ally thus appearing as a man loyal to the interests of his own followers rather than as a man disloyal to the chiefs with whom he quarreled. He was fifty years old before his tribal wars brought him to the position where he could snowball together the strength of all the tribes and engage in wars of conquest beyond the tribal area.

Though Jenghis Khan's campaigns were greater than those of Alexander or any other conqueror, he did not actually conquer China. His wars along the Great Wall of China were primarily against the Chin dynasty and the

Tangut kingdom; it was while he was returning from his final victory over the Tangut ruler that he died. The overthrow of the Sung dynasty was completed after his death, when the Mongols rode all the way to the Yangtze and far beyond the Yangtze into Burma.

Several Mongol empires were formed after the death of Jenghis Khan—in Persia, in Central Asia and southern Russia, and in China. The dynasty in China, under the name of Yuan, was founded by his grandson Kublai Khan. It was regarded as the senior Mongol dynasty, to which the others were rather vaguely subordinate.

Because of their enormously wide conquests, the Mongols provided communications which made possible a good deal of trade and cultural interchange between China, western Asia, and Europe. Nevertheless the Mongols were regarded in Europe as the darkest kind of savages, and in China also the Yuan dynasty is not considered by the Chinese to have reached a high cultural level, though the paintings of that period are greatly admired.

The Mongols themselves had no urbane culture, but they were important carriers of cultural influences. Through them the knowledge of printing and gunpowder spread to Europe, and from Central Asia and Persia they brought administrators, mathematicians, and engineers to China. These foreigners in the Mongol service brought with them kaoliang (sorghum millet) and cotton as new crops; and with Persian engineers and Chinese gunpowder the Mongols undertook massive siege operations against walled cities.

Being warriors rather than literati, the Mongols liked their learning popularized. They had a zest for the theater, and in music and stylized form the Chinese theatrical opera derives from the Mongol period. The Mongols also loved

romantic and picaresque historical novels, which they could learn to read more easily than the stilted classics.

People of western countries have always had a special interest in the history of the Mongol or Yuan dynasty in China because of the travels of Marco Polo. More people have heard about Marco Polo than have read his accounts, and this hearsay has left us with a romantic but somewhat hazy idea of the man and his time. What Marco Polo actually tells us, supplemented by the accounts of other travelers, shows us an empire almost incredibly vast but badly put together. The Mongol conquerors tried hard not to let themselves become enmeshed in the Chinese bureaucratic system, to draw a tribute from China, but not to "become Chinese." Yet the empire which they had created was one which it was impossible to integrate under the conditions of a time when there was no machine industry and when the fastest communication was by mounted courier.

The Mongols did not want to turn Chinese, yet it was impossible for them to remain pure nomad warriors, because of the economic and social effects on them of ruling China and administering the profitable but cumbersome and at the same time intricate machinery of its irrigation, flood prevention, and minutely subdivided system of collecting land taxes and land rents. It is not surprising that their empire, which Marco Polo—judging it by the European standards of his time—considered to be the most powerful, stable, and efficiently ruled in the world, crashed in confusion less than a hundred years after the time of his travels.

The fall of the Mongol Empire was different from that of any other Chinese dynasty. First the Mongol homeland itself began to become impatient of control by the court at Peking and unwilling in obedience to an emperor whom

the Mongols had come to think of as distant, effete, and un-Mongol. Then the Chinese began to rise in rebellion. Peasant revolt in the Yangtze valley reduced the revenues and weakened the power of the state.

THE MING DYNASTY—NATIONALISM

Out of this fighting arose the man who founded the Ming dynasty in the middle of the fourteenth century. Having been a wandering Buddhist priest, he was closely in touch with the people; having been a bandit rebel against the Mongols, he was a nationalist leader. In fact, the Ming dynasty had a nationalist tinge, retained to this day in the memories of Chinese, distinguishing it from all other dynasties.

Throughout their history the Chinese have probably had less racial consciousness than any other great people. In all their centuries of war against "barbarians" they seem to have thought of themselves as fighting against alien and unwelcomed ways of living and doing things rather than against "foreign" people. As for the barbarian conquerors of China, those who did not adapt themselves to Chinese culture found themselves baffled. Even the wealth of the culture could not be tapped except through the elaborate bureaucracy. Conquerors who attempted simply to plunder found that the sources of wealth dried up rapidly. Other conquerors, who attempted regular exploitation so as to assure themselves a steady revenue, found that they could do so only by mutual adjustments between their interests and those of the bureaucracy. In proportion as they did so, they found themselves "becoming Chinese"; at the same time the upper-class, literate, landowning Chinese would begin to go over, one after the other, to the new dynasty.

The Mongols had never entirely reconciled themselves to this process. They even made a conscious attempt to supersede the Chinese bureaucracy by importing "civil servants" of their own recruited among the literate peoples of Central Asia and Persia. Because of this the Mongol dynasty, when it fell, was not only a government that had become corrupt and incompetent; it still remained, for most of the Chinese people, a government of foreigners.

As the Chinese armies moved north, under a new national leader, the Mongol emperor and his court fled back to Mongolia. Failing to establish a new dynasty there, they became lost in the turmoil of tribal wars, just as more than one Chinese dynasty of the past few hundred years, retiring from the North, had been overturned and replaced in the South. A number of Mongol nobles, however, did not withdraw entirely from China; retiring as far as the frontier, they came to terms with the Chinese and managed to hold out as princes of feudal domains, professing submission and allegiance to the new Chinese dynasty. Such men were the equivalents of many a powerful Chinese who, in previous centuries, had come to terms with some barbarian conqueror, submitting to defeat but at the same time entering the service of the new dynasty.

In culture as in politics the Ming period was nationalistic. The Ming Chinese were restorers, not originators. The study of the classics, painting, printing, and the manufacture of such things as lacquer and porcelain had all degenerated to a certain extent under the comparatively uncouth Mongol rule. The Ming Chinese restored much higher standards, but the period as a whole was not highly inventive or creative.

The nationalistic glory of the Ming dynasty has somewhat obscured the actual distribution of power that fol-

lowed the fall of the Mongols. For a few decades, Chinese troops campaigned far to the north, defeating the Mongols in their own terrain. Then the ancient pattern began to reassert itself. The Chinese were unable to maintain themselves as rulers in the steppe habitat of the nomads without "going nomad" any more than nomads had been able to set up as rulers deep within China without "going Chinese." Since there was a stubborn reluctance among most Chinese to stay in nomad territory and adapt themselves to nomad life, the territory as a whole gradually came back under the rule of tribal chiefs.

THE MANCHU DYNASTY

Beyond the Great Wall, it was in the Northeastern Provinces that the Ming Chinese established themselves most firmly. In the southern part of this area there was prosperous farming land which had always been populated by Chinese. West of the good farming land the Ming authorities dealt with a number of Mongol tribes; to the north and north-east they dealt with a number of the tribes which are known under the collective name of Tungus. For the control of all of these peoples they used a mixture of punitive expeditions, grants of titles and honors and subsidies, and grants of special rights of trade.

In the woods and river valleys of the Northeast the Tungus tribes were descendants of barbarian warriors who, in the twelfth century, had been adherents of the Jurchids who founded the Chin dynasty. Some of the petty chieftains of these tribes claimed to be, and may actually have been, descendants of the Jurchid imperial clan. Among them was a family of warriors from which came, in the late sixteenth century, the founder of the next dynasty to rule over China.

This man was called Nurhachi. His family paid tribute to the Chinese, received grants from the Chinese frontier authorities, and carried on blood feuds with other clans of backwoods aristocrats. In proportion as the Ming government became decadent in China, its frontier officials found it difficult to keep order among the quarrelsome tribes. Clan feuds tended to get out of control and become tribal wars; tribal wars tended to get out of control and involve the Chinese authorities as partisans, because they no longer had the power to intervene as dispassionate arbiters.

This chaos was what opened the way to a career for a man like Nurhachi. Claiming that a relative had been betrayed by the Chinese, he turned against the Chinese. He was able to make two kinds of political appeal: drawing on his experience among the Chinese, he could criticize the breakdown of Chinese government in the region, blaming the officials; drawing on his tribal background, he could remind the tribal people of the glorious time, many hundred years before, when their ancestors had conquered a large part of China and the government had belonged to them.

After several turbulent decades, Nurhachi became the ruler of a powerful border kingdom. His armies made long forays into North China. His own tribesmen, to whom he had now given the name of Manchu, were only a part of his forces; he also enlisted Mongols, Koreans, and many Chinese. The Manchus at this time had no written language; but as their language is rather closely related to Mongol, he borrowed the Mongol alphabet and adapted it so that documents could be written in Manchu. In this way he hoped to make the Manchu language both a symbol and an instrument of government; but it was evident, even in his own lifetime, that this attempt would not succeed. In the

mixed kingdom of the Manchus, the main elements of systematic government, taxation, and administration were from the beginning Chinese, because the most important revenue, and even a large part of the military manpower, were drawn from regions populated by Chinese.

Nurhachi himself did not live to conquer China, but the conquest was the work of the armies which he had built up. It was, however, only in part a "foreign" conquest by "invading barbarians." Within China itself the Ming government was falling to pieces. Peasants were rising in rebellion, and regional claimants to power were showing themselves. In this turmoil the Manchus, with their mixed legions or "Banners" of Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese troops, together with many Koreans, had the best military force in the field and they were, moreover, the claimants best provided with civil administrators and best qualified to restore the standard forms and procedures of Chinese government.

No previous invaders of China had been so strongly affected by Chinese culture, before conquering China, as had the Manchus. It was the deliberate policy of the Manchu emperors to represent themselves as guardians of orthodox Chinese traditions. At the same time, being conquerors, they liked to take their culture in easy doses. Even the "competitive" examinations by which men were qualified for positions in the government bureaucracy were made easier for Manchus than for Chinese. It is not surprising, therefore, that Manchu tastes were more eclectic than austere. Like the Mongols before them, they preferred the sweet flavor of novels to the dry flavor of historical research. China's most famous novel of sophisticated society, "The Dream of the Red Chamber," was written by a Manchu. Of the novels written by Chinese, the most important were

those which combined fiction with disguised political pamphleteering: under the pretense of writing spicy scandals, they lampooned the corruptness of the whole administrative system under the Manchus.

In spite of Manchu policy, Chinese nationalism never died. This undoubtedly had something to do with the high level reached, during the Manchu period, in comparative philology and in the editing of historical texts by scientific methods. The spirit of criticism which could not safely venture into public discussion of current events turned back to the examination of the past. The scholars of the Manchu period set up standards of methodical procedure which underlie a great part of contemporary China's output of critical and theoretical work in the social sciences.

If this were all, the history of the Manchu dynasty could be written as one more chapter in a series; but in the time of the Manchus the history of China began to merge with that of the outer world in a totally new way.

CHAPTER III

China and the West

AS A RESULT of the great voyages which had opened a way across the Atlantic, a way around the Cape of Good Hope, and a way around Cape Horn, western traders and missionaries had begun to reach the coast of China by sea even before the fall of the Ming dynasty. Cannon made by Europeans won a great battle against the Manchus, before the Manchus finally broke through the Great Wall. This may be taken as symbolic. Although firearms soon became widely known in China, and crude muskets were even manufactured in China, Manchu statesmanship may in large measure be described as an attempt to maintain in China the rule of a bow-and-arrow aristocracy in spite of the changes that were going on in the world as a whole.

By the eighteenth century, the activities of Europeans in China had changed from intermittent contact to increasing pressure.

This change from contact to pressure was due first and foremost to great changes among the Europeans themselves. The early Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch, though often strongly armed and predatory, were merchants in search of commodities that had a high value of rarity and luxury on the European market. What they wanted most of all was

free opportunity to buy in the Chinese markets. In much the same way the Catholic missionaries who accompanied the Spanish and Portuguese wanted a chance to win converts to their faith and to create a place for their faith among the religions of Asia. Since the Catholic Church represented that part of the society of Europe which was most resistant to change, these missionaries were eager to win religious adherents but were quite willing to adapt themselves to the conservative society and economy of China as a whole.

Compared with these early comers, the English, who toward the end of the eighteenth century became the most active and numerous among the foreigners along the coast of China, were a revolutionary force. A curious symbol of this change from one historical period to another is the fact that the first English missionary to China was not only a Protestant but a Nonconformist, that is to say, one who did not accept the authority of the established Church of England, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century was quite a serious matter. This missionary, Robert Morrison, had to travel to China by way of America, because of the effort of the British East India Company to stop him from getting there at all. From the time that Protestant missionary work in China began, the missionaries took an attitude sharply different from that of the Catholics. Far from seeking merely for converts, and far from accepting the culture and social system of China, their view was that the Chinese, as "benighted heathen," were an inferior people. Everything that was "wrong" with them—poverty, ignorance, disease, the bound feet of women, the system of marriages arranged between families instead of by individuals—was to be attributed to the fact that they did not believe in the Protestant Christian God. The individual Chinese convert must therefore not only accept

the new religion but also turn against practically the whole of the established Chinese way of living, of thinking, and of doing things. In fact it is hardly too much to say that the whole of the Protestant missionary movement in China was more of a subverting force than a converting proselytism. This tendency continued for about a hundred years, until the rise of a revolutionary movement among the Chinese themselves began to assert the startling doctrine that the Chinese were as good as anybody else and entitled to organize and manage their own Protestant Christian church.

CHINA AS A MARKET

Trade, under the pressure of England's Industrial Revolution, brought its own attack on Chinese culture parallel to the missionaries' faultfinding. English merchants competed to win the Chinese market for their English goods.

In the eighteenth century British trade with China had been predominantly an activity of the East India Company, and an extension of that company's monopoly from India to China. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries trade had been dominated by the theory of "mercantilism." A group of merchants would form a company and apply to the government of their own country for a charter giving them a monopoly of trading rights in some geographical region. This device enabled private interests to use the power of the government of their country to compete against similar groups supported by the governments of other countries, and at the same time to prevent other groups in their own country from trading in the same region and competing with them. Protected in this way, they were able to monopolize the trade in a number of

commodities, controlling prices and insuring enormous profits.

In the case of England, the great wealth brought back from India provided much of the capital which gave England a head start in carrying through the Industrial Revolution. This capital in turn created new private-interest groups in England which eventually conflicted with and overthrew the monopoly trading privileges of the East India Company. This change within England was reflected in the activities of the British in China and brought about a new relationship between the British government and the Chinese government.

In the eighteenth century the East India ships had come to China primarily for cargoes of silk, tea, and porcelain. The first flowered wallpaper used in Europe also came from China. In return the Chinese bought such luxury goods as clocks and watches; but on the whole the Chinese, who considered their civilization infinitely superior to that of the westerners, did not have nearly so much to buy from the westerners as they had to sell to them.

To make up the balance of trade, the western traders had to bring in great quantities of silver. Naturally the westerners looked eagerly for some commodity that could be sold in China in really large quantities. American clipper ships, for instance, took with them from New England large quantities of the ginseng root, valued by the Chinese as medicine. Filling the rest of their cargo space with rum, kettles, hatchets, and other trade goods, they would sail around Cape Horn and up the Pacific Coast of America all the way to the Columbia River, where they traded with the Indians for valuable furs. Then with their furs and ginseng they crossed the Pacific to China, taking with them also sil-

ver dollars which they had acquired in Mexico on the way up the Pacific Coast. With these cargoes and coins they would trade for Chinese goods; and this practice incidentally accounts for the fact that the silver dollar in China came to be known as the "Mexican dollar."

There were more things for the foreign traders to buy than they had to sell and these things continued to be paid for chiefly in silver until British merchants found a market for opium. This commodity brought about a rapid reversal of the balance of trade. The Chinese began to consume so much opium that soon the foreign ships, instead of bringing silver to China, were sailing away from China with stocks of silver.

Other changes were taking place at the same time. On the one hand, opium had such a high value that the trade in it could not be successfully confined to a monopoly; there was plenty of money left over to bribe officials, and more and more traders made their private arrangements and crowded into the business. More important still, though not so obvious at first, were the new pressures beginning to operate far away in England. The constantly growing factories in England became strong enough to influence the government. They forced all ships sailing from England to carry a quota of manufactured textiles, even though the market for these commodities in China was as yet so undeveloped that many of the textiles had to be sold at a loss.

There were three results of all these changes. First, the Chinese government, alarmed at the loss of silver, tried to enforce regulations severely restricting the trade. Second, the older British monopoly interests, trying to maintain their established market, urged the British government to force the Chinese government to continue accepting the im-

port of opium, whether they liked it or not. And third, the newer British interests, pushing impatiently to find or create new markets for their manufactured commodities, especially textiles, urged the British government to force the Chinese government to accept the principle of free opportunity to trade for all merchants dealing in any commodities.

Since these new British interests represented an expanding industrial capacity to manufacture not only greater quantities but more kinds of commodities, they were as much opposed to the old British monopoly charters as to any other kind of limitation on trade, and framed their demands in such a way that they were supported by similar interests in other countries. Thus the new British drive for free trade became the spearhead of a new international development.

FOREIGN DOMINATION

This tangled interplay of private interests and government policy came to a crisis when a zealous Chinese official seized and burned a large stock of British-owned opium. The controversy developed into the Opium War, in which the British government supported the interests of the British merchants. It ended in the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. The terms of this treaty, and other negotiations which immediately followed, completely changed the international status of China, with five chief consequences.

First: The Chinese were forced to pay not only for the burned opium which was the immediate cause of the war, but for the cost to the British of fighting the war. This payment established a new principle, and from that time forward, whenever the Chinese were defeated, they not only

suffered the other consequences of defeat, but had to pay an indemnity to cover the expenses of whatever country had defeated them.

Second: The indemnity for the Opium War, to which other indemnities were later added, saddled the Chinese government with an international debt and a yearly tribute which could not be paid under the existing system of taxation. In order to raise the necessary funds, a customs service was created to collect dues on foreign trade. This service was from the beginning dominated by the foreign powers, principally the British, and dues were collected at the flat rate of five per cent of the value of all goods. This low tariff opened the way to the penetration of China by foreign manufactured commodities, and at the same time prevented the Chinese from developing industries of their own under the protection of a tariff framed in the national interest.

Third: Whereas the Chinese had formerly limited trade to the single port of Canton, the foreigners now secured the right to trade at a number of other ports. These became known as the Treaty Ports, because they were opened under the treaties forced on the Chinese. At one or two of these ports there were international settlements within which all foreigners lived, under local self-government; in most of them, separate national concessions were granted to various foreign countries. Within these settlements and concessions foreign consuls had jurisdiction over their own nationals, and a Chinese who had a civil suit against a foreigner had to have it judged under foreign law. This aspect of the "unequal treaties" gave the foreigners not only political power and social prestige, but tremendous economic leverage.

Fourth: Political and economic domination were assured to the western nations by their overwhelming technical

superiority in arms manufacture. Before the Industrial Revolution, cannon were made almost entirely in royal or state arsenals and small arms by individual craftsmen working either for the state or independently. This was the practice both in China and in the western countries. But in Europe and America the Industrial Revolution made metals abundant. Eli Whitney's first venture in mass production was in the manufacture of muskets. China, limited by handicraft methods, lagged behind both in the mining and the processing of metals. And while China in time bought arms and munitions and even a navy, the foreign powers naturally took care that she should never become their equal in arms.

Fifth: Under a separate treaty signed in 1843, the British established the "most-favored nation clause." This subjected the Chinese to another new principle: that any privilege won from them by any foreign country could be equally enjoyed by all other foreign countries. The Americans were the first to take advantage of this clause, under a treaty signed in 1844. Thus China, instead of being conquered and made a colony by one nation, became virtually the international colony of all nations which had merchant ships to send to China and gunboats to accompany them. As the result of a victory won in the first instance by the British there came into being a new international system, controlling the country with the greatest population in the world; a country with a tremendous geographical area and with enormous undeveloped resources which it was henceforth unable to develop in its own national interest. This system of "unequal treaties" limited the sovereignty of China and gave rights in China and over China to the "Treaty Powers."

It is worth devoting a few words to the special American

interest in these new developments. The Americans were themselves a new nation, with a vast undeveloped hinterland of their own. At the same time, the Americans were also in the forefront of the world-wide Industrial Revolution. Unhampered by the established social structure and vested interest of Europe, they developed a social and economic system which was the most perfect expression of the new age created by the Industrial Revolution. This made the Americans, busy though they were in the development of their own country, keenly conscious of the new principle of world-wide trade. Although America built up its own industrial system behind a protective tariff, the American interest everywhere else in the world was against both national monopolies and monopolies controlled by groups within nations. For this reason, although the United States was not ready to stake out concessions in the Treaty Ports, American merchants lived in the concessions held by other countries and claimed all the advantages and privileges of the concession system.

After the Opium War, domestic developments and foreign relations in China were more closely connected than in any other country. The degree of foreign control forced a number of changes on the Chinese and at the same time prevented other changes. Economically, this resulted in great distortion. China had quantities of cheap raw materials, but the foreigners had a controlling power not only in finance and technology but also in political security. As a result, industry was unable to develop in an organic and functional way related to the sources of raw materials and the distribution of potential domestic markets; it grew up instead in a lopsided way at seaports like Shanghai and Tientsin and river ports like Hankow. Here factories could be built in foreign concessions under foreign

flags, free of Chinese taxation and protected when necessary by foreign gunboats. To these ports the raw materials were brought by cheap inland water transport and cheap human labor. The cheapness of labor, more than any other factor, made it possible to process these materials at a profit. Not unnaturally, the first Chinese industries were imitations of foreign enterprises, and grew up close to the foreign-controlled centers, thus increasing the nonfunctional concentration of industry at points accessible to foreign-owned steamers.

Politically there was also great distortion. At the time of the Opium War, the Manchu dynasty was already in marked decay. The Opium War gravely injured the prestige of the Manchus, and their dynasty would have fallen within a decade or two, had it not been for the fact that the foreigners themselves, after defeating the Manchus, had an interest in maintaining the dynasty in order to dictate, through the Manchu court, the kind of government that suited their own interests. The second half of the nineteenth century was therefore a period of brutal confusion, held in check by the intermittent application of foreign violence. Throughout this period the foreigners had only one device for ruling China which really counted: reliance on the Strong Man. The Strong Man, in practice, turned out always to be a man weak enough to accept orders and control from abroad, but strong enough to give orders and exercise control domestically.

Within China, the most important events between the Opium War and the Chinese Revolution of 1911 were the Taiping Rebellion (1848-65), and the Boxer Rebellion (1900). Further complications were the Anglo-French war against China in 1860-61; the depredation of the French in connection with their annexation of part of what is now

French Indo-China; the Japanese war against China of 1894-95; the international punitive expedition to China which ended the Boxer Rebellion; and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, which was fought on Chinese territory.

The Taiping Rebellion lasted more than fifteen years. It spread over eleven provinces south of the Yangtze and along the Yangtze, and is believed to have cost about 20,000,000 lives. It was in part a peasant rebellion and in part a national rising against the Manchus. Owing to the fact that the leader of the rebellion was influenced in his early years by Christian teachings, there was for a while quite a strong tendency among some foreigners in China to advocate support for the rebels, but eventually foreign interests decided to bolster up the Manchu government. Accordingly, a British officer, the famous "Chinese Gordon," was lent to the Manchus and the rebellion was put down by force.

The Taiping Rebellion left behind a permanent tradition of both social and political revolution, and it ought to be regarded as the first revolutionary war in the long struggle which created the independent China of today. Unfortunately, there also developed out of the Taiping Rebellion a new and sinister factor in Chinese politics—the semimodern Chinese army. These troops and the militarists who commanded them were strong enough to tyrannize within China, but not strong enough to fight a war of national defense against foreign aggression. Their first effect was to eat up revenue and their second effect was to make command of an army even more important for ambitious officials than a high appointment at the imperial court.

More treaties were signed as the nineteenth century progressed, all increasing and defining the degree of foreign

control. Then in 1894 came the calamitous war with Japan. Its consequences were even worse than a defeat by Britain or France might have been. For the western powers Japan's victory meant that she now claimed a place in the ring of despoilers closing in on China; moreover, Japan was within closer striking distance of China than any other naval power. This new circumstance intensified the competition for strategic bases and economic spheres of influence in China to the point where China was threatened with actual dismemberment.

THE OPEN DOOR

Final crisis was deferred by the policy of the Open Door, proposed by American Secretary of State Hay in 1899 in a series of notes to the Treaty Powers who might have sought to partition China into separate colonial possessions. Essentially, the Open Door was a further development of the permanent American policy, which may be called a policy of "hitchhiking" imperialism in preference to active imperialism. That is to say, America did not take the lead in seizing Chinese territory or imposing legal disabilities on the Chinese, but did demand that whatever was gouged out of China by any other nation should not be monopolized by that nation alone, but shared with all comers.

The Open Door notes did not propose a cessation of imperialistic demands on China; they merely registered a claim of "me too." That is to say, whatever any country took in China, it must leave an Open Door for American trade and enterprise. The practical effect of this arrangement was to halt the process of cutting China up into colonial possessions. There developed, instead, a uniform procedure of

presenting joint international demands to the Chinese government. This accounts for both the strength and the weakness of America's long-maintained policy of checking Japan's imperialistic encroachments in China. America did restrain Japan with a good deal of effectiveness; but the restraint was never worded in clear-cut terms of anti-imperialism, because all that America attempted to prevent was the acquisition by Japan of *exclusive* rights, privileges, and territorial control.

The Open Door policy, far from being an isolated American pronouncement, was a compromise formula for keeping rivalry under control. In fact, the first draft of the formula was not the work of the American State Department, but of an Englishman named Hoppisley who was in the Chinese Customs Service, and therefore technically in the employ of the Chinese government, although actually an executive of the international control over China's most important source of revenue.

The rivalry of the last decade of the nineteenth century was complicated by the fact that Tsarist Russia was the only great power which had direct access to China by land. This situation led to attempts to regulate the competition between encroachment on China from the land and from the sea. After the Japanese victory over China in 1895, Russia, Germany, and France intervened to limit the territorial claims which Japan made on China; then came the Boxer Rebellion and the invasion of China by international forces to put down the rebellion.

THE BOXER REBELLION

The Boxer Rebellion was a result of the fact that for decades the encroachments of foreign countries had been

both breaking down the Manchu dynasty in China and proping it up. Defeats had destroyed the prestige of the government, and the indemnities paid for defeat had put a larger and larger share of China's revenue under foreign control. Yet the foreigners, not quite ready to partition China, always gave back to the Manchu court just enough power to keep on ruling badly, without being able to rule effectively.

It is hardly surprising either that the Chinese people were resentful, or that their resentment was bewildered. Secret societies abounded, because it was only in secrecy that the people, especially the peasants, could safely organize. Organization in secret, to prepare for open rebellion, was the Chinese peasant's traditional mode of direct political action. Such societies, of which the Boxer Society was one, were naturally and inevitably antidynastic, but at this period they were also antiforeign, because the westerners in China were intruders like the Manchus, quite as arrogant as the Manchus and even more powerful.

In the year 1900, when peasant outbreaks began to increase in frequency and in the number of rebels involved, the Manchu court attempted a desperate gamble: to turn the insurgents away from themselves, they turned them against the foreigners, promising them support and blaming all the sufferings of China on the "foreign devils." The viceroys of the Yangtze region and the South, who knew more about the real strength of the foreigners, prevented the spread of the Boxer movement; but in the North missionaries were murdered and all the foreigners in Peking were besieged within the semifortified Legation Quarter. They were eventually rescued by an international military expedition; and once more a heavy indemnity was imposed on China, the payments on which could only be met by

WESTERN WORLD	DYNASTIES	CHINESE WORLD	B.C. 1800 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100
amurabi BRONZE AGE	HSIA	NEOLITHIC AGE. Agricultural communities in Yellow River valley cultivated loess soil with stone tools. Domesticated dog and pig. Hunting and fishing tribes in Yangtse valley.	
EGYPTIAN NEW EMPIRE osers rojan War	SHANG	BRONZE AGE. Primitive Yellow River city states. Probable use of irrigation. Shāng-inscribed bones give base line of history. Sheep and goats domesticated. Writing. Beautiful bronze castings. Potter's wheel. Stone carving. Silk culture and weaving. Wheeled vehicles.	
ION AGE lomon curgus rthage founded brew prophets eek lyric poets	CHOU	ANCIENT FEUDALISM. Expansion from Yellow River to Yangtse valley. "City and country" cells. Increased irrigation. Eunuchs. Horse-drawn war chariots. 841 B.C. earliest authenticated date. Glass. IRON AGE. Round coins. Magnetism known. CLASSICAL PERIOD. Confucius, Lao-tze.	
rsian Wars crates ito istotle xander nic Wars rthage and Corinth destroyed lilus Caesar	CHIN	Mencius. Bronze mirrors. BEGINNING OF EMPIRE. Great Wall. Palace architecture. Trade through Central Asia with Roman Empire. Ink.	

D.	HÂN	A.D.
00	3 KINGDOMS	100
00	CHIN	200
00	WEI	300
00	SUNG	400
00	CHI	500
00	LIANG	600
00	CHEN	700
00	SUI	800
00	TANG	900
00	5 DYNASTIES	1000
00	LIAO	1100
00	CHIN	1200
00	SUNG	1300
00	YUAN	1400
00	MING	1500
00	CHING	1600
00	REPUBLIC	1700
00	CRUSADES	1800
00	Magna Carta	1900
00	RENAISSANCE	
00	Printing in Europe	
00	Turks take Constantinople	
00	AGE OF DISCOVERY	
00	Religious Wars	
00	American } Revolutions	
00	French } First World War	
00	Industrial } Russian Revolution	
00	Second World War	
00	First Buddhist Influences.	
00	Paper.	
00	Tea.	
00	Political disunity but cultural progress and spread.	
00	Buddhism flourishing. Use of coal.	
00	Trade with Indo-China and Siam.	
00	Large-scale unification. Grand Canal.	
00	ZENITH OF CULTURE. Chinese culture reaches Japan. Turk and Tungus alliances.	
00	Revival of Confucianism weakens power of Buddhist monasteries. Mohammedanism. Cotton from India. Porcelain. First printed book.	
00	State examinations organized. Rise of Khitan.	
00	Foot binding. Poetry, painting, sculpture.	
00	Wang An-shih.	
00	Classical Renaissance. Paper money.	
00	Rise of Jurchid. Compass.	
00	Navigation and mathematics.	
00	MONGOL AGE. Jenghis Khan. Marco Polo. Franciscans.	
00	Operatic theater. Novels.	
00	Lamaism.	
00	Yung Lo builds Peking.	
00	Period of restoration and stagnation.	
00	Portuguese traders arrive.	
00	Clash with Japan over Korea.	
00	Nurhachi.	
00	Critical scholarship.	
00	Canton open to Western trade.	
00	Treaties with Western powers. Spread of Western culture. Taiping Rebellion.	
00	Boxer Rebellion. 1911 Revolution. Nationalist Revolution. Unification under Chiang Kai-shek.	
00	Japanese invasion and World War II.	

giving the foreigners still more control of China's revenues. This burden was partially mitigated some years later when most of the powers involved remitted to China what was still owed to them of the Boxer indemnity funds, to be used largely for educational and cultural purposes.

In spite of the terms of settlement, Russian forces remained in Manchuria in great numbers, and consequently when the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904 the fact that the Japanese invaded Chinese territory to carry on the war was regarded by many people as less important than the fact that they were challenging Russian power on Chinese territory. The trend of opinion began to turn the other way again when the Japanese, after their victory, replaced the Russians as the people who were most likely to exploit a position of special advantage on the very threshold of China.

PART THREE

Modern China

CHAPTER I

The Chinese Revolution

AFTER THE Boxer Rebellion, the Manchu dynasty in China was doomed. The only question was whether the Chinese could organize a movement capable of setting up a new government before the foreign powers partitioned the whole country.

The political genius of the movement which overthrew the Manchus and founded the Republic of China was Sun Yat-sen; the raw material with which he worked was the wide network of anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist secret societies among the Chinese in China and the Chinese abroad. Out of this raw material he built a politically disciplined revolutionary party and a coherent theory of the aims of the Chinese Revolution and the methods by which to achieve them.

THE FIRST REVOLUTION

The Revolution began many years before Sun Yat-sen's full ascendancy was recognized. It broke out in 1911, while Sun was abroad. The destructive work of the Revolution was quickly finished; the empire fell because it was too rotten to stand. The constructive work of the Revolution,

however, lagged for many years because there was not yet enough training and discipline among the revolutionaries.

The western world received the Revolution of 1911 with little enthusiasm, but could not quite decide to suppress it, because the great powers were already lining up for the savage world-wide war over colonies, markets, and investments which broke out in 1914. The great powers accordingly limited themselves to the policy of aiding a "strong man" to usurp control of the new Republic, in order that he might act as trustee for foreign treaty rights, privileges, markets, loans, and investments. In order to make sure of him, they granted him an international loan. This "strong man" was Yuan Shih-kai, the first of the modern war lords, who later tried to make himself emperor.

From this time on until the Second Revolution of 1926-27 the war lord—the politician with a private army—became the dominant factor in China. The typical war lord aimed at the control, if possible, of a seaport through which he could receive shipments of arms from abroad. If he controlled an inland area, he frequently tried to set up an arsenal, in order to supply himself with arms. He financed his private army by collecting all taxes within the territory occupied by his army.

All war lords bargained, shadow-boxed, and occasionally fought between themselves and with or against the central government. The individual war lords could either bargain over the price for which he would be willing to support the central government, or threaten to support some other war lord against the central government. Various foreign governments had dealings, direct or indirect, with one war lord or another; but most of them did so only in search of a strongest man among the strong men—someone who could be set up as the internationally recognized dictator of all

China, competent to mortgage China's minerals and other natural resources in return for loans.

Japan, on the other hand, pursued a calculated policy of always supporting more than one war lord, since Japan did not want a unified dictatorship any more than any other form of unity in China. The Japanese method was to negotiate local concessions from a regional war lord, and then press for recognition of these concessions by the central government. By way of insurance, whenever the Japanese dealt with a man in power, they also dealt with one of the leading claimants to his power.

For many years, one of the most independent and powerful of the war lords with whom they dealt was Chang Tso-lin, who controlled Northeast China, where the Japanese enjoyed many special privileges. According to his lights, Chang Tso-lin was an honest war lord; he would bargain for support against other war lords, but he would not sell his country outright. This eventually made it necessary for the Japanese to get rid of him; his train was blown up while on a stretch of track patrolled by Japanese sentries. No Chinese had been allowed to approach this stretch of track for some time.

It is important to remember that a great part of the warlord period in China ran parallel with the war in Europe from 1914 to 1918. Moreover, while this war ended in Europe with the Armistice of 1918 and the Versailles Treaty of 1919, it did not really end in Eastern Asia until the Japanese finally abandoned their attempt to occupy Siberia. At the Washington Conference of 1922, when new treaties were drawn up defining the balance of naval and political power in Eastern Asia and the Pacific, international pressure was applied to make Japan withdraw from Siberia.

Until the Washington Conference, China had been

threatened by Japan almost from day to day. Japan used Northeast China as a base against both China and Russia. In 1915, when the other major powers were locked in war in Europe, and America's attention was also diverted across the Atlantic, Japan had made one especially bold attempt to assert permanent control over China. She presented the Twenty-one Demands, which were intended to win for her certain powers of control over China, and certain powers of veto, military, political, and financial. China had to give in to some of the demands, and probably would have had to accept all of them, had it not been for the fact that the demands, which Japan intended to keep secret, were revealed in America.

During these years of trouble Sun Yat-sen continued his work, though regarded by the western powers as an ineffective visionary. His major source of strength was his ability to bring together men of widely divergent views, theories, and personal interests, and to persuade them to work together in one direction, guided by what they had in common. The number of his adherents varied. When things got a little better, the more cautious or easily satisfied would drop out, feeling that enough had been won, at least for the present. When, on the other hand, the situation got decidedly worse, the more timid would be frightened away. Time after time the revolutionary movement was checked when Sun Yat-sen was abandoned, or even driven out, by some militarist who had worked with him only long enough to get a few troops under his command, or when foreign interests, alarmed by the growth of his "subversive" movement, began to threaten or bribe his political followers.

Yet Sun Yat-sen was always able to keep on working. During his periods of exile he carried the political news and current political opinions of China to the Chinese

abroad; whenever he returned to China, he brought back both political funds and political views from the Chinese abroad. He was the very man to serve as the link between the Chinese at home and overseas, because he was born on the coast of China, in a district from which Chinese had emigrated to many lands. As a boy he had himself gone to Hawaii, and studied for a while in American schools. Later he studied for a medical degree in Hong Kong, the British colonial foothold in China.

The overseas Chinese played a great part in the Chinese Revolution, both by remitting funds for political action and by communicating ideas which helped to mature Chinese political thinking. They were the descendants of Chinese who had gone abroad, to the American mainland, to Hawaii, and most of all to the British, French, and Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. Most of the emigrants were very poor peasants, hired to work as docile, cheap, and politically defenseless laborers. They built railroads in America, mined tin in Malaya, grew rubber and other plantation products in various colonies. Because they were Chinese and clannish, they helped each other; because they were Chinese and frugal, they first saved money and then invested it; because they were Chinese and bred to believe that education is power, they sent their children to school.

The result was that a large proportion of these overseas Chinese became prosperous and progressive. Yet in America they were held back by color prejudice and in all the colonies, although they were regarded as very desirable "natives," they were up against the basic assumption that "natives" are not fit to rule themselves. This discrimination awakened their nationalism and turned their thoughts back to China. If they wished to remain abroad, only a strong and free China could help them to improve their status; if

they wished to return to China, they were not willing to live under an incompetent monarchy, an unchanging social system, and an economic structure which did not permit them to make advantageous use of either the money or the technical qualifications which they had acquired abroad.

Consequently the overseas Chinese were ardently in favor of revolution at home. Even prosperous Chinese were exceptionally radical in their revolutionary thinking. One reason was that colonial governments are normally so authoritarian that colonial subjects who think politically at all are forced to think radically. Another reason was that, being without political life, they could only think politically. Political thought without political action always tends to radicalism, because the more radically a political theory is stated, the more logical it can be made. It is the working practice of politics which, through the persistent human pressure toward compromise, blunts the sharp edge of theory and makes political practice less logical but more workable.

THE SECOND REVOLUTION

For China, as for Russia, the great revolutionary opportunity came when the war in Europe had shattered the foundations of the prevailing world order. Sun Yat-sen did not live to make full use of this opportunity. He died in 1925. His last great achievement was the ideological preparation for the Second Revolution of 1926-27, when he lectured to thousands of his followers at Canton. These lectures, which were never completed, were edited into their present form after his death, as the *San Min Chu I* or *Three People's Principles*. They preserve for us the most important statement of Sun Yat-sen's ideas. The *Three Principles*

are usually translated as Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Livelihood. Dr. Sun Fo, the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, has proposed as an alternative rendering: National Democracy, Political Democracy, Economic Democracy.

Sun Yat-sen's teachings have often been called obscure, but there are certain points of reference which make it easier to understand them. At the close of the European War in 1918 the whole of Asia was agitated by the fact that while the nations which had defeated Germany had talked of "making the world safe for democracy," they were themselves clearly determined not to bring the colonial system to an end. Eastern Asia from India to Korea resounded with demands for independence, or at the very least for increased representation in local government. In addition, the colonial peoples were electrified by the news of the Russian Revolution. They did not need to understand Marxism to appreciate the significance of the fall of one of the great empires. In Asia, the most important sequel of the Russian Revolution was the failure of the Japanese attempt to annex eastern Siberia. This was the first time since the eighteenth century that a calculated attempt to conquer a colony had failed.

The very idea of revolution in China had therefore become something much more massive than it had been in 1911. Once the revolutionary movement had been a spearhead formed out of intellectuals interested in theories of political systems, and merchants and industrialists who, because they lacked political representation, had not been able to make the most of their economic potentialities. The weakness of this spearhead was that it did not have much of a shaft. Now, instead, of a spear with a shaft, the revolutionary movement embraced the whole people of China, compacted into a massive battering ram.

The aim of Sun Yat-sen, in lecturing publicly, was to weld this popular support into the strongest possible coalition. He had also to deal with one especially delicate problem: how to reconcile his followers who were afraid of armed intervention by Britain, America, and the other Treaty Powers with his other followers who rejoiced in the aid being given by the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communist Party had been formed in 1921. Its members were allowed to join Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang or Nationalist Party and some Kuomintang members who were not Communists were sent to Russia for study, one of whom was Chiang Kai-shek. There was also the fact that Sun Yat-sen had signed agreements with Soviet representatives, and had received Soviet military experts and political organizers. These agreements alarmed the Treaty Powers, and many Chinese, because they were the first and only political agreements with a Chinese political faction or leader that had no strings attached to them. The Soviet Union simply said that it approved what Sun Yat-sen was trying to do, and would help him, although it realized that he was not trying to make China Communist. Previously no Chinese had ever signed a foreign political agreement without signing away Chinese territory or resources. The very fact that Sun Yat-sen had signed agreements with no strings attached made it suspected that there were secret clauses of control.

There was also the fact that the Communists with whom Sun Yat-sen was dealing were not a solidly united party. This period was the one of struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, which also involved every other faction or potential leader of a faction in Russia. China became one of the ideological battlegrounds of Russia. Every politically prominent person in the Soviet Union felt called on to contribute

his ideas on conditions in China, and what ought to be done about China.

All of these matters undoubtedly had a great deal to do with the cautious and rather involved way in which Sun Yat-sen "talked around" the subjects of socialism and communism and the application of Marxist theories to Chinese problems. He was following his established practice of emphasizing points of agreement rather than disagreement, of drawing to himself as many new followers as possible without alienating old followers.

It was only after Sun Yat-sen's death that the armies inspired by his Kuomintang or Nationalist Party began their march north from Canton to unify all China. This march was the famous Northern Expedition under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. The troops were partly trained by a picked body of officers, who had themselves been trained by Russian instructors. In addition, the armies were accompanied and preceded by political organizers. Many of these had been trained in Communist methods, and there were Communists among them; but the ideas and interests to which they appealed were overwhelmingly Nationalist, rather than Communist. As a result the war-lord armies, which were not bound together by either patriotism or nationalism, were overwhelmed as much by political disintegration as by the professional superiority of the Nationalists.

The prevailing opinion of foreign political and business representatives in China was bitterly anti-Nationalist, although a good many missionaries, especially those engaged in educational work and those in the interior who were closely in touch with the common people, recognized that the Kuomintang truly represented the people of China as

a whole. When the Nationalist armies came into the zone of long-established foreign interests along the Yangtze there was a succession of crises. Some of the foreigners were arrogantly determined to maintain the traditional attitude that the Chinese, no matter what they fought about among themselves, had no right to disturb foreign "law and order." Some of the Chinese were impetuously determined to show that the time had now come when the Chinese were going to do what they liked in their own country and that foreigners had better accept this new dispensation or get out of the way, at the risk of being hurt.

Some foreigners were killed, including missionaries; some foreign property was burned or looted; but much more publicity was given in the world press to such incidents than to several nasty flare-ups of the old "gunboat policy" when foreign warships fired vindictively on the Chinese, killing and wounding not individuals but thousands of people.

The rapid advance of the Northern Expedition slowed after Hankow, Nanking, and Shanghai had been occupied. Ruthless Japanese intervention delayed the march of the Nationalists north of the Yangtze. As the main Nationalist force advanced up the railway from Nanking toward Tientsin and Peking the Japanese military forces in the province of Shantung obstructed them, provoking an armed clash.

The highest councils of the Kuomintang had now to reconsider their whole position. In North China they ran the risk of an undeclared war with Japan. In Shanghai they occupied the Chinese city, but not the International Concession and the French Concession, the greatest strongholds in China of foreign investment, business interest, and political privilege—a center from which powerful pressure was being brought to bear on Washington, London, and other

foreign capitals. The question was whether the National Revolution should push through to immediate and complete victory at the risk of foreign military intervention, or should pause, consolidate its already impressive victories, and try to win by negotiation the rest of what had yet to be won.

At this point there were important realignments within the Kuomintang. Many of those who had been most ardent in launching the new revolutionary movement were now convinced that enough had been won for the moment and thought that it would be wise to consolidate. Many of the wealthier Chinese, including some of those from abroad who had financed and inspired the Revolution, had now shifted at least one foot from the position of "have not" to the position of "have." A situation had been created within China in which, instead of agitating for more change, those who, as leaders of the Revolution, had been the first to benefit from its success, could settle down to problems of administration and organization.

CHAPTER II

Changing China before the War

FROM 1928 TO 1937 the Chinese government had two main lines of policy; to achieve uniformity of political structure and administrative control within China, and to strengthen and modernize the country. This was the decade in which the western-trained Chinese had their greatest opportunity. They had unlimited things to do, and a strong government backing them. This made possible China's greatest and most rapid advances in industrial growth, mining, banking, engineering, education, and medicine and public health. The whole people felt that China was becoming more modern and progressive, because they could see it happening. At the same time the whole nation was conscious of one great danger: that Japan would not allow it to go on happening.

Japanese resistance to the unification of China began immediately, with an attempt to prevent Nationalist control of North China. This brought on a crisis. If the Nationalists pushed on too resolutely, there was a very real danger that other Treaty Powers would back up the Japanese. On the other hand, the Nationalists already held Shanghai and the Yangtze. If they could show that they intended to allow business at a profit for the important Ameri-

can and especially British interests in this region, they could prevent a united front among the Treaty Powers.

To make its intentions clear the new government broke with the Communists and estranged itself from Russia. Here foreign policy interlocked with domestic problems. How far was the new government to represent the urban interests of the small but rapidly growing Chinese capitalist class of merchants, bankers, owners of factories and insurance companies and steamship lines, and the overseas Chinese who remitted money to China? How much heed was to be paid to the inland provinces where landlords were still the dominant "upper class"? In the army, where was the balance to be struck? The soldiers were overwhelmingly of peasant origin. Ideas like "independence" and "self-government" were naturally applied by the peasants to their own problems, and took the form of demands for more land and less rent. Among the officers, on the other hand, there were more from the landlord group, whose better education had enabled them to rise more rapidly in military training.

Consequently civil war between the government and the Communists followed the break with Russia, as the break with Russia accompanied the improvement in relations with Britain and America, which in turn was influenced by the strategy of avoiding a head-on collision with Japan.

The problem as a whole can best be reviewed when we come to the question of the part played by the Chinese Communists in the war of resistance against Japan. For the years between 1928 and 1937, it is important to stress the fact that China went through much more than the civil war against the Communists. The new National Government had to vindicate and extend its authority within the country. It had to win first the recognition and then the confidence of the more friendly foreign governments, and

it had to withstand a succession of Japanese invasions. Within the country, the National Government had to cope with strong survivals of provincial separatism and with both passive obstruction and active resistance on the part of regional war lords.

The destructiveness and internal social strains of civil war against the Communists were partly compensated for by increased control over provinces where independent war lords were still reluctant to accept the authority of the National Government. When Communist forces were pressed back against these provinces, the war lords were compelled to accept first aid of government troops and then the financial and administrative supervision of the central government.

Rapid extension of road and rail communications met both strategic and economic needs. The primary railway systems of China were those which ran parallel with the coast, joining the Yangtze valley with the Yellow River plain. These lines had first been built with foreign loans and under foreign control in order to increase the trade of the Treaty Ports in the interests of foreign enterprise. The National Government now began to build lines directly opening up the hinterland, extending its hold over the country as a whole and increasing trade without increasing foreign control. The two most important lines were one in South China, from Canton to the Yangtze at Wuchang (opposite Hankow), and one in North China which crossed the old lines from Nanking to Peiping and from Hankow to Peiping and reached well up into the northwestern province of Shensi. Had it not been for these new railways, it is doubtful whether China could have withstood the weight of the Japanese offensives in 1937 and 1938.

Beyond and between the railways the network of motor

roads was even more rapidly expanded; and still deeper in the hinterland, air lines began to reach points to which even the motor roads had not yet penetrated. The result has been that in far inland China there are today actually millions of people who have seen airplanes but never an automobile, and many more who have seen cars and trucks but never a railway train. There are important psychological and social effects, as well as economic effects, resulting from the fact that the remotest regions, where life has hardly changed for centuries, are reached first by the most advanced technological developments. There are vast areas in China which will move directly into the age of electric power, skipping almost entirely the age of steam power.

In the same period China's heavy and light industry expanded with unprecedented rapidity. In all kinds of enterprises which had once been possible only under foreign ownership or management, the Chinese began to show more and more competence and versatility. Quantitatively, in numbers of factories or total of horsepower, the achievements of Chinese industry by the year 1937 were so small that they would hardly show on a comparative world chart. Qualitatively, they were as important as yeast is to bread. Every power-driven machine in China does two things: it operates productively and it functions educationally. Every factory is a technical training school. The transformation of China's economy and society is at flash point: as in early Yankee New England, when the machine age was just coming into its own, the transition from journeyman worker to inventor and skilled engineer can be made in an astonishingly short time.

To take one example only: a far-sighted Chinese engineer wanted to design a Diesel engine to burn tung oil (wood oil). German engineers refused help—partly to guard their

trade monopoly, partly because (they said) the over-all development of Chinese technique was too weak to attempt the manifold processes of producing Diesel engines. The Chinese went ahead on his own. Chemical experiments having failed to break down tung oil to a formula satisfactory for standard Diesels, the problem was solved by altering compression ratios in the engine itself; machine tools were then made to produce the redesigned engines, and a complete industry created.

The National Government showed a high average of skill in dealing with foreign countries. Here the primary problem was the old yearning of the foreign interests for a strong man to run China on their behalf. These foreign interests were still conservative, still disposed to resent as effrontery any attempt of the Chinese government to make foreign enterprise respect the national interests of China. They were still fond of saying that the ordinary Chinese had no desire to be concerned with government or politics, but only wanted to be let alone. They also obstinately clung to the theory that the foreign concessions and the system of extraterritoriality were essential safeguards of "law and order"—although disorder and corrupt politics were still fostered by the ability of all Chinese war lords and others who got rich in unpatriotic ways to put their money in foreign banks in the foreign concessions, safe from taxation or any form of Chinese control.

These foreign interests would have liked nothing better than to make Chiang Kai-shek their strong man. One of his major achievements in these years was in building up the strength of the government and its international credit without allowing foreign control to increase either politically or financially. Gradually he succeeded in committing Amer-

ica and Great Britain, among the great powers, not only to support of the Chinese government but to progressive relinquishment of their privileges and restoration of the sovereignty of China. This meant that Japan stood more and more isolated both as the advocate of territorial and political imperialism in China and as a rival threatening American and British interests. Had this been entirely clear at the time, there need have been no Second World War. Those who have studied the rise of Hitler as if it were a purely European phenomenon often overlook the fact that he came to power in 1933 only after Japan had exposed the impotence of the League of Nations in 1931-32. Unfortunately, many issues were obscured by the fact that some American, British and other Treaty Power interests were sympathetic to the ambitions of Japan. Similar interests were inclined in favor of Hitler and Mussolini on the other side of the world. For this reason the early aggressive moves of Japan, like those of Germany and Italy, were not opposed by united policies in the democratic countries. In each democratic country there were some who were alarmed by the spread of aggression. On the other hand, a great many were ignorant or indifferent, and a few were heartily sympathetic.

In China itself, many of those foreigners who had formerly been predisposed to look for a strong man to control the country from within on behalf of foreign imperialism were now inclined to substitute the idea of a strong country, controlling China from the outside and acting both as primary imperialist and as agent for imperialism in general. These were the interests which said: "Why take the risk of dealing directly with China, where the political future is uncertain? Why not be satisfied with a limited but comforta-

ble profit, and a limited risk, by investing in Japan? Let Japan take the greater risk and greater profit, and do the direct job of controlling and exploiting China."

It was this policy, or rather frustration of policy, which led the self-styled trustees of law and order in China, in spite of the misgivings and protests of many people in the democratic countries, to tolerate and even to subsidize, the process by which Japan destroyed all law and order, until at last not the Chinese alone but also the Americans, the British, and the minor privileged peoples like the Dutch, found themselves fighting not for rivalry and self-interest, but for simple survival.

CHAPTER III

The War

THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT

THE FIRST test came when the Japanese invaded Northeast China in 1931. On the eighteenth of September a rail was torn up on the South Manchuria Railway (owned by Japan but running through Northeast China). This was on a stretch of track heavily guarded by Japanese troops. The damage was discovered *after* an express train had passed, and nobody was hurt. Nevertheless Japanese troops instantly attacked Mukden, the capital of Northeast China; within a few hours they were seizing all strategic points; within a few hours more they were spreading along the main railway lines and seizing all key towns.

This invasion cannot be explained by referring to the diplomatic documents of the time. The problems involved were of the kind known in diplomatic language as "delicate"—so delicate that the world's best diplomatic brains were employed in drawing up documents that would get around the real issues without mentioning them. Yet the truth was fairly simple: China was becoming united. The great provinces of the Northeast had joined the National Government and submitted to its authority by negotiation,

without civil war. This was a political event of the first importance, because ever since the founding of the Republic in 1911 these provinces had been known for their political separatism and their readiness to invade the adjoining parts of China in civil war.

The Northeast Provinces had a frontier tradition which made them impatient of control by any government which was not closely in touch with their immediate problems, but the people who lived there were none the less patriotic Chinese who regarded their homeland as a bulwark of the Chinese nation. They were as much determined to get rid of Japanese penetration of the Northeast by railway and mining concessions and all kinds of "special treaties" as the Chinese of the rest of China were determined to get rid of all kinds of foreign control and privilege that encroached on the sovereignty of China. The Northeast Provinces were, moreover, not a backward frontier region, but one of China's most important frontiers of progress. They had more mechanized industry in terms of horsepower per unit of population and more miles of railway per square mile of territory than any other region of China except the immediate vicinity of Shanghai.

Chang Tso-lin, the old war lord of the Northeast, had been succeeded by his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, who had been notified by the Japanese in an unmistakably menacing way that it would not be a good thing for the Northeast to participate in the unification of China by having anything to do with the new National Government at Nanking. In spite of this warning, Chang Hsueh-liang had made it his personal policy to identify the Northeast with the rest of the nation of China. This was done in 1929 and the Nationalist flag was hoisted. The most separatist provinces in China had acknowledged the authority of the central gov-

ernment—and without civil war. Japan struck two years later.

Northeast China was the primary symbol of Japan's imperial position. Japan held in this region not only privileges which mutilated the sovereignty of China but privileges which had been given enough recognition by other powers to give Japan two feet within the threshold of China where other countries had only one foot in the doorway.

Furthermore, while unity in China was rapidly increasing, Japan was just as rapidly heading toward a domestic crisis. The professional army careerists had suffered the heaviest setback in the modern history of Japan through their failure to conquer Siberia after 1918, and the navy felt that it also had been humiliated by the Washington Treaties of 1922. Backing the army and the navy were the most powerful industrial and financial interests in Japan, whose political link with the armed services was revealed by the annual budget for naval and military appropriations.

The fiction of a cleavage between "military" and "civilian" interests in Japan, which duped an astonishingly large number of people in other countries, was very crude. In reality, the civilian imperialists were only a little more timid than the military; satisfied from year to year with their profitable contracts, they were always inclined to hope that the chances for active aggression would be easier and saler next year. The imperialists of the armed services were more impatient. Debate broke down into open action in 1931, partly because the "harmless" practice of parliamentary forms had, since 1922, allowed a demand for real expression of the will of the people to grow. This development was regarded by the militarists and their civilian backers as an acute danger, and the growth of this "danger" from within, combined with the challenge of growing

Chinese unity, made them decide that the time had come for action.

The invasion of the Northeastern Provinces was accordingly coldly planned and ruthlessly carried out. Its effects in converting Japan's privileged position in Northeast China into outright occupation were no less important than its effect in creating a "state of emergency" within Japan, enabling the military and civilian imperialists to cut democratic development short and combine a fascist conquest of the people of Japan at home with imperialist conquest of Chinese territories abroad.

REACTION ABROAD

Crisis in the Far East had its reverberations abroad. In every country that had economic, political, and strategic interests in the Far East there was doubt and indecision. There was a widespread feeling that "something ought to be done about it," but those who felt this way were baffled by the problem of expressing their conviction in terms that would lead to action by their governments. There was a lag in the comprehension of the realities of both China and Japan which it was not yet possible to overcome.

For a century it had been accepted without question that the Chinese did not have either the power or the knowledge to decide the most important questions affecting their own country; that the things which really mattered were the things done to China, or in China, or about China, by the great powers. Out of this long-accepted way of thinking there had grown an assumption which stood in the way of any intelligent policy about China: the assumption that it would be an expensive altruism to save China from Japan. People were not yet ready to be convinced that China was a

country which could be backed in an international decision, as one might, for instance, decide to back Japan against Russia.

In the meantime two arguments worked strongly in favor of Japan. One was the argument that China, if allowed to escape entirely from foreign control, would turn out to be an unruly country, disturbing to the balance of world power. It would therefore be prudent to let the Japanese take the main responsibility for law and order in China—in other words, to let the Japanese “keep the Chinese in their place.”

The other argument was that the real issue was not between Japan and China at all, but between Japan and Russia. According to this argument, the invasion of Manchuria had launched the Japanese unswervingly against Russia. The Japanese were bound to turn the Northeastern Provinces into the base for a further invasion of Russia. If they succeeded easily, the vast undeveloped regions of eastern Siberia would keep the Japanese busy for a long time besides which they would certainly have to come to the western democracies for investments and profitable loans. Even if the conquest of Siberia turned out to be difficult, this would be to the interest of the western democracies, which in the process of backing Japan against Russia would recover full control of the balance of power in the Far East.

FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Caught between Japanese determination and the *laissez-faire* of Britain and America, the Chinese and their government hesitated. A conviction swept through the country that this was no belated renewal of nineteenth-century

imperialism. It was no incursion, to be bought off by paying ransom—the opening of a new treaty port, the ceding of a new leased territory, or the granting of enlarged economic concessions. It was something bigger even than the cutting off of the vast and rich Northeast. It was the beginning of the final decision between life and death, freedom and conquest, for the whole Chinese people.

A sense of fateful decision was in the air; but the sense of decision did not make it easy to decide on a course of action. It must be remembered what kind of country China was in 1931. The government had been founded on two policies, one foreign and one domestic. The foreign policy was to come to terms with the powers which had great vested interests in China. These powers had the ability to act, but were in some instances badly frightened by the idea that the defense of their vested interests against the Japanese might cost them more than those interests were worth, in other instances by the idea that China might “lapse into chaos.” The domestic policy was to slow down the course of revolution in China before it could make a full transition from political revolution to social revolution. The two policies interacted intimately on each other. The National Government was one that stood for law and order, and as such it had begun to receive foreign support and foreign credit. Customs receipts—the most important index of foreign trade, and therefore of the prosperity of foreign interests in China and foreign contentment with the state of affairs in China—were going up steadily.

The Chinese government therefore had reason to feel that it was already making a good showing in the actual accomplishment of those things which Japanese propaganda had always claimed it was the “mission” of Japan to accomplish in China. There was no need for Japan to act as the

protector of all foreign interests in China, because foreign interests were enjoying better conditions than they had for two decades. Old foreign investments were more secure, and the return on them more steady and less speculative; nor was there any need for Japan to act as the channel and guarantor for new investments, because opportunities for new direct investments were opening up. There was no need for Japan to "save China from chaos" because the National Government had restored order over a wider area than had even been pacified by any foreign intervention. Far beyond the Treaty Ports, wherever the authority of the National Government extended, the interior was safe for travel and trade. As for Japan's most sensational bid for international sympathy—the function of "saving China from communism and holding back the Bolshevik flood from Asia"—that was also superfluous. The National Government had pinned the Chinese Communists into a limited area, and its intentions were made clear by the fact that foreign credit and planes and military equipment purchased from abroad were being used on a large scale against the Communists.

Accordingly, it looked as though China might perhaps save the Northeast without actually going to war. If China had in fact decided to fight, the risks would have been very great. The troops of the Northeast were among the best equipped in China. Had they made a stand in full force, and had they been defeated, it would have taken too much time to send other picked troops to the Northeast, and the rest of China would have been fatally exposed because the Japanese navy had access to the entire coast.

China therefore decided to transfer the whole issue to the League of Nations, and orders were issued to the Northeastern troops to withdraw with as little fighting as possible.

There was this much in favor of the appeal to the League: it would force other countries—primarily Britain and America—to share in the crisis. Would they not feel obliged to restrain Japan? The essence of Japan's claim was the *desire* to be recognized as the international trustee of "law and order" in China. The essence of China's case was that under the National Government there was more law and order, and a better prospect for the future, than at any time in the history of China's contact with the western world.

It need not be assumed that the Chinese naively mistook the League of Nations for an impartial tribunal. The League was in fact a kind of stock exchange of power politics, where profits and losses could be added up in committee meetings and written off in treaties instead of being fought out on the battlefield. Here the Chinese would have at least a chance of winning, and even if they did not win they would at least be able to cut their losses. The Soviet Union was not a member of the League. Neither was America; but precedent existed for associating America with decisions worked out by the League of Nations, while on the other hand the Washington Conference of 1922 was a precedent for excluding Russia from international decisions in the Far East.

Since it was Japan's aim to identify China with Russia, or at least with the "Bolshevik menace," while it was to China's interest to enlist the traditional American support for the territorial and political integrity of China, the appeal to the League was a safer move than an appeal to arms. The result of this appeal was, it is true, a costly defeat for China; but it was not a final defeat, and at the price of this defeat China bought the time in which to prepare for the final struggle.

It is difficult to summarize the League's decision. The Lytton Commission, sent out to see what had happened

(as if something might have happened that was not obvious), made a report that was a masterpiece in the dignified acceptance of international indignities. Japan left the League and set up in Northeast China a make-believe state which it called "Manchukuo." This device was remarkably successful in its main intent: Japan got the power to do anything it liked in Northeast China, while pretending that the responsibility belonged to "Manchukuo."

To this there was an adroit American retort, the Hoover-Stimson doctrine of "nonrecognition," which was followed by Britain. The doctrine did not confess that America would not fight in support of the traditional American policy as to China's territorial and political integrity; but neither did it promise that America would not fight in support of this policy at some more opportune time.

FROM MUKDEN TO PEARL HARBOR

However much Americans insist that the Open Door policy came out of the "Manchurian incident" alive, the League of Nations came out dead.

The consequences have been recited again and again. Italy went on an old-fashioned slave-catching expedition in Ethiopia. Fascism was established in Spain with the overt aid of Germany and Italy and the half-ashamed, half-defiant connivance of America, Britain, and France. Hitler rose to power in Germany and was immediately offered bank accounts all over the world. The ultimate repudiation of common decency was the betrayal of Czechoslovakia—an out-and-out commercial deal, and dishonest at that. Winston Churchill was one of the few statesmen who criticized this deal at the time.

In the meantime China, having cut its losses on the stock

exchange of international power politics, began patiently to maneuver from an apparently weak position into one that was much stronger for the long pull. The conflict between the newly inflated claims of Japan and the vested interests of Britain and America began to tell. Governments which had acquiesced in the League's decision on Northeast China were in no position to restrain private interests from dealing with the Japanese in exploiting the newly seized territory, or from contributing raw materials and technology—including designs for airplanes and motors, and formulas for high-octane gas—to the rapid military expansion of Japan. Yet they were simultaneously forced to adopt policies which, they hoped, would insure against further sudden moves by Japan.

The more it became evident that Japan could not be forced to attack Russia, the more it became evident that any new movement against China would not be at the expense of China alone but also at the expense of the vested interests and future economic prospects of America, Britain and France. To an increasing extent America and Britain were now associated in interest with China, though not politically committed to China. Military equipment continued to be shipped to China, and money was no longer lent to China simply as money, but as an economic implementation of a political course of action.

Many Americans were able to take China's loss of the Northeast so calmly that they were inclined to think that perhaps it was not so very serious for the Chinese either. Even now, many assume that war almost broke out between Japan and China in 1931, and then really began in 1937, after the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge. The fact is that the war really began in 1931 and never stopped. From 1931 to 1937 it was a limited war; after the Marco Polo

Bridge incident in 1937 it became an unlimited war; and after Pearl Harbor the war between China and Japan merged into a total or global war.

Anybody who goes back to the newspapers and books of the time will find that there was a widespread and incredibly smug assumption that the seizure of the Northeast would "satisfy" the Japanese for a long time, because they would have to "digest" 360,000 square miles of territory with 30,000,000 inhabitants and a great variety of undeveloped and partly developed resources. The truth was that the Japanese did not pause or hesitate. The League of Nations and America had abandoned the Northeast to them; following up this advantage, they continued their pressure against China relentlessly.

JEHOL AND NORTH CHINA "AUTONOMY"

In the next year, 1933, the Japanese struck at the Chinese province of Jehol, and annexed it, not to Japan but to "Manchukuo." Like many things that have happened in Asia in recent years, this move was much more important than it seemed to many people at the time. There are 100,000 square miles of territory in the province of Jehol, and all this the Japanese took in a campaign that lasted exactly ten days. They did so by the use of motorized troops on a scale that had never before been seen, even in maneuvers. The Americans and British do not seem to have taken any particular notice; but it can hardly be doubted that the Germans did, and that the methods demonstrated by the Japanese in Jehol encouraged the Germans to develop the methods by which they later seized Austria and Czechoslovakia and overwhelmed Poland.

With Jehol in their hands, the Japanese were in a posi-

tion to extend their strategic power westward through Inner Mongolia, and to dominate Peiping and the great North China port of Tientsin. Holding their strategic power in reserve, the Japanese began to apply political and economic pressure. First, they wrecked the economic life of North China by encouraging wholesale smuggling. This was done by armed men who were protected by Japanese troops and naval forces whenever necessary. North China was flooded with Japanese goods which had paid no duty. Chinese industry and trade were ruined and the government was deprived of a large part of the customs revenue from foreign trade which was the most important item in China's national revenue.

Economic chaos opened the way to political penetration. The Japanese began to demand that the five northern provinces of Hopei, Shansi, Suiyuan, Honan, and Shantung be recognized as a part of China which had "legitimate aspirations" of its own. They demanded that the Chinese government set up a special "political council" in this area, to deal with the Japanese. This arrangement was intended to establish the principle that in certain parts of China local interests were more important than national interests, and that such parts of China should be allowed to deal "autonomously" with Japan, instead of through the National Government. The next step, of course, was to demand that the personnel of the "North China Political Council" be acceptable to the Japanese, to encourage local militarists to accept Japanese patronage, and to detach the military forces as a whole from allegiance to the National Government.

To a limited extent the Japanese were successful. All the scum in North China rose to the surface and began to collect about them. This misled a good many foreign observers

into thinking either that the trend toward unity and national patriotism in China had come too late or else that the Chinese were hopeless, incapable of lasting political unity, and fatally vulnerable to the combined use of money and strength. The truth was, however, that the strength of China really did lie in the people, not in individuals. Under the surface, the people were neither confused nor disheartened by the Japanese use of terror combined with corruption.

Though the Japanese appeared almost to have succeeded in severing North China from the rest of China, a double-process was in fact going on. In the part of China not yet reached by the Japanese, the will to resist was hardening, and the consciousness that the time was coming for a great national effort spread back into North China, heartening the people with the feeling that they did not stand alone but had the support of a vast nation behind them. From North China in turn the spirit of unwillingness to submit was similarly communicated to the rest of China, where it encouraged people to think that resistance was possible. It was as if, throughout the nation, people were saying "we want a front on which to resist"; and as if the people in North China were saying "we will make a front, if you will back it."

THE SIAN KIDNAPING

This feeling crystallized in December, 1936, when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was kidnaped at Sian. In this incident all the political tendencies that had been at work in China for many years were brought together and concentrated in a few hours of one man's life, shaped up into

sharp issues, and then resolved in such a way as to create a new stability, balance, and unity of purpose in hundreds of millions of people.

From the time that the Japanese took the Northeast, the National Government had intensified its efforts to unify and to organize the rest of China. The campaign against the Communists in South Central China had been pressed unrelentingly. In 1935 and 1936, while Japanese penetration and pressure in North China were forcing things nearer to a climax, the Communists were dislodged from their position to the south of the Yangtze. Withdrawing in a spectacular retreat known ever since as the "Long March," they first struck far west, to the frontiers of Tibet, then swung around to the north and east, and finally took up a new position in the northern part of the province of Shensi. Here they occupied a stretch of territory that was economically very poor but strategically very important. On the west they touched one of the most important Moslem regions in China, where the Mohammedans are a powerful political minority with a good deal of military strength. On the north they touched Inner Mongolia, a thinly populated and almost defenseless area dangerously open to Japanese motorized invasion. On the east they touched Shansi, a province enclosed by mountains and rich in minerals, one of the most important objectives in Japan's proposed step-by-step dismemberment of China. On the south stood the open plain of Sian, one of the key strategic areas in China.

On this side the Communist forces were hemmed in by troops of the National Government. Among them were many thousands who had been withdrawn from the Northeast in 1931 and 1932 while the "Manchurian Incident" was being debated at Geneva. They were under the command of

Chang Hsueh-liang, who was almost their hereditary commander.

By the end of 1936 there was a growing feeling in China that the Communist problem was no longer nearly so serious as Japanese encroachment. The Communists, who had once been lodged in the heart of China, had now been herded away to a far frontier. Neither militarily nor geographically were they in a position to seize power. On the other hand, they were in a position to fight the Japanese if war should break out in North China. Ever since 1934, an important part of the Communist propaganda had been the demand for a truce between the Communists and the National Government, and a national united front against the Japanese. "Very well," people were beginning to say; "if they want to fight the Japanese, let them: Resistance against the Japanese is what we all want."

This feeling came to a head among the Northeastern Chinese troops who were part of the cordon around the Communists in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu. At points along the line they even began to fraternize with the Communists. There was a crisis over the question of military discipline and control. With the personal courage and willingness to assume the most dangerous responsibility that had made him the unifier of China, Chiang Kai-shek went to Sian. There was open mutiny; Chang Hsueh-liang arrested him and attempted to force him to agree to a sweeping political and military settlement of all issues. The Generalissimo, though a prisoner, resolutely insisted on his authority as commander in chief, refusing to negotiate with mutineers. The situation was not only tense but amazingly complicated. Chang Hsueh-liang's Northeasterners were not the only troops on the spot; there were also local provincial

troops, not very well disciplined and not directly subject to the orders of the National Government. The Communists were not far away, and there were also forces of the National Government within striking distance. Practically every body of troops implicated was either surrounded or outflanked or threatened in the rear by some other force. There was the greatest danger that before the tension could be broken the Generalissimo would be killed.

However, the tension was broken. Madame Chiang, refusing to allow government troops to advance on Sian, flew there herself to be with her husband. At the same time the Communists, instead of moving to take advantage of the crisis, sent one of their most important leaders to Sian to take part in negotiations. The final outcome was even more dramatic than the original mutiny. The Generalissimo was unconditionally released. Not only was he released, but Chang Hsueh-liang, who had been his captor, accompanied him to the National Capital and gave himself up as a mutineer to be tried by court-martial.

While Chiang Kai-shek was under detention there were demonstrations all over the country in support of him. When he was unconditionally released, these were followed by even more impressive demonstrations of joy and relief. China had come through a crisis the significance of which could be felt emotionally even by those who could not express their feelings in political terms. At the end of the most remorselessly fought civil war in China's history there had been a threat that civil war would flare up again in spite of the way in which the nation was imperiled by Japanese aggression. When, instead, an attempted military coup d'état turned into agreement by all concerned for the welfare of the country, the reaction of all Chinese was more than one of relief: it was one of achievement. The fact that

the Generalissimo was released without paying political ransom was a tacit announcement that the Chinese were now a united people. They could turn and face the Japanese peril without fear of treachery or civil war within the country. The very fact of China's new inner cohesion made an attack by Japan inevitable. The Japanese were now forced to abandon the hope of breaking up China by the method of local penetration and regional pressure. They were foiled by a new toughness in the Chinese people, even in North China where the Japanese bayonets were clustered most thickly and Japanese planes roared daily over the main cities, flying low to show the bombs in the racks. They had now either to back down or shoot to kill.

While attack had become inevitable, resistance was now also predetermined. The Generalissimo's policy had been one of long-range preparation for final resistance when the time came. The Sian incident showed him that the time had now come. China had been through a period in which the main problem had been the assertion of control by the National Government. That phase was now over. The people were pressing the government for leadership.

THE CHINA INCIDENT

Six months after the Sian incident, on July 7, at the Marco Polo Bridge outside Peiping, the Japanese began to shoot to kill. But they made the fatal mistake of still trying to combine politics with force. The shooting which they began at the Marco Polo Bridge was a deliberate attempt at a "putsch" as a last alternative to a full-scale invasion of China. This was a miscalculation and a calamity for Japan. The Japanese had taken great care to get everything fixed up in advance, and with respect to many of the higher

political and military positions in North China they had good reason to believe that things would stay fixed. The long period of pressure and indirect control, and the aggressive way in which the Japanese insisted that men appointed by the Chinese government must be "acceptable" to the Japanese authorities, had resulted in the assignment to North China of a few men who were so defeatist that they would not hesitate to take Japanese orders, and a great many who had so little faith in their own country and their own people that they could easily be bluffed once the Japanese war machine started rolling.

In this situation an unexpected factor saved North China long enough to make the fighting spread beyond the proportions of the "local incident" planned by the Japanese and become a war of national survival clearly understood by the whole Chinese people. This unexpected factor was the Chinese common soldier—the man most underestimated, and often despised, by foreign observers; the man who was supposed to be of no political consequence except as the armed but only half-trained hireling of some war lord. In and around Peiping, and in and around Tientsin, the key points of the "local incident" which was planned to paralyze North China and convert indirect Japanese control into open military occupation, an adequate number of officers in the right positions had been "fixed" by the Japanese. The only thing that went wrong was that the Chinese common soldier refused to be sold out. In regiment after regiment, division after division, the spirit of resistance flared up among the rank and file. Men refused to be marched off to places where they could not fight. Without orders, they began to shoot when they saw something to shoot at.

The result was confusion and slaughter. The Japanese

had artillery and machine guns ready at points chosen in advance, and airplanes ready to take off. They began to kill; but once Chinese resistance had begun, it could not be broken. It spread like wildfire. There were even cases of higher officers who had clearly decided to submit to the Japanese and then, once resistance had begun, changed their minds and went back to their men. The resistance was too lacking in organization to save North China; but it delayed the Japanese time table first by hours, then by days, and then by weeks. A war had begun.

It was a national war. Just as the Germans, when they took Austria and again when they took Czechoslovakia, had carefully concentrated military power so as to crush local resistance if it should break out, and at the same time had taken the greatest precautions to prevent the general spread of war, so the Japanese had done everything they could to be "conciliatory" in central China. All along the Yangtze valley they actually withdrew their citizens, and in Shanghai they lay low, anxious not to provoke or challenge the Chinese. The maneuver did not work, because when Chinese resistance wrecked the Japanese time table in the north, the Japanese at Shanghai felt the loss of prestige, and became too nervous and quick on the trigger. The tension also excited the old jealousies between the Japanese army and navy.

In 1932, at the time of the "Manchurian Incident," the Japanese navy, jealous of the way in which the Japanese army was running wild in the Northeast, had attempted to take Shanghai as a gesture of bravado. It had failed, and had to be rescued by large expeditionary forces of the Japanese army. In 1937 the navy, attempting to avenge the disgrace of 1932, once more assaulted Shanghai, with massed cruisers and destroyers moored alongside the city and pouring a terrible gunfire into it.

Once more the Chinese resistance at Shanghai amazed the world. Once more the Japanese navy failed to take a city which lay under its guns. In the attempt to salvage its prestige, the Japanese navy lost thousands of men in frontal assault and house-to-house fighting, but was finally forced to let the army land fresh troops at points some distance away and compel the Chinese to withdraw by threatening to outflank and encircle them. The fighting then moved toward Nanking, the capital of China. Once out in the open, the Japanese could fully exploit their superiority in planes, artillery, and motorized equipment. In addition the Chinese were permanently outflanked by the Japanese navy, which now came to the aid of the land forces, moving up the Yangtze River abreast or ahead of them, making it impossible for the Chinese to form a line protected at one end by the river.

The Japanese pressed on so hard that it was impossible for the Chinese to make a major stand between Shanghai and Nanking or at the city itself. They had to abandon their capital. When the Japanese entered it, they ran amok. While the city burned, looting, raping, and the murder of military prisoners and civilians went on for weeks. Not only did Japanese officers fail to control their troops; many of them did not want to, and joined in the atrocities themselves. So terrible were the horrors of Nanking that their military significance has been overlooked. When they reached Nanking, the Japanese had such an advantage that they could probably have pushed on, split up and encircled most of the best divisions in the Chinese army, and won a victory that would really have crippled China and made a short war possible. The opportunity which they lost at Nanking has never been within their reach again.

THE GREAT POWERS AND THE WAR

A word should be said about the attitude of other countries at this time. The Soviet Union, which many had thought would be the next victim of Japanese aggression, openly showed its approval of Chinese resistance from the very beginning, and from the very beginning supplied China with war material and financial aid to the best of its ability. The great democracies showed split personalities. On the one hand there was a spontaneous admiration for Chinese resistance, combined with a fatal hesitation when it came to the point of believing that Chinese resistance could actually be successful. This indecision was shown by copious references to the courage of the Chinese combined with an uncomprehending lack of appreciation for the skill which the Chinese high command began to show almost from the beginning in evading the conditions of battle which the Japanese tried to impose, and establishing instead the conditions which enabled the Chinese to continue to resist. From week to week the fact that the Chinese were still in the field was referred to as a "miracle," while practically no attempt was made to explain the miracle by logical military analysis.

On the other hand, the great democracies were appalled by the fear that they might spread the war more widely and become involved in it if they attempted to restrain Japan. Yet at the same time that they insisted upon "keeping out of war," the temptations of profit were too great to allow them to keep out of the kind of trade which the war created and offered to them. The ultimate outgrowth of this self-contradictory attitude was a system of "neutrality" which allowed

unlimited sale of raw materials to Japan and unlimited investment of private capital in Japanese war industries, while arbitrarily limiting the sale and transport to China of ready-made war supplies, and even the uses which the Chinese government was allowed to make of loans granted or sanctioned by foreign governments.

TRADING SPACE FOR TIME

After the bloody interlude of Nanking, the Japanese columns began to batter their way ahead again. Their strategic aim was to occupy the two main railway systems which join the Yangtze valley and the Yellow River valley, and to control the whole of the vast area traversed by these railways. One of these systems connects Nanking and Shanghai with Peiping and its port of Tientsin. It lies not far inland, and runs roughly parallel with the coast. Farther inland lies the Peiping-Hankow line. The two systems are connected by the Lunghai line, striking directly inland.

It was now too late to entrap and annihilate the Chinese armies, which were engaged in delaying actions on a vast scale. Their strategy was the same defense in depth which the Russians, with more and better equipment, later used even more effectively against the Germans. The Chinese tactics were to give way at the point of heaviest Japanese pressure, but to close in on the flanks and communications of the Japanese columns or wedges. This was the strategy and tactics which Chiang Kai-shek called "trading space for time." Its greatest success was in the famous battle of Taierhchwang, when a Japanese mechanized spearhead, trying to thrust too daringly along the Lunghai Railway from the coastal railway system to the Peiping-Hankow line, was cut off and almost annihilated by the Chinese.

In spite of the skill with which the Chinese forced the Japanese to fight their kind of war, the Japanese had one advantage which they used again and again. The Japanese had a navy, and the Yangtze River is so deep and wide that ocean-going vessels and large cruisers can steam all the way up to Hankow, in the heart of the country. It was as if America, with no navy, were fighting an invader whose navy could steam all the way up the Mississippi to St. Louis. The junction of the Missouri and the Mississippi, above St. Louis, corresponds roughly with the junction of the Han River and the Yangtze at Hankow.

There is friction and jealousy between the Japanese army and navy which have frequently hampered the execution of Japan's imperialistic strategy; but there is also co-operation between army and navy. Our own failure to recognize the importance of Japanese naval action in China has resulted in overestimation of the Japanese army and underestimation of Chinese military skill and competence. Roughly speaking, it can be said that the Japanese army has been able to strike into China only as far as the navy can reach. It is possible that the Japanese land forces would never have been able to get to Hankow at all if the Japanese navy had not been able to get there; certainly they would not have been able to get there by the end of 1938.

By the end of 1938, however, the Japanese navy was too much for the Chinese army. Although the Chinese front was never shattered, its flank was repeatedly turned along the Yangtze, and toward the end of 1938 the Japanese navy enabled the land forces to reach Hankow and simultaneously to take the great city of Canton on the coast. These losses deprived the Chinese of both ends of the strategically important Canton-Hankow railway; but they have never lost control of the inland section of the line.

MAGNETIC WARFARE AND GUERILLA FIGHTING

A new phase of the war began after the fall of Hankow and Canton at the end of 1938, and lasted until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor at the end of 1941. With the Japanese navy in control of the coast and the Yangtze, the Chinese could receive no more supplies by ship and rail except for a very small trickle through French Indo-China. The kinds of supplies that could be sent by this route were very much limited by French anxiety not to be "unneutral" toward the Japanese; and the route was closed entirely when the Japanese took over Indo-China in 1940. The Chinese were now limited to what they could get over the truck road from Burma, which they had in the meantime built for themselves, and over the 2,000-mile truck route from the Soviet Union. Of these, even the Burma Road—by which American supplies arrived—was closed for a few months in 1940 when the British were put in a desperate position by the fall of France and were forced by the Japanese to stop shipments at the Burma frontier.

During these three years the Chinese fought a new kind of delaying war. You can draw on the map an almost straight line from Peiping through Hankow to Canton, and this is all that is needed for a rough diagram of the Japanese front in China. Wherever the Japanese are to be found west of this line, they are virtually besieged, as they are in the mountainous province of Shansi, and at Ichang on the Yangtze. China east of this line contained, in 1937, almost the whole of China's industrial production; almost the entire railway system; most of the well-developed coal mines; the richest agricultural production; and more than half the total population. West of this line the Chinese have today

less than ten per cent of China's former industrial production; some fragments of railway; mining resources that have largely been developed since the war began; and a system of motor roads that is badly hampered by the difficulty of getting fuel, new trucks, and spare parts.


The kind of war that could be fought up to Pearl Harbor, and to a large extent since Pearl Harbor, was dictated by this division of China. West of the line from Peiping to Canton through Hankow begins the hilly country of China, in contrast to the great open plains of the lower Yellow River and Yangtze valleys to the east. It is in the open country that the Japanese get the most advantage out of their motorized equipment and artillery. With command of the air, they are able to detect any Chinese attempt to concentrate a large striking force, and to make their own stronger concentrations of artillery and tanks. In the more hilly and broken country, the Chinese are able to hide their movements and concentrations from Japanese observation planes.

This is the explanation of what Chiang Kai-shek calls "magnetic warfare." Whenever the Japanese attempt a major thrust the Chinese retreat, without losing contact, until they have drawn the Japanese column far from its starting point. By scattering their defense, the Chinese force the Japanese to weaken their main column by detaching units from it. As the Chinese are very weak in artillery, the ideal moment for them to strike is when they have drawn the Japanese into country where their artillery can neither keep up in large numbers nor maneuver advantageously. The Chinese then bring their trench mortars into action; with these and with machine guns and rifles and finally with hand grenades and bayonets, they close in on the Japanese at every point of contact, preventing reinforcement from the rear of the column and at the same time

destroying the head of the column. It was in this way that the Chinese won the battles of Changsha in 1941 and 1942, and the Ichang campaign of 1943.

While the Chinese have been able to fight the Japanese to a standstill by these methods, they fight under one terrible disadvantage. They cannot convert a victory into a large-scale counteroffensive of their own, because once they come out to the open country it is the Japanese who have the advantage in mobility, concentration, and overwhelming superiority of fire power. East of the great dividing line, therefore, the Chinese resort to guerilla warfare. The region of guerilla warfare is not really "Occupied China" as it is often called, but *penetrated* China. The Japanese occupy many points, and keep communications open between these points. The bulk of the country and the mass of the population are subject to vindictive Japanese raids, but are not under Japanese control and are able to organize themselves. The guerillas have greatly hampered Japanese exploitation of China's resources, but they have not been able to win back wide territory or strategic points. Final Japanese defeat awaits the strengthening of China's regular armies.

The political prospects arising from this guerilla warfare are even more important than its military prospects. The guerillas have been able to survive at all only because they have found out how to live between fights; how to cultivate their land and secure the harvest in spite of the Japanese; how to organize the duties and responsibilities of individuals and village communities. They have appealed directly to the political instincts of the Chinese people and have found in them the ability to organize a society that works. This is primary proof that the society of China, especially the rural society that makes up the bulk of the popula-



Courtesy of Chinese News Service

Chinese Theater of War after Six Years of Japanese Aggression

tion, is capable of democracy in the functional sense of government by the will of the majority, with the consent of minorities, for the greatest good of the greatest number.

Guerilla China is not uniform. Some of the guerillas are irregular troops who form an extension, behind the Japanese lines, of China's regular forces and receive orders, or at least directives, from the commanders of regular forces. Some guerilla regions in Penetrated China remit taxes to the National Government at Chungking. Some guerillas are Communists. Others, without being Communists, are on friendly terms with the Communists and borrow experts from them to train their troops and show them how to set up social and economic organization.

The determining factor, however, is not the question of whether guerillas are in touch with National Government organizers or Communist organizers. What matters most is that millions of people are fighting in defense of their country by defending their own homes and their own fields, and surviving. It is always true that it is easiest to organize people when they want to be organized. It is equally true that the success of political propaganda depends even more on the readiness of people to hear it than on the skill of the propagandists. The widest surge of action in the Chinese Revolution was in 1926-27, when the Kuomintang came into power and the National Government was founded. This was largely because the Kuomintang was well-organized and was led with enthusiasm; but even more it was because the whole nation was in a mood for action—action against militarism and separatism within the country, and action against foreign control and exploitation.

A similar mood is building up to even greater power in the China of today. When the constraint imposed by Japanese invasion is broken by China's final victory, the whole

nation will surge forward toward all the forms of active participation in public and national affairs which naturally go with the feeling that the people have won for themselves a great victory and created a country that is really free and united by its freedom and its victory.

AFTER PEARL HARBOR

With the news of Pearl Harbor, a great wave of hope spread over China. Terrible though the news was, it proved that the Chinese were right. They had always contended that the British and American hope of avoiding war with Japan was a delusion. Too many British and Americans had played around with the shallower kind of "realism." They were half willing to believe that Japan had been driven into aggression because of too much population and too little raw material. The Chinese realized that Japan was in the grip of a militarism which, exactly like the fascism of Italy and Germany, demanded raw materials not for economic purposes but for the creation of the kind of armament needed for aggression, and instead of trying to regulate population rationally did everything it could to increase the population in order to increase the supply of cannon fodder. This kind of fascist militarism was committed to endless aggression. If it ever confessed to defeat or even frustration abroad, it would have to deal with anger, resistance, and finally revolution at home. Therefore the Chinese had always been sure that if they could fight the Japanese to a standstill, the standstill would not last; the Japanese militarists would be forced to seek another way out, however desperate.

While the Chinese were right about Japan, they were wrong in hoping that the combined naval power and air

forces of America, Britain, and the Dutch would be able to deal summarily with the Japanese. Optimism turned into deepening depression as the Japanese remorselessly overwhelmed Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, Netherlands India, and Burma. When the Burma end of the Burma Road was lost, the Chinese no longer had any source of overland supply except from Russia. The blow was made worse by the fact that as the international situation had grown more ominous, China had belatedly been placed on a lend-lease basis. Lend-lease supplies had accumulated in considerable quantity at Rangoon, but had only just begun to trickle into China. Almost all these supplies were lost when Burma fell. Against these increasing disadvantages, there was an agonizingly slow increase of aid in the air, either in combat planes or in the cargo planes flying from India as a substitute for the Burma Road.

However, aid was sent to China, and it did increase. Even before Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt policy had been to aid China in every way permitted by the American obsession with the fear of getting into war. Under this policy a small group of American fliers had been formed in China. These fliers were just completing their training at the time of Pearl Harbor, and piled up an astonishing record in the Burma campaign. They were then re-formed into a unit of the United States Army Air Force, which has since become the Fourteenth Air Force, under the command of General Chennault, with bombers as well as fighter planes. At the same time Chinese pilots were brought to America for advanced training, and equipped with American planes.

With the growth of the Chinese Air Force and the American Air Force in China, the tide began very slowly to turn in favor of China. The new turn of the tide became unmistakable in 1943 when Chinese and American planes gave

a new punch and decisiveness to Chinese "magnetic warfare" in breaking up the campaign which the Japanese launched from Ichang in an attempt to penetrate into the province of Szechwan.

The outline of final victory in China can now be seen. The decisive battles await the time when China's allies can supply artillery as well as planes. When that time comes, and China's veteran manpower is provided with adequate fire power, eastern China will offer the great battlefield on which Japanese armies can be engaged and Japanese soldiers destroyed by the hundred thousand. This will prove to be even more important than the bombing of Japan from bases in China; for the morale of Japanese troops is such that while they fight desperately when pinned down in small numbers, as in the fighting in the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Aleutians, they can be made to surrender in large numbers after mass defeat, in which loss of confidence and then loss of hope infect not only individuals but whole regiments and whole divisions.

PART FOUR

Today and Tomorrow

CHAPTER I

Contemporary China

CHINA has been more disrupted by the war than any other country, even Russia. When we think of the postwar problems of other countries, we think very largely in terms of restoration. China has to think more in terms of creating a new system than in terms of restoring any old system. The Chinese people were engaged in the rapid transformation of their whole life when the Japanese invasion cut across everything they were doing. When the war is over, they will not want to begin again exactly where they were. It is the process of transformation which they will want to pick up and work at and carry forward.

PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

China's system of politics and government is as difficult for most people in democratic countries to understand as the Russian system, but it resembles that system as it existed in Russia fifteen or twenty years ago rather than as it exists today. It does not have such democratic features as wide participation by non-Party members in government affairs, factory councils, and responsible functions of all kinds; wide use of the secret ballot; actual equality of

women in all kinds of activities instead of nominal legal equality, and so on, which the Russian system has been developing.

The Chinese one-party system is preparatory to a future democratic development. In this fact it differs from fascist one-party systems, which are ideologically antidemocratic. The Kuomintang, though a monopoly party, is founded on the democratic thought of Sun Yat-sen and is pledged to the creation of a democratic system which will in time supersede its own monopoly.

In the democratic system of America and Britain the government is a thing apart. When a party wins an election it acquires the right to run the government. In China, under the one-party system, it is the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party, which has all the rights. It decides which of those rights to exercise directly and which of them to depute to the government. The government was created and set up in the first place by the Party, and if the Party wants to change either the structure or the working processes of the government, it can. It is the Party which decides what public officials, and how many of them, shall be appointed or nominated or elected. When the time comes to initiate a working democratic system in China, the Kuomintang will make the decision; and it will then make the necessary adjustments in the government to allow for the working and representation of more than one party. At the present time any group of people in China can get together and call themselves a political party; but only the Kuomintang can decide whether such a party is to be recognized as legal and to what extent its members are allowed to speak in public or circulate printed matter.

China is a democratic country in the sense that the Party and the government represent what the vast majority of the

people want. When we want to make up our minds whether we ought to call another country "democratic," we quite naturally begin by comparing it with our own democratic country. Has it got the same institutions that exist in our own country? Has it got the same kinds of procedure for seeing that the will of the majority is carried out, and the same safeguards for seeing that the rights of minorities are protected? If it has not, we hesitate to call it a democracy.

This way of looking at things can often lead to misunderstandings. The most important standard by which to measure progress in a country like China is not "how near have they got to our way of doing things?" but "how far have they got ahead of the way things used to be done?" Judging them by this standard, the Chinese have made very great progress; they have made so much progress that they certainly will not slip back into the old condition from which they were slowly lifted by the long struggle of the Chinese Revolution: weakness, chaos, disunity, and tyranny enforced by independent regional military chieftains, combined with foreign control of a large part of their government revenue and foreign domination of their economic life.

The present rulers and leaders of China are not revolutionary in the sense that they have suddenly and recently seized power. They are the sons and disciples of the Chinese revolutionaries of twenty and thirty years ago. It is because they represent the tradition and process of the Revolution as a whole that they so confidently feel that they represent the people and the nation as a whole.

The question of further progress in China is not a question of whether there will be any progress, but merely a question of how the progress will be accomplished. War always increases the authority of a government, because

it is necessary for those in power to be able to act decisively with a minimum of debate or discussion. In spite of the fact that its government has been driven from the region in which its authority was established first and most firmly into regions where, at the outbreak of the war, its power was as yet only tentative and sketchily organized, China during the years of war has to some degree increased the facilities for the expression of popular opinion.

The People's Political Council is an example of the way in which the Kuomintang has begun to permit political expression through channels other than those of the Kuomintang itself. Formed during the war, the People's Political Council contains a Kuomintang majority, together with representatives of other political parties, including the Communists. This produces the curious phenomenon of recognized representation for parties which cannot conduct unrestricted public campaigns for membership. Parenthetically, it may be pointed out that the Communists, who dominate both politically and militarily a restricted area in the North and Northwest, but are not permitted open political activity in the rest of China, are allowed to maintain several resident representatives at Chungking, and also have their own newspaper at Chungking in addition to their representation in the People's Political Council.

Other members of the People's Political Council are nominated or elected by provincial or municipal organizations. In this way the total representation includes members chosen by the central organization of the Kuomintang, members representing minority parties or groups, and members from various provinces who represent the principle of decentralized local nominations or elections. It is true that the members who stand for the provinces are also for the most part either Kuomintang Party members or

are nominated by the provincial organizations of the Kuomintang; but on the other hand the proportion of the total membership which is elected rather than appointed or nominated has steadily increased.

The People's Political Council meets once or twice a year and continuity between meetings is provided by a standing committee. While the Council cannot legislate, it can suggest legislation, criticize government policy, and call on all departments of the government, including the army, for reports. Debates are conducted according to parliamentary procedure. As in all parliamentary bodies, especially during a war, some sessions are closed, when the subjects discussed might give information to the enemy; but most sessions are open and the public is admitted, by ticket. It is noteworthy that an increasing proportion of the recommendations of the People's Political Council is carried into effect by the decisions of the government.

The Kuomintang monopoly of political action and political expression is also mitigated by a planned development of local government and by allowing the press to serve to a certain extent as a carefully regulated safety valve. Control over the press is regulated in such a manner that while occasionally a paper may have an issue confiscated, or be suspended for a few days, and while papers almost never bluntly oppose a major decision of the Kuomintang or the government, there is frequent and lively criticism of the details of execution of a policy, and this extends to criticism of individuals, even when the individuals are highly placed.

Americans, with American ideas of the freedom of the press, should not jump to the conclusion that control of the press in China is altogether repressive or reactionary. Two traditions have always existed in China: that the man

of education has the right to speak out and that the authorities have the right and the duty to pass final judgment on anything that appears in print. The press in China today shows the continuation of both traditions.

CENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The development of local government also shows two processes at work. On the one hand the Kuomintang is attempting to spread its influence and membership more and more widely through the population; on the other hand, the very fact that it is doing so gives larger and larger numbers of the people the opportunity to come into contact with Party members and to influence them. For this reason the attempt to develop local government in China during the course of a long war, which has put a strain on the whole society and economy of China, is one of the most significant aspects of Chinese political life today. It works in the following way.

The province, in China, has always been a large political and geographic unit. Because of poor communications, which meant limited transport and therefore limited markets for raw materials and finished commodities, the province as a political unit always tended to be based on a convenient geographical area. The typical province was as nearly as possible self-sufficient in providing the basic necessities like food and clothing. Only a few things, like silk and tea and sometimes iron and salt, were transported from one province to another. This is another way of saying what everybody knows—that the old China was a decentralized country in which every province had a life of its own, in large measure independent of the national life.

The new nationalism urgently demands the end of provincial separatism and this ending means the physical breaking up of the provinces as separate compartments. The drive for local self-government, sponsored by the Kuomintang, is a planned policy for accomplishing this. It aims at creating, eventually, provincial units that will be much smaller than at present. The result will be that many larger questions of taxation and administration, handled at present by the provinces, will be transferred to the National Government, thus bringing about a much higher degree of centralization in national affairs. By way of compensation, it will be possible to handle matters of genuinely local interest and importance within political units that will really be local in scale. These units will be the *hsien* or counties, which already exist but will be given new functions.

Perhaps this does not sound very revolutionary, but in fact it is the most revolutionary policy which the Chinese government has attempted, and it will have revolutionary consequences. Every province in China has more rural population than urban population. Every provincial government in China has always been dominated by landlord interests, because the landlords could get to the provincial capital and make themselves felt and heard, while the poorer peasants could not. Landlord interests, grouped at the provincial capital, formed a large and powerful body. But when government moves from the scale of the province down to the scale of the county, it inevitably brings smaller and smaller groups of landlords into more and more direct political contact with the peasants who have little or no land; and landlord and peasant then confront each other within a political unit so small that the realities cannot be hidden.

The most urgent reality is the fact that, under prevailing

conditions, the landlords transfer almost the whole burden of taxes to the peasants, in the form of extra rent. On the county scale the Kuomintang organizers, even though as individuals they mostly represent the landlords and the richer peasants, cannot evade the pressure of the peasants. This effect has already become evident. In those areas where the National Government has carried furthest the experimental development of the county system, landlord interests have begun to band together in opposition.

Landlord opposition also hampers other policies. One of the greatest reforms attempted by the government has been the collection of the tax on land in the form of grain instead of money. With foreign trade cut off by the war and internal trade choked by lack of railways and lack of trucks and fuel to make full use even of the few main motor roads, China has gone through a painful inflation period. It has become much more important to own grain than to own money. It has become more and more meaningless for the government to collect taxes in the form of printed paper money issued by itself. The government has therefore decreed that the tax on land is to be paid in actual grain instead of money. This has been a valuable reform in two ways. It has increased the power of the government over the provinces, where the grain is collected, and it has given the government a source of revenue with which it can actually feed the armies and give food allowances to officials in addition to their salaries in paper money. The one flaw is that landlords can do exactly the same thing as the government itself. When a landlord has to deliver grain to the government, according to the amount of land he owns, he turns to each individual peasant who farms his land for him and demands from him a contribution which not only pays the tax but provides a surplus.

In this way, while the government is able to store grain and use it for national purposes, the landlord is able to hoard grain in his private interest, with the result that during the period of inflation landlords have profiteered and have often been able to buy, with their grain, more land than they owned before, while peasants, who grow the food, have less land than they had before, less food, and less surplus grain with which to buy other things they need.

In short, in economic terms of China's main forms of wealth—land and grain—as well as in political terms of the balance between National Government and local government, China is still a revolutionary country, faced by revolutionary issues. The Kuomintang, as the party that controls the government, has yet to make a great historical decision—whether it will champion the interests of the people as a whole, or itself submit to domination by the landlords who are the strongest survivors of the old society of China.

INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATIVES

Other trends in China offset the bad influence of the landlords. Historically, one of the main driving forces which brought the Kuomintang to power was that of the businessmen—not corporate “big business,” but the businessmen who invested their own capital in enterprises which they managed themselves. The independent businessman is a healthy factor in China. For one thing, he is not a natural ally of the landlord, because the tax system which favors the landlord and impoverishes the peasant is not good for business.

Fortunately, conditions on the whole, difficult though they are, favor investment and production on a relatively small scale. It is difficult to invest on a large scale, because

with rapid inflation a large investment piles up too much in the way of wages and other costs before it can get into production. This condition encourages bankers and other owners of capital to buy existing commodities, hoard them, and speculate on the rise in prices rather than invest in production of new commodities. On the other hand, the scarcity of commodities is so great that a small investment which gets into production rapidly, turning out needed commodities, is certain of a good profit and is at the same time a direct contribution to the national welfare. The difficulty and expensiveness of transport encourage the decentralized kind of enterprise which uses local raw materials and sells to a hungry local market. This is also healthy, because it tends to even out the development of industrial production over the whole country, besides relieving wartime shortage of transport.

In the China of today the interests of independent, non-corporate private enterprise are practically identical with those of co-operative enterprise. One of the best devices for setting capital to work, shortening the interval between investments and production, and manufacturing local raw materials into commodities for local markets, is the industrial co-operative. The special feature of the co-operatives is that they are able to mobilize labor skill as a kind of capital in itself. Six unemployed blacksmiths, refugees perhaps from villages destroyed by the Japanese, are only six individual unemployed men looking for jobs; but if they join together in a co-operative, their combined productive potential is already so great that it takes only a minimum of money capital to set them up in actual production.

Another advantage of the co-operative method is its flexibility. The damage done by monetary inflation is minimized if a co-operative of blacksmiths can get its iron from

a mining co-operative and make metal parts for the looms of a weaving co-operative. In fact, a relatively complicated enterprise like a weaving co-operative can be created with virtually no money capital if the building materials are provided by brick and tile co-operatives, put up by brick-laying co-operatives, equipped with looms by carpenter and blacksmith co-operatives, and furnished with woolen or cotton yarn from spinning co-operatives. The cloth turned out by the new co-operatives thus created can then be used for clothing by members of the other co-operatives.

The social and political by-products of this movement, organized as the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, are almost as valuable as their direct economic contribution. They encourage individualism and enterprise, because among those who have little or no money it is naturally those who are enterprising and capable of responsibility who come forward as organizers. At the same time they encourage group loyalty, social responsibility, and the democratic way of doing things because necessarily all decisions on what to make and how to sell are taken by vote.

As for big business, it will probably be very different in China from what it has ever been in America or Western Europe. After the war, the only agency capable of raising capital in China on a really large scale will be the government, because of its power of taxation. The only agency capable of borrowing really large funds abroad, without mortgaging China's natural resources to foreign control, will again be the government. This means that state ownership will inevitably preponderate in the heavy industries, public utilities, and banking.

Since China is not a primitive country or a country with an undeveloped culture, the major changes of the future will not be in the way of creating a civilization, but in the

way of creating a modern economy. Nevertheless, economic changes will have their social and cultural effect.

WOMEN IN THE NEW CHINA

Nothing more revolutionary has happened in China in the twentieth century than the transformation which has been wrought in the lives of countless women in all classes of society. Women have always been important and influential in China. As in medieval Europe, an exceptional few played leading roles in history as warriors, scholars, and poets, while millions of others had an indirect effect on public life through the power or influence which they wielded within the four walls of their own homes. Only within recent years, however, have women begun to participate directly in public and national life and to hold positions of influence not merely as wives or mistresses but in their own right.

In the early years of the Republic, schools were opened for girls and a certain number of them began to attend colleges and universities. As more of them left home to go to school, and read western books and saw American movies, the rigid pattern of the old life began to crumble at the edges, particularly in the coastal cities where there was contact with the west. Many of the early college graduates became teachers or public-health workers or took an active part in political movements, but at the time of the Japanese invasion the great mass of Chinese women still led the old life within their homes.

The process which contact with the west had started was immeasurably speeded up by the war with Japan. For one thing, 50,000,000 refugees were forced to leave their homes and flee into the far interior of China under circumstances

which made it almost impossible for families to stay together. Sometimes the young people would go and the old people stay on the land. Sometimes the husband would go and the wife be left behind to look after those too old or sick to travel. Sometimes half a family would be killed by bombs and the rest would flee. Children would become separated from their parents and wives from husbands. When they reached Free China they would have to make a new home and the wife would need to work as well as the husband in order to feed the family.

This great migration not only uprooted 50,000,000 people from their homes, but it also uprooted the family system of China. For even the families who were not forced to move hundreds of miles and those who were not bombed out of their homes cannot carry on in the old way. Food has become scarce, and manufactured goods, and labor, and almost everyone must work, men and women alike.

Today there is almost no field of work which is not open to women. There are a few women soldiers and women guerrillas. Not long ago a bank was opened in Chungking owned and operated by women. There are industrial co-operatives managed by women, and women railway and mining engineers and government officials. This year there are fifteen women members of the People's Political Council.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek has organized a Women's Advisory Council through which she has mobilized enormous numbers of women all over Free China to do various forms of war work, such as nursing, caring for orphans and refugees, organizing co-operatives, and teaching women sewing and other crafts.

The Chinese woman of today has exchanged her security and seclusion for insecurity and freedom, and the adaptability which was in the old days required of a successful

wife is enabling her to fit into her new role with equal efficiency and grace.

LITERACY AND EDUCATION

Chinese have always had tremendous respect for learning and faith in education in spite of the fact that so large a proportion of the population have always been illiterate. Today, as a part of the enthusiastic program of reconstruction, there is a government policy of encouraging mass education and a great hunger for learning on the part of the masses, which has already markedly reduced illiteracy. In 1940 it was claimed that in the preceding two years more than 46,000,000 people had learned to read. School children are encouraged to teach their parents, older children form classes among their neighbors or in the villages, and an extensive teacher-training program is under way.

The process of teaching a nation to read in wartime has been made easier by two movements which were started in the early 1920's. One was the so called "literary renaissance" under the leadership of Hu Shih, which developed the use in writing of the *pai hua* or conversational language, making it possible for the average person to learn to read in months instead of the years it used to take. Another movement toward mass education developed as part of the rural rehabilitation program of Y. C. Yen and is often referred to as the "thousand-character movement." It promoted a system for learning a thousand characters which would enable people to read a simple book or newspaper in *pai hua*. Other similar movements developed in other parts of the country which today are bearing fruit.

Because China has many more soldiers than she can equip, and fewer trained leaders than she needs, the government

has advised students to continue with their studies in spite of the lure of more active patriotic work. The epic migration of thousands of students from Occupied China into the interior has been often told. Students and professors, with what little equipment they could salvage from their bombed campuses, walked thousands of miles into Free China and started school again in mud huts or abandoned temples or caves dug in hillsides. In spite of all the hardships and difficulties involved, university enrollment jumped from 32,000 in 1936 to 45,000 in 1941.

CHAPTER II

The Peace and the Future

THIS BRINGS US to a point from which we can look speculatively forward to the China of the future. There are several questions which are often asked about China after the war. Will the Chinese really be able to establish a democratic form of government? Will the government be able to maintain order, or will there be civil war? Will China cooperate with other countries? Will there be opportunities for foreign trade and investments, or will the Chinese make their country "another Japan," flooding the world's markets with cheap goods, encroaching on other people and trying to annex the territories of other nations?

China's allies must face the fact that these questions cannot be answered in China alone by what the Chinese do themselves. While the Chinese will have, within their own country, the full responsibility that goes with freedom to decide and to act, nevertheless the future as a whole depends on the complex interaction between what the Chinese themselves do in their own country and what other countries do that affects China and how they behave toward China. Democracy in its young and formative period is like a young plant. If the environment is favorable, the plant will soon establish its root and attain enough growth to give

it a strong independent ability to survive. If the environment is unfavorable, the plant may be distorted or even killed.

This truth can be checked by looking at the history of the young American nation and the young Soviet nation. American democracy grew rapidly out of the American Revolution, protected by distance from the Old World and the old political forms of Europe, and favored by the opportunity of a rich new continent, easy to develop. The young Soviet nation had to struggle for survival within a ring of countries hostile to its political and economic principles. There has always been, in Soviet life, a strong sense of common interests and of the duty and responsibility of all the people to take part in the building of the commonwealth. This feeling is generically democratic; without it the Soviet order would not have survived at all, and certainly could not have rallied against the German invasion with the passion that has so astounded the world—for it is quite clear that the many peoples of the Soviet Union have been defending not simply Russian soil and the Russian nation, but the Soviet order, which they feel is their own.

It is time for the rest of us to admit something which is as important for us as it is for the Russians; that many of the harsh and cruel aspects of the Soviet order are in fact scars inflicted on it in its youth by the intolerance and active hostility against which it had to struggle to survive. For this part of the environment of the early years of Soviet history it was the rest of the world that was responsible. Similarly we may predict, of the future of China, that the growth of democracy will be favored if the rest of the world takes it for granted that China is capable of democracy and provides for China a democratic place among other democracies. If, on the other hand, we grudgingly wait for Chinese

democracy to break down; if we try to impose on China forms of political or economic tutelage that approximate to an attempt at the restoration of foreign control, then there are many ways in which China may react and many ways in which the growth of democracy may be stunted or deformed.

DEMOCRACY AFTER THE WAR

The degree of democracy attained in China during the war is not an adequate index to the potentialities of democracy for the future. The long battle front in China has been relatively stable now for about four years. Behind this battle front the Kuomintang, which controls the government, has tended to tighten up discipline and to impose both uniformity and conformity. This policy appears to be based on the theory that when the Japanese are defeated the occupied parts of China will not merely be released; they will have to be recovered. Free China must be used as the base for this recovery. The Chinese who are under the control of their own government must be trained and disciplined so that as the Japanese are driven out, they can follow up, carrying with them a uniform system of political ideas and a uniform practice in carrying out those ideas, thus making as short as possible the period of confusion that could be expected if many millions of Chinese were left to put into practice their own spontaneous but possibly conflicting ideas of how to start organizing themselves.

As a matter of fact, it can be expected that when the process of recovering the invaded parts of China begins, there will be exactly this phenomenon of spontaneous but often naive and even Utopian attempts to establish democratic methods and procedures. Democracy is the opposite

of the system of terror and force which Japan has imposed. It is what the Chinese people have been promised for the future and what the people long for as something that will instantly bring a happy life, free from all abuses. The organizers and administrators who are sent into the newly liberated areas will have to cope with this outburst of the feeling of liberty. It is reasonable to expect practical compromises between the popular instinct for untrammelled liberty and the organized drive of the Kuomintang for uniformity, discipline, and control.

At this point, the question of the Chinese Communists will become important, but not necessarily acute. Agents of the Communists, even more than representatives of the Kuomintang, will have to compromise between what they would like to do and what the people want them to do. It must also be remembered that the Kuomintang, as the established party controlling China, has had freedom to teach the complete range of its doctrines and theories. The Communists, in a marginal part of Free China, hard-pressed by the Japanese, have been able to preach only a wartime doctrine of patriotism and survival. They have had to persuade peasants that they stand for lighter taxes and more popular representation, and at the same time to persuade landlords that they do not stand for the expropriation of private property. Thus they are already a party of compromise, and it is at least possible that after the war, instead of becoming the party of extremism, they will be found to be a party of moderation.

Both Communists and Kuomintang have a great stake in avoiding civil war. All that China has gained during the national war of survival would be ruined by civil war; it would revive all the doubts of the "old China hands" about the ability of the Chinese to rule themselves, let alone

practice democracy. A further restraint on the Communists will be their own desire to avoid being represented as "agents of a foreign power." Complete independence as a country and complete freedom of action within their own country will be major standards of political debate and political action among the Chinese after this war; the accusation most to be avoided by any political party will be that of carrying out the policy, or defending the interests, of some foreign government.

CHINA AND COLONIAL ASIA

China's internal development will also be strongly influenced by China's new prestige among the other Asiatic peoples, especially in the colonial areas. One of China's greatest international assets will be the fact that with the overthrow of Japan's Asiatic imperialism, China will become the symbol of Asiatic freedom under the democratic system. If in China, newly recognized as an equal by the great powers of the world, freedom to settle differences of opinion by the ballot were to degenerate into attempts to settle disputes by civil war, the movement toward freedom and self-government in all the colonial Asiatic countries would be set back, possibly for many decades. There would be a revival of the old conservative argument that political democracy is incompatible with any of the Asiatic cultures; that the social structure of Asia, in spite of the existence of refined literatures and philosophies confined to a few small groups, is basically a structure of peasant communities, and that "the Asiatic peasant does not want to rule himself—he prefers an unchanging peasant life under a just but firm government that collects fair taxes and maintains peace and order."

The revival of this kind of disbelief in the democratic potentialities of Asia would be disastrous for China. It would encourage the reconstruction and perpetuation of the colonial system in Southeast Asia, and from these bases of political imperialism the strong pressure of a new economic imperialism would inevitably be projected toward China.

These are the factors that will decide whether China itself will become imperialistic. The question is as important for China's allies as it is for China. Eventually, a balance will be struck between processes and tendencies working from within China out to the colonial countries and processes and tendencies working from the colonial countries inward to China. We cannot predict what will happen simply by reading books and accepting or rejecting theories about the nature of Asiatic peoples. What will actually happen will be a complex product of what the Chinese do and what other peoples do. In other words, we cannot escape our share of the responsibility. We must do something; we must accept the responsibility for whatever we do; and we must realize in good time that we cannot escape responsibility by doing nothing and having no policy, because having no policy is in itself a kind of policy, and doing nothing has its consequences just as much as doing something has its consequences.

CHINA'S OWN MINORITIES

Minorities within China and relations with the border territories link up the domestic and foreign problems that have to be faced in creating a government that is both efficient and progressive.

In two southwestern provinces, Yunnan and Kweichow,

there are tribal groups which actually outnumber the Chinese. In Kwangsi about a third of the population is tribal, and in a number of other provinces there are non-Chinese minorities. These minor peoples are survivors of the ancient process, which has already lasted untold centuries, by which the Chinese have spread and infiltrated to the southwest, converting other peoples to the Chinese way of life and eventually absorbing them into the Chinese people.

In the past this process was more social and cultural than political. A new political standard is now coming into being. As a result of the victory in this war of the Chinese themselves, there will inevitably be a wave of nationalism, expressed in demands for independence, among all the peoples of Southeast Asia. Even if they do not immediately achieve independence, their demands for independence will give them a new political consciousness of themselves as national entities. Among the tribal peoples of Southwest China, many are related to peoples in Burma, Thailand, and French Indo-China. If the development of China after the war does not satisfy them politically as well as culturally and economically, it will be only natural for them to be attracted to the nationalism of their kinsmen across the frontiers; and that nationalism, in the years of the immediate future, will undoubtedly be fervid and militant.

During the war years the Chinese have won a unique prestige in Southeast Asia. In the eyes of all the subject colonial peoples they have been the only nation fighting independently for freedom as well as against aggression—and successfully. It is true that the Filipinos fought for their own cause, but they did not fight independently, since the major forces engaged were Americans. The United States is well regarded, because of American willingness to restore

freedom to the Philippines; but the Americans are not regarded as liberators of peoples who are not under American rule. The French, British, and Dutch are universally regarded as nations that will never restore liberty to an Asiatic people if they can help it. The Chinese, though often disliked to a greater or less degree before the war in various Asiatic countries where they settled, have now become the symbol of the aspirations of all Asiatic peoples. This prestige is now a valuable asset. Its value has been brought out by Chiang Kai-shek on more than one occasion. On November 17, 1942, in a message to the New York Herald Tribune Forum on Current Problems, he said:

"Among our friends there has been recently some talk of China emerging as the leader of Asia, as if China wishes the mantle of an unworthy Japan to fall on her shoulders. Having herself been a victim of exploitation, China has infinite sympathy for the submerged nations of Asia, and toward them China feels she has only responsibilities—not rights. . . . China has no desire to replace western imperialism in Asia with an oriental imperialism or isolationism of its own or of anyone else."

In a message to the United Nations on July 6, 1943, he made an unmistakable reference to the colonial peoples:

"As to the peoples under the rule of the enemy or otherwise still having not attained complete freedom, we must likewise help them to be emancipated. The relative speed of emancipation may have to vary in accordance with different cultural levels of different peoples, but it is imperatively desirable that the same principles apply in the emancipation of all peoples."

These declarations are serious politics because China's frontier with colonial Asia is in the southwest.

Somewhat similar considerations apply to Tibet, which borders on India, the greatest stronghold of the whole colonial and imperial system. There is an old controversy here. The British maintain the principle of tripartite negotiation between themselves, Tibet, and China, while the Chinese claim that since Tibet is Chinese territory, there should only be direct negotiation between China and the British authorities.

The Chinese will certainly resist any British attempt to go on dealing with the Tibetans as if they were independent or semi-independent. Yet the Tibetans are in fact semi-independent, and very nationalistic. China would impair its own prestige as the spokesman of Asiatic nationalism by trying to subject Tibet by force to direct Chinese rule. Accordingly, China will probably work for a federal relationship with Tibet, giving the Tibetans local autonomy but keeping the conduct of foreign relations in the hands of the Chinese government.

China's longest land frontier is with the Soviet Union, concerning which there is an important statement by Hu Shih:

"With a common frontier extending nearly 5,000 miles, China and Russia should work out a permanent scheme of peace, nonaggression, mutual assistance, and general security, somewhat along the same lines as the latest British-Soviet Treaty. The historical example of 3,500 miles of undefended common frontier between Canada and the United States can be emulated by China and Russia to our mutual benefit. The peace and prosperity of Asia demand

such a mutual understanding between these two countries which comprise three quarters of the continent."

Here Outer Mongolia is the main subject of controversy; but the controversy is not insoluble. The Mongols claim full sovereignty and independence, and historically and legally they have good arguments. The Chinese claim sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. The Russians, in treaties and agreements with China, recognize the Chinese claim; in treaties and agreements with the Mongols, they recognize the Mongol claim.

This can be made to sound very complicated, but in fact it is not. The Russians have to deal with the people who are across the frontier from them. The Mongols are there; the Chinese are not. The Russians merely indicate that it is not their business either to force the Mongols to accept Chinese rule, or to force the Chinese to recognize Mongol independence.

A federal union between Mongolia and China may be the solution; but this could be achieved only on the basis of equal and peaceful negotiation between the Mongol and Chinese governments. Any attempt to conquer Mongolia would instantly brand China as imperialistic and destroy China's new prestige as the representative of Asiatic liberty and nationalism. Continued Mongol independence would, in any case upset no balance of either principle or power politics, since it has already existed in fact for twenty years.

Sinkiang, which like Outer Mongolia occupies an important sector of the frontier with the Soviet Union, is ruled by a small Chinese minority. Its non-Chinese majority population is not solid, like the population of Mongolia, but divided into many groups. Here the decisive political prob-

lem of the Chinese is to provide a government which offers as much to the non-Chinese peoples as is offered to non-Russians in Soviet territory.

China's other territorial problems are simple. At the end of the war China will recover in full the Northeastern Provinces, Formosa, and the Liuchiu Islands, and will support Korea's claim to independence. This has been clearly and authoritatively stated by many spokesmen. The question of Hong Kong is not primary but secondary. If there is a general decision to terminate the whole colonial order, Hong Kong will be returned to China soon and there will be good feeling between China and Britain. If a determined effort is made to perpetuate the colonial order, Hong Kong may not be returned to China for a long time, and there will be bad feeling between China and Britain.

WHAT ABOUT JAPAN?

There remains the question of the future relations between China and Japan. Chinese bitterness toward Japan is tempered by Chinese wisdom. Though the Chinese government has been cautious in making commitments, there appear to be several basic assumptions among well-informed Chinese:

First: If the Japanese wish to depose their emperor, they should be allowed to do so. There should be no international policy of upholding the emperor as an "alternative" to Japanese militarism, because he is in fact the center and symbol of militarism.

Second: Japan should be deprived of standing armaments, but not of her whole industrial structure. The problem is not one of industries, but of raw materials. These are scarce in Japan's own territory. Japan's power of ag-

gression has been inseparable from her right and power to control raw materials in territories outside of Japan, such as Northeast China. This right and power Japan will no longer have; therefore the Japanese should be allowed open-market access to raw materials anywhere in the world on equal terms with any other country. Not having political control of the sources, Japan can be denied access to them if she makes an attempt at aggressive rearmament.

Third: Japan should not be subjected to prolonged military occupation. China advocates a general and rapid evolution out of the colonial system, and this would be incompatible with reducing the Japanese, as an Asiatic people, to anything even resembling colonial control. China needs a free Japan; and China will undoubtedly buy machinery and other Japanese products, in order to stimulate competition in the prices of the machinery and other products which China will need to buy from all countries.

NEIGHBORS IN A WORLD ORDER

China's future policies toward Japan, toward Russia, and toward colonial Asia, like China's domestic development within the homeland of the 450,000,000 Chinese, will be of primary concern to all men living in the world today. The abolition of the unequal treaties by America and Britain has already symbolized the end of the hundred years of China's semicolonial subjection. China's part in the final victory will give significance to that symbolic act by Britain and America; it will mark the beginning of the end of the colonial system as a whole.

No longer will the destinies of Asia be dictated by imperial powers. Nor, on the other hand, is an Asiatic counter-

imperialism to be expected. Japan tried that and failed. The truth is that we no longer live in a world of "the European question," "the Balkan question," "the Russian question," "the Near Eastern question," "the Indian question," "the Far Eastern question." That era is over. Henceforth we live in a world where there are only local aspects of the world question. Whether we make a success of that new world will depend on the interaction of two things: the success or failure that each nation makes of its own affairs, and the success or failure of all nations in dealing with each other as neighbors in a world order.

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